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Abstract 
This thesis examines the situation of Turkish-speaking boys and girls, mostly aged 14- 
16, in two London boroughs, Hackney and Haringey. It seeks to deconstruct the notion 
of a single Turkish identity. It is also informed by the view that it is necessary to situate 
ethnic differences within a broader socio-economic context. It systematically identifies 
the lives, aspirations and values of these young people with specific reference to ethnic, 
religious, family, education and economic concerns. First of all, the thesis concentrates 
on the construction of the young people's ethnic and religious identities. Secondly, it 
discusses their attitudes towards family issues. Thirdly, the academic performances of 
the Turkish-speaking young people are addressed, and their economic aspirations and 
future perceptions are studied in relation to their parents' economic status. Finally, the 
young people's contacts with their relatives both in London, Turkey, Cyprus and other 
countries are analysed, together with their access to Turkish-speaking television and 
newspapers. 
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There has been growing academic interest in ethnic minorities in the West. In this 
process, quite a substantial amount of research has been produced concerning ethnic 
communities in developed countries. The study of the younger generation has become 
particularly important. As Portes (1996: 2) argues: 
the adaptation of the second generation will be decisive in establishing the long-term 
outlook for contemporary immigration. It is indeed among the second generation, not the 
first, where such issues as the continuing dominance of English, the growth of a welfare- 
dependent population, the resilience of culturally distinct urban enclaves, and the decline 
or growth of ethnic intermarriages will be decided permanently. 
On the other hand, research to date does not seem to have a full understanding of the 
second generation's lives and aspirations. As Rumbault (1996: 122) points out: 
less is known about the subjective aspects of the children's experience... including their 
modes of ethnic or national self-identification, perceptions of discrimination, aspirations for 
their adult futures, cultural preferences, forms of intergenerational cohesion or conflict 
within their families, self-esteem and psychological well-being, and how all these may be 
related to more objective indices of their experience, such as their school and work 
performance and language shifts from the mother tongue to English, in given social 
context. 
In line with these arguments, this thesis is particularly aimed at the study of Turkish- 
speaking young people' . Throughout, the term 'Turkish-speaking' will be used instead 
of 'Turkish'. Since the 1990s the schools and the education authorities have used the 
term 'Turkish-speaking' in order to identify their pupils whose home language is Turkish. 
The term has certain advantages, since it is able to cover various ethnic and religious 
sub-groups. 
'When I use the term 'young people', I am referring to both women and men in general. I prefer 
not to differentiate between the two each time I use the term in order to avoid disrupting the 
readability of the sentences. 
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In the Turkish-speaking 'community' in the UK, there are three basic sub-communities - 
Kurds, Turks and Turkish Cypriots2. The oldest established community is Turkish 
Cypriot. Turkish Cypriot males began to migrate to the UK between 1945 and 1955 
(Sonyel, 1988: 11). Most of the Turkish Cypriot young people in my research were 
second generation, and quite a number were third generation. The Turks came to 
England to find a job after the 1960s, when Europe, and in particular Germany, began to 
accept Turkish workers. Kurds have been in the United Kingdom since the early 1980s. 
Their political status is different from Turkish Cypriots and Turks. They are here as 
political refugees escaping from a dispute in the Eastern part of Turkey. 98 per cent of 
Kurdish young people in the sample had been in the UK for less than ten years, while 88 
per cent of the Cypriots were born in the UK. 
The Turkish-speaking 'community' makes up the largest immigrant community in the 
European Union. Although the majority live in Germany, there are a substantial number 
living in Great Britain. Estimates of the size of this community in Britain are not accurate, 
and there are different calculations. Problems are caused by the structure of the 1991 
census data (Dale and Holdsworth 1997). As Fenton (1996: 152) has discussed, there 
are several ways to determine the size of the ethnic minority population. For the 
purposes of this research, the census question on ethnicity is not useful, because most 
of the Turkish-speaking people were classified as 'white'. The number of people who 
called themselves 'Turkish, not white' was 18,876, including Turkish Cypriots (OPCS 
1993a). However, the number of those born in Turkey was 26,597. Moreover, 78,031 
people were born in Cyprus (OPCS 1993a). 31,189 people lived in households headed 
by someone born in Turkey. Additionally, 118,347 people lived in households headed by 
someone born in Cyprus (OPCS 1993a). A further delineation of Turkish Cypriots and 
Turkish Kurds from this data is not possible. 
Given these restrictions, the census data were used to find the places where the 
Turkish-speaking population was concentrated, rather than to obtain an accurate 
21 use the word 'community' in quotation marks each time I refer to Turkish-speaking people, 
since there are three sub-communities and the thesis seeks to analyse their differences. 
Nevertheless, the Turkish-speaking community is a generic term to describe people who share a 
common language. 
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number. It appears that 10,996 of the 18,876 Turkish population in the UK live in the 
inner London area and 53 per cent of the 10,996 live in Hackney and Haringey (OPCS 
1993c). For this reason, the fieldwork was concentrated in these two boroughs. In fact, 
the latest language survey, of 896,743 schoolchildren in London, found that Turkish is 
the sixth mostly spoken language. There are 15,659 Turkish-speaking schoolchildren in 
London (Baker and Mohieldeen 2000: 5). Turkish-speaking schoolchildren make up 1.74 
per cent of all children in London, while they are 9.9 per cent in Haringey and 10.61 per 
cent in Hackney (Baker and Mohieldeen 2000: 56). Storkey (2000: 65) estimated from 
these figures that the total number of Turkish-speaking people living in London would be 
between 67,600 and 73,900. 
These two areas in which the Turkish-speaking 'community' is concentrated, also 
include various other ethnic minorities. The schools which Turkish-speaking students 
attend have highly concentrated numbers of ethnic minority pupils but, most importantly, 
the Turkish-speaking students are one of the main groups in the schools. A total of over 
a hundred languages are spoken in Hackney and Haringey (OFSTED 1997: 7 and 
Haringey Education Authority). In general, these boroughs are economically very 
disadvantaged. According to the Deprivation Index, which was prepared by the 
Department of the Environment in 1994 (DfE 1994), Hackney and Haringey are two of 
the most deprived areas. Hackney was the third most deprived local authority out of 366, 
and Haringey was tenth. Additionally, the Turkish-speaking students come from 
disadvantaged families in terms of economic prosperity. Most of the Turkish-speaking 
families live in council houses. The unemployment rate of the Kurdish fathers is 
especially high, compared to that of other Turkish-speaking fathers and that of the 
national average. The main economic activity among the community members is small 
shop keeping and working in garment factories. Economic participation is very low 
among the Kurdish mothers, compared to others. 
In recent years, 'Turkish' communities have begun to be investigated, most notably in 
some continental countries, such as Germany and Holland. In the case of the UK, there 
are several studies on Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish community. 
Ladbury (1977) carried out field research in London and in northern Cyprus in the mid 
1970s in order to analyse the inter-ethnic relationships between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots. However, she did not give detailed information about her research regarding 
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the number of cases and methodology. The study concluded that although the 
relationships between the two communities in Cyprus suffered as a result of the 1974 
war, they had reasonably good relationships in London due to individuals' economic 
goals (Ladbury 1977: 327). This research was limited to the Turkish Cypriot community 
and did not reveal any particular information about young people. 
Other research, does however, specifically focus on young people. Ulug (1981), for 
instance, conducted in-depth interviews with five Turkish Cypriot girls and their families 
on a variety of cultural issues and carried out observations in the schools. Ulug (1981: 1- 
2,64) argued that Turkish Cypriot girls felt a considerable amount of alienation, 
confusion and conflict between their own culture (Eastern-Turkish) and English 
(Western) culture. Turkish families, as she observed, were scared of children having 
their moral values loosened by integrating with mainstream culture (1981: 33). 
Sonyel (1988) studied the education problems of Turkish pupils, by surveying 200 
Turkish children aged between fourteen and seventeen years, and 100 parents and 100 
teachers or other educationalists working with these children. Sonyel (1988) found that 
there was a lack of recognition of the Turkish children's own culture and religion and that 
they had difficulties because of this. He commented that: 
Many of them [the children] are ignorant of their own culture: language, religion and 
traditions; and many more are becoming strangers to their own ethnicity. Under the 
influence of British culture, a number of them question, and even reject, their own values 
and traditions. In the confusion created by the conflict of two cultures, they have become 
the victims of the dual-role dilemma (Sonyel 1988: 45). 
He added that unless serious and effective measures were taken at the family, 
community and governmental levels, these children might completely lose their ethnic 
and religious identity in 'the melting pot of Anglo-conformism' (Sonyel 1988: 73). 
Dedezade (1994) studied Turkish-speaking pupils' problems in the schools of north 
London, by interviewing twenty pupils (fourteen boys and six girls) aged between 15 and 
16 years and seventy parents. The research concluded that the parents and the pupils 
were not satisfied with the education system due to the teachers' attitudes towards 
Turkish-speaking pupils, the lack of discipline, the language problems and the lack of 
respect given to their culture (Dedezade 1994: 50). 
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Finally, Kucukcan (1998) conducted research on 93 Turkish and Turkish Cypriot young 
people (42 boys and 51 girls aged 12-18) in London, and found that Turkish young 
people's values under the influence of the socio-cultural values of British society, were in 
conflict with the values of their community presented by their parents (Kucukcan 
1998: 128). 
It might be argued that these studies are either overly concentrated on Turkish Cypriot 
and Turkish young people, or overlook the internal dynamics of the community. The 
studies have a tendency to define a 'Turkish' culture in contrast to a British one, defining 
the young people's situation as caught between two different cultures. By doing this, the 
studies have restricted the understanding of Turkish-speaking young people's lives and 
aspirations within the assimilation and integration debates. Moreover, they usually 
studied young people in an educational context and mention other issues such as family 
and employment only when relevant to the young people's school performance. 
Consequently, these studies have very little to offer in terms of the sectoral and religious 
differentiation and change within the community arising from these internal dynamics. 
This thesis aims to contribute to filling this gap. The thesis consists of five chapters. I 
review the relevant literature in relation to particular topics that form the substance of the 
separate chapters, rather than provide a single overview followed by my own 
investigation. The first chapter considers identity formation among Turkish-speaking 
young people. Initially, it is argued that the studies of ethnic and religious identities in 
general and of Muslim and Turkish identity in particular, usually claim that religious 
(Muslim) identity, as cultural, overrides ethnic identity (Turkish) as social. They then 
impose a distinction between the mainstream social values as secular, western and/or 
Christian and ethnic minority values as religious, traditional and/or Muslim. As against 
this, the chapter concentrates on the evidence regarding the fragmented nature of the 
Turkish-speaking 'community' which creates fractions based on religious and ethnic 
identities. 
These fractions are not held to be creations of a process of interaction with the 
mainstream society, but rather a product of internal processes of interaction between 
various Turkish religious and ethnic groups. In other words, when Turkish-speaking 
young people identify themselves in religious and ethnic terms, their reference point is 
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not British society, nor even other Muslim communities in Britain, but the ethnic and 
religious sectoral differences in the Turkish-speaking 'community'. 
Additionally, the first chapter argues that many current approaches ignore the practical 
implications of religious and ethnic identities due to the fact that they tend to focus on 
the importance of public representation of Muslim identities and the role of community- 
based associations in the public sphere. They pay little attention to the meaning of 
religious and ethnic identities for individuals in the private sphere. 
The second chapter deals with Muslim family stereotypes. Whilst associating Muslim 
family structure with extended family size, a high level of solidarity and patriarchalism, 
earlier studies sometimes ignore changes in Muslim family structure, or explain these 
changes as the assimilationist effects of mainstream societies. In this chapter, it is 
argued that whilst there is a considerable attachment to traditional values, and that 
attitudes towards pre-marital sexual relationships and inter-ethnic marriages are 
generally conservative, this is not the whole of the story. 
Empirical evidence suggests that young people have attitudes that differ considerably 
from a traditional Muslim family understanding, with regards to: the number of children 
they want to have in the future; arranged marriages; extended families and women 
working outside their homes. It will be argued that these kinds of attitudes cannot simply 
be portrayed as the assimilationist effects of the mainstream society. Rather their 
attitudes are not different from those of their own parents. Turkish-speaking families also 
differ in many respects compared to other Muslim families. Therefore, it is crucial to take 
into account the changing family structure in Turkey. 
The third chapter discusses multi-culturalist education policies. In recent years, in order 
to explain the underachievement of ethnic minority students, a growing number of multi- 
culturalist scholars have claimed that the educational failure of ethnic-minority students 
is due to the lack of recognition of their cultural assets. Yet the evidence suggests that, 
although the schools of two boroughs, Haringey and Hackney, adopted a considerable 
set of multi-culturalist policies, the Turkish-speaking students do not show a uniform 
pattern in terms of academic achievement. Besides, there is a wide-spread scepticism 
amongst the Turkish-speaking students and teachers concerning some multi-culturalist 
incentives. 
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The third chapter argues that the Turkish-speaking young people's educational problems 
cannot be encapsulated into the space of cultural debates. It is necessary to take into 
account the effects of their families' economic exclusion3 on their school-life in order to 
understand their problems. To substantiate such an argument, consideration is given to 
the case of the 'work experience scheme'. It is shown that, Turkish-speaking pupils are 
'placed' in the small shops of the Turkish-speaking 'community' in which they are already 
working on a part-time basis and this is likely reinforce their disadvantage. Then, I will 
refer to the educational ambitions of students, and their feelings that education will not 
bring an end to exclusion in their future life. 
The fourth chapter is devoted to a general analysis of the position of Turkish-speaking 
communities in the labour market. The young people's position in the labour market is 
analysed in the context of transition from school to work and their current engagement 
with the labour market through part-time jobs. The evidence shows that the current 
structural changes in the British market economy are bringing about severe 
disadvantages for Turkish-speaking immigrant communities in terms of their employment 
opportunities. Most are pushed into self-employment, or other forms of informal 
community employment, in the ethnic enclave labour markets. 
Turkish-speaking adolescents' perceptions of their economic prospects and their chance 
of having a part-time job are clearly related to their parents' economic situations and the 
existing labour market conditions. In fact, the parents' economic positions are not 
uniform and vary in terms of their place of origin. Although they are located in the same 
deprived labour market and are dependent on the ethnic network to find employment, 
3 There are various meanings of exclusion. Levitas (1998) puts all existing discussions into three 
categories: a redistributionist discourse primarily concerned with poverty, the moral underclass 
discourse centred on the moral and behavioural delinquency of the excluded themselves and, 
finally, a social integrationist discourse focused on paid work. To advance a specific discussion 
about all three categories is beyond the scope of this thesis, yet throughout this thesis, exclusion 
is used in the context of a redistributionist discourse. For a detailed discussion on the exclusion 
issue, see Levitas (1998). Additionally I should add here that I am also using the term exclusion 
descriptively to refer to the facts of economic disadvantage - economic marginalisation etc. 
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the Kurdish families are in the most disadvantaged circumstances, in comparison with 
the Turkish and Cypriot families. 
The fifth chapter shows that the economic disadvantages of ethnic minorities are often 
referred to alongside the concerns over cultural assimilation within transnationalisation 
studies. In recent years, there has been increasing academic attention given to the 
transnationalisation of migrant communities. In this process, the advances in 
transportation systems, credit transactions between ethnic minorities and their relatives 
in different countries, and the globalisation of ethnic-minority media are amongst the 
most frequently cited changes. The chapter considers the association between 
transnationalisation and Turkish-speaking young people's attitudes on several issues in 
relation to the globalisation of ethnic-minority media. Their attitudes are analysed in 
terms of their access to Turkish/Kurdish newspapers and television. 
Finally, the thesis will conclude that the existing identity, understandings and attitudes of 
Turkish-speaking young people cannot simply be regarded as the assimilationist effects 
of the dominant society on young people and that it is also necessary to take into 
account the impacts of changes in social life in Turkey and Cyprus. Nor can their 
problems be understood only within the limits of cultural debates, it is necessary to refer 
to the problems of economic exclusion as well. Likewise, describing certain effects of 
transnationalisation as a way of saving ethnic minorities from the assimilationist effects 
of the dominant society cannot be unreservedly accepted in the case of Turkish- 
speaking young people. 
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Epistemology and Methodology: 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss this thesis in relation to current epistemological 
debates and describe the research method in detail. First of all, I begin with the 
epistemological debate. Then move into a more detailed account of the research method 
I used and a rationale for the strategy I adopted. This will include discussion of my role 
as a researcher vis-a-vis the Turkish-speaking 'community', my overall approach to data 
collection, the sampling, conduct of the interviews and issues around the use of 
language. 
In recent years, the question of the social context of knowledge has been a central 
concern. As Delanty (2000: 111) puts it, the central issue lies in clarifying the extent to 
which social reality is constructed by social sciences. There seem to be two sides to this 
discussion: constructivist and realist. The constructivist concentrates on the question of 
whether reality can be objectively observed or how the scientist constructs the reality. As 
a constructionist, Bourdieu (1995: 10) argues that sociologists occupy a position in 
various struggles, not only class struggles, but also scientific ones. Their position in 
these struggles is first as the possessors of a certain economic and cultural capital, and 
then as researchers endowed with a certain specific capital in the field of cultural 
production. Referring to the sociologist, Bourdieu (1995: 10) states that: 
He [a sociologist] always has to bear this in mind, ... to try to allow for everything that his 
practice, what he sees and does not see, what he does and does not do (for example, the 
objects he chooses to study), owes to his social position. ' 
From a similar position, Millman and Kanter (1987: 31) introduce a feminist model which 
takes into account the researcher's subjective experiences as well as the respondents' 
experiences. They argue that male researchers have difficulties achieving the same 
empathy with female subjects as female researchers and, in this sense, female 
researchers might have an advantage (Millman and Kanter 1987: 35). Likewise, Harding 
(1987: 187) contended that: 
Once we undertake to use women's experience as a resource to generate scientific 
problems, hypotheses, and evidence, to design research for women, and to place the 
researcher in the same critical plane as the research subject, traditional epistemological 
assumptions can no longer be made. 
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Ladner (1987) asserted that her own identity as a black woman growing up in rural 
America helps her to understand the urban black girls' experiences of poverty and 
racism better than other researchers who have studied black people before her from 
white middle class perspectives. 
On the realist side of the argument, on the other hand, the theorists believe the 
existence of the objective reality to be independent of the researcher's position or 
experiences in relation to that reality. Bhaskar (1987: 51) makes a distinction between 
the (relatively) unchanging real objects which exist outside the scientific process and the 
changing (and theoretically - imbued) cognitive objects which are produced within 
science as a function and result of its practice. Trigg (1989: 219) states that everything 
collapses when there is no concept of an objective reality, corresponding to each level of 
science, as a target or goal. Everything is then arbitrary, since there is no point in 
holding to one theory rather than another. Coser (1984: 306) takes a similar stand: 
We deal here with a massive cop-out, a determined refusal to undertake research that 
would indicate the extent to which our lives are affected by the socio-economic context in 
which they are embedded. It amounts to an orgy of subjectivism, a self-indulgent 
enterprise in which perpetual methodological analysis and self-analysis leads to infinite 
regress, where the discovery of the ineffable qualities of the mind of the analyst and 
analysand and their private construction of reality serves to obscure the tangible qualities 
of the world 'out there'. 
In fact, Delanty (2000: 132) argues that the constructivist - realist divide is a false 
dichotomy and the real conflict lies in the various positions of the constructivists from 
postmodernist to feminist. Unlike the postmodernist, for instance, the feminist 
constructionist seeks an objective reality different from a positivist understanding of the 
term. For instance, Bhavnani (1995: 30) introduces three questions in order to assist 
feminist objectivity in scientific work: are the researched reinscribed Into prevailing 
notions of powerlessness? are the micropolitics of the research relationships discussed? 
and how are the questions of difference engaged? 
Then, Bhavnani (1995: 33-36) discusses her own research on young people and politics 
in respect of these three questions. First of all, she does not recognise young working- 
class people as social victims. Secondly, she takes into account her role as student 
researcher, her age, and her assumed class affiliation as sources of potential 
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domination, yet at the same time, her racialised and gendered ascriptions suggest the 
opposite. And finally, she notes that her research study did point to many continuities of 
experience for the young people studied, while there were also non-shared experiences 
and accounts such as those of racism, culture and gender. 
My Position in The Debate: 
Within the scope of the constructivist and realist debate, I could not easily take my stand 
on one side or another. On the one hand, I agree with the constructivist view that my 
background has certain implications in this research. Some of these implications are 
positive and some of them might be regarded as negative. On the positive side, since 
Turkish is my mother tongue, I enjoyed better communication with the young people 
than an English speaking person. Moreover, I can understand better than somebody 
who is not Turkish, the sectoral and ethnic differences in the ways people identify 
themselves and organise their lives. Otherwise, I might not have asked the questions 
about their ethnic and religious identities in detail, and assumed that all belonged to a 
single Muslim Turkish community. Coming from Turkey also alerted me to the ways in 
which changing dynamics of family and community life not only in Britain, but also in 
Turkey, could affect these young people's lives. In addition, being a woman enabled me 
to enjoy a more relaxed communication with the young women, especially on the issues 
of family and sexual relations. Moreover, despite the gender difference, my more mature 
age helped to create a relaxed atmosphere with young men during the interviews. 
On the negative side, although I shared a common language with my respondents, my 
ethnic and socio-economic background is different from that of my respondents. I am not 
from Cyprus nor Kurdish, and, unlike most Turkish young people, I have an urban middle 
class and secular background. Additionally, I came to Britain as a student at the 
university level so my socialisation did not take place in this country. All these could be 
regarded as potential barriers between me and my respondents. Yet, my non-affiliation 
to any specific groups in the sample made it more comfortable for my respondents to 
speak with me. Otherwise, I might have enjoyed good communication with some 
respondents, while creating unease among others because of my background. For 
instance, if I had been heavily identified with a religious position, this might have made 
some Alevi respondents reluctant to discuss the religious issues in more detail with me. 
Likewise, if I was Kurdish or Alevi, this might have put off some Turkish respondents 
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discussing the same issues in detail. Most importantly, since I did not share the same 
socialisation process as the young people, they were more willing to reveal their lives 
more thoroughly in order to make me understand more. 
Furthermore, as Benney and Hughes (1984: 219) point out, where the parties to an 
interview are unsure of their appropriate roles they are likely to have recourse to other 
more firmly delineated roles that will turn the encounter into one where they feel more at 
home. In this regard, my lack of affiliation to any one group enabled most respondents to 
turn our communication into one where they felt more comfortable. 
Apart from recognising the implications of my position on the selection of my research 
subject, the questions and on the conduct of the interviews, I am not a constructivist in 
the sense that I do not believe that there is no objective reality other than the 
researcher's subjective interpretations. Because if this was the case, I, as a sociologist, 
would arguably not need to bother to do any research of any kind, other than to write my 
personal opinions on a certain subject on my desktop. And we as sociologists might find 
ourselves in a situation where anything goes. However, our subjects living in certain 
social, cultural and economic structures or settings have real practical problems. 
Moreover, as Giddens (1987: 215) points out, common awareness of these settings of 
action forms an anchoring element in the 'mutual knowledge' whereby agents make 
sense of what others say and do. In this respect, I tried to reach a mutual understanding 
with my respondents by using our common knowledge in order to understand their 
problems, their lives and aspirations. 
In the context of the relationship between my position on [the question of] the social 
context of knowledge and the methods I used during the interviews, I agree with 
Bryman's (1988: 108) argument on the subject. He states that the difference between 
quantitative and qualitative research is really a technical matter rather than 
epistemological, whereby the choice between them is to do with their suitability in 
answering particular research questions. 
Bryman (1988: 112) also adds that there are similarities in the technical problems 
associated with quantitative and qualitative research. The problem of the role of the 
researcher is the problem for both techniques. The second problem is related to our 
instrument's ability to capture the daily life and conditions, opinions and values of 
respondents in their "natural habitat". This problem occurs in various ways such as the 
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wording in the questionnaire and the availability of the necessary knowledge to answer a 
question on the part of the respondent. Thirdly, although survey interviews might be 
criticised for relying on attitudes and people's reports of their behaviour, both of which 
may bear little relation to actual behaviour, it would be difficult to assume that qualitative 
techniques, especially participant observation, have a technical advantage in this 
respect by virtue of the researcher's ability to observe behaviour directly. In a sense that 
it might be assumed participant observation would be better for 'capturing' behaviour 
rather than decontextualised attitudes in a survey, since it is observation of people in 
their 'natural' context. However, unless the researcher lied about his or her identity, there 
is no guarantee that he or she able to capture the respondents' 'natural behaviour' in 
their 'natural' habitat. Fourth, some of the unstructured interviews might take a more 
formal, ordered character like survey data collection and this might have an adverse 
effect on the qualitative depth of the data. When all these common problems are taken 
into account, Bryman (1988: 126) contends that when quantitative and qualitative 
research are jointly pursued, much more complete accounts of social reality can ensue. 
In this sense, I used various methods ranging from structured interviews to focus groups 
and observations. My intention was to achieve both depth and systematic coverage. 
Research Techniques and Sampling: 
In this study, I mainly conducted interviews with a structured questionnaire, and also 
held two focus group discussions, and carried out intensive observations and 
unstructured interviews with several parents and teachers. In this way, I was able to gain 
as much information as possible. Although in-depth interviews might have allowed me to 
concentrate on a particular issue with only a small number of cases, it would have been 
difficult to draw a representative sample for in-depth interviews. Besides, in order to 
answer the question why the young people had certain attitudes, aspirations and ideas, 
first of all I needed to know what these attitudes were and how typical these attitudes 
were among the young people. In order to answer these questions, I needed a 
considerable sample of young people which would have been very time consuming and 
difficult to achieve by the in-depth interview technique. The following section will give 
detailed information about the techniques I used and the nature of my sample. 
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Sample: 
The initial aim had been to achieve a large number of self-completed questionnaires, 
covering all age ranges in the secondary schools in Hackney and Haringey where the 
majority of the Turkish-speaking people live, and then interview a small sample of the 
students in depth. But it was realised during the pilot study covering whole age groups in 
a girls' school in Haringey that most of the students, especially from Kurdish origins, 
could barely read English or Turkish, and could only speak Turkish. Consequently, I 
decided to interview students between 14 and 16 years old, because they are a 
relatively homogeneous group in terms of employment and marital status compared to 
older young people. Besides they are at the final stage of their compulsory education 
and will make a transition from school life to adult life sooner than their younger 
counterparts. Students between 14 and 16 years old also concentrated on questions 
much better than younger age groups. Moreover, interviewing seemed better suited to 
young people, in order to minimise the possibility that they might misread or 
misunderstand some of the items in a questionnaire. Preliminary interviews and data 
gathering began in 1996. After a short pilot study, the rest of the fieldwork took one and 
half years to complete and was conducted between 1997 and mid 1998. 
All the secondary schools in Hackney and Haringey were first contacted by telephone in 
order to ascertain whether they had a Turkish-speaking population. Subsequently, those 
schools which confirmed having Turkish-speaking pupils, were asked for their 
permission to undertake the research, by letter to the head teachers. In this way, 
seventeen schools were contacted. In the end few schools were willing/able to co- 
operate. Only four schools responded positively (two in Hackney and two in Haringey) 
and further contacts were made with these schools in order to explain the nature of the 
research. Once personal contact was established with heads of the Section 11 and 
deputy heads of the schools, it proved less difficult but getting that far was a problem. 
After several meetings with the head teachers or their deputies or the staff responsible 
for ethnic minority students, the schools took over the responsibility for organising a 
detailed timetable of interviews and allocating a private room for the duration of the 
fieldwork. Only one systematic classroom observation was undertaken, although the 
students were observed informally in all schools during their break times. 
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The sample was drawn from a number of schools in Haringey and Hackney. Interviews 
were conducted with 206 Turkish-speaking young persons, 103 girls and 103 boys, aged 
mainly between 14-16. There were 117 young people (56 girls and 61 boys) from 
Haringey and 89 (47 girls and 42 boys) from Hackney. Over half of the interviews (125) 
were conducted in four comprehensive schools, two (a mixed and a girls' school) in 
Hackney and two (again a mixed and a girls' school) in Haringey. In the sample, 45 girls 
were from a girls' school, six girls and 37 boys from a mixed school in Haringey. There 
were 14 girls from a girls' school and 16 girls and seven boys from a mixed school in 
Hackney. Nineteen students (three girls and 16 boys) from another Haringey mixed 
school were interviewed outside the school premises, mainly in their homes. The rest of 
the students (62) were selected from two (Turkish-speaking) Sunday Community 
Schools. Ten of those (two girls and eight boys) were from other Haringey schools and 
others (17 girls and 35 boys) were from Hackney schools. In the Sunday Community 
Schools, several classroom observations were also carried out. The schools arranged 
the interviews and they approached to the suitable pupils first and asked their 
permission to be interviewed. I interviewed all the suitable pupils in each school and 
none of them refused to be interviewed. 
I am aware of the fact that where people live can have a considerable effect on their life 
chances, aspirations and quality of life. However, in the case of this research, Haringey 
and Hackney have more similarities than differences in terms of economic conditions, 
social and cultural relations. As mentioned in the introduction to the thesis and 
discussed thoroughly in later chapters, however, it is necessary to mention here that 
these areas, in which the Turkish-speaking 'community' is concentrated, include various 
other ethnic minorities and are also two of the most deprived areas in Britain. 
Furthermore, regardless of where they lived and which school they attended, the young 
people's responses, attitudes and aspirations seemed to be in line with where they or 
their families came from. The Turkish-speaking students came from disadvantaged 
families in terms of economic prosperity. Most of the Turkish-speaking families lived in 
council houses. The unemployment rate of Kurdish fathers was especially high 
compared to that of other Turkish-speaking fathers and that of the national average. 
The socio-economic background of the young people varied in terms of ethnic origins, 
rather than the school they attended (see chapter 4). The schools which Turkish- 
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speaking students attended have various numbers of other ethnic minority pupils as well 
but, most importantly, the Turkish-speaking students were one of the main groups in the 
schools. In relation to the GCSE results of the young people, the school differences 
would obviously have been very important, yet, in order to assess the implications of 
these differences, it would have been necessary to concentrate on the schools' 
curricula, the teachers' profiles, the schools' reports and how the teaching was 
conducted, etc. in more detail than was actually possible for this thesis. Then, it could be 
said that although all the students' backgrounds were more or less similar, the school A 
seemed more successful than school B because of the reason C or D. 
As can be appreciated, this would have required a different project than that conducted 
here. I was given access in the school to the pupils but not to background data on the 
individual pupils' achievements and only to one classroom situation (one lesson) in one 
school. Nevertheless, as far as the scope of the present research is concerned, the 
differences between Hackney and Haringey in terms of the young people's overall 
GSCE results (i. e. they are for the cohort not on a pupil by pupil basis which would have 
enabled me to correlate data from my interview responses from particular pupils with 
their achievement records) will be mentioned in chapter 3 in order to substantiate an 
argument that multi-cultural education policies might not be sufficiently adequate in 
themselves to guarantee students' continued success. 
In the sample, one hundred and sixteen of the young people (56%) had been in the UK 
less than ten years, while nine (4%) had been in this country more than ten years. 
Further, eighty one young people in the sample (39%) had been born in Britain. Almost 
all the young Cypriots had been born in this country, while all the Kurdish young people 
had been here less than ten years (nine in ten Cypriot, six in ten Turkish but only one in 
ten Kurdish young people had been born in Britain). Because of these different 
proportions this variable was not represented as an independent variable throughout the 
analysis, and, the relevance of being born in this country is only mentioned in specific 
contexts. 
One hundred and seventy five young people (85%) came from two parent households. 
All of the parents were married in these households, so there were no cohabiting 
parents. There were 166 young people (81%) that had no other family member in their 
households apart from their mother, father and siblings. Of the young people, 44% had 
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only one sibling and 36% had two siblings. Only 20% of the young people had more than 
three siblings. All these household characteristics are discussed in detail in the family 
chapter, i. e. chapter 2. 
There were four categories of young people in the sample in terms of place of origin: 
Kurdish, Turkish, Cypriot and mixed origin. The number of Kurdish, Turkish and Cypriot 
young people were 92,34 and 50 respectively. There were thirty young people of mixed 
origin in the sample: their mothers and fathers did not have common origins. In the 
mixed origin category, there were nine young people with one parent from outside the 
Turkish-speaking 'community'. Another ten had one Turkish and one Kurdish parent. 
Eight had one Turkish and one Cypriot parent and only three had one Kurdish and one 
Cypriot parent. I am aware of the fact that people bundled up together in a loose 
category like 'mixed' would vary in terms of their responses on a number of issues, yet 
with a sample of 206 respondents, their number on their own would not be sufficient for 
the purposes of statistical analysis. However, on a number of occasions, I will mention 
these variances in response in the mixed category in relation to specific issues. Besides, 
more detailed data on the young people in relation to the ethnic origin and identity is 
provided in the substantive chapters. 
Interviews: 
At each interview, confidentiality and anonymity were assured. At the beginning of the 
fieldwork, I thought that it might be useful to have each respondent's name in order to 
access their GCSE results through the school after the fieldwork. However, I then 
realised that this technique might diminish the relaxed atmosphere of the communication 
I had managed to construct therefore I abandoned this strategy. Other than the 
confidentiality issue, I promised respondents that I would never discuss any issue raised 
during the interviews with their schools or their families on an individual basis. 
The interviews lasted between an hour and one and a half hours. On a couple of 
occasions, young people were interviewed together with their friends in compliance with 
their wishes to do so. On these occasions, the young people were allowed to discuss 
some issues in the questionnaire with each other and these discussions were also noted 
on the questionnaire either during the discussions or immediately afterwards. The 
students seemed to enjoy themselves during the interviews, especially the girls who 
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were very keen to discuss their families, school experiences, aspirations, expectations, 
and ideals. Language and translation issues are discussed below. 
Nine Turkish-speaking teachers were also included in the fieldwork. Extensive 
unstructured interviews were conducted with four of them, while the contribution of the 
rest was limited to their opinions on specific issues. Only one of these interviews was 
tape recorded. This was transcribed and only relevant parts were translated into English. 
Only five non-Turkish-speaking teachers were involved in the fieldwork. Although none 
of them were formally interviewed, their opinions on several issues were noted. Most of 
the interviews with the other teachers and parents were not tape recorded, since it was 
realised that they were more relaxed without a tape recorder. After the initial data 
gathering, two London Borough Education Authorities were contacted to obtain 
statistical data on Turkish-speaking pupils' GSCE results. 
Apart from the students, parents and the teachers, the heads of three organisations 
were also interviewed: an organisation for elderly Turkish people; an organisation for 
Turkish-speaking women; and an educational organisation for Turkish-speaking 
students. The interview with the head of the educational organisation was tape recorded. 
Observation: 
Data were also included from direct observations of some of the students (both boys and 
girls) in their home and in their free time. Each of these observations was recorded in 
great detail immediately after each occasion. In addition, after analysing the interview 
data, focus group discussions were held with two groups of young people, five boys and 
five girls separately at a school. The girls and boys discussed the various issues 
mentioned in the questionnaire thoroughly. Both of these discussion were tape recorded 
and transcribed in Turkish and then the relevant parts were translated into English. 
Twelve families were observed both in and outside their home settings. Again all these 
observations were documented immediately afterwards. Continued contact with seven of 
these families throughout the fieldwork was achieved, but the rest of the parents (both 
mothers and fathers) were interviewed only once. I did not use tape recorders during 
these interviews, but took notes. During the fieldwork, I stayed with a couple of Turkish- 
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speaking families. These families helped me to find other families and introduced me to 
those young people who were interviewed outside school hours. 
During the fieldwork, all the time apart from the interviews, I was together with the young 
people and their families. I socialised with the women a little more than the men. 
However, during the family visits, weddings I had plenty of chances to spend time with 
the men as well. When I was with a family, they treated me as a visitor. We ate, watched 
television or went shopping together. We chatted about various issues such as families, 
make up, shopping, politics, television and life in general. These interactions were very 
informal. I also helped some of the family members during their doctor, school or council 
appointments. I translated their letters or made phone calls on their behalf. 
Additionally, two textiles factories; a community meeting on International Women's Day; 
and several weddings and circumcision ceremonies were observed. During all these 
occasions, all relevant incidents were noted and immediately afterwards written down in 
detail. The families took me to the factories and the meetings. At one of the factories, the 
people (men and women) were paid on piece work and they had a little time to talk with 
me, but nevertheless I watched them and I talked with the ironers and some cutters. At 
the second factory, I had a chance to speak with the workers. These were very informal 
conversations. The working conditions in both factories were bad with poor air 
circulation, noise, dirty toilets and lavatories and crowded. 
When I attended the wedding and circumcision ceremonies, I was introduced to the 
other families by the family I went with. I spoke to both men and women of varying ages, 
but usually women in these ceremonies. Apart from these, I approached to the young 
people (both girls and boys) and chatted with them. 
Analyses: 
At the end of the fieldwork, the quantitative data were analysed on the computer using 
SPSS (Statistical Programme for Social Sciences). I used cross tabulation to explore the 
relationships between variables. Since I mostly explored the relationship between more 
than two variables and the number of cases in each cell was not sufficient, in all the 
Tables I give the raw numbers for each category and use the percentages for each cell. 
However, when the numbers are less than twenty in a category, I put their raw numbers 




aim was to achieve a large sample size, yet I was unable to do this for the reasons 
outlined above. In each table, the total may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
In addition, the quantitative data were supported and supplemented by the qualitative 
analysis of discussions, observations and interviews, which were usually translated from 
Turkish into English. After analysing quantitative data, I checked all qualitative data to 
clarify and discuss the cross-table results in detail. In fact, especially focus group 
discussions helped me considerably in this process, since I conducted them after 
finishing the analysis of the quantitative data and I use the focus group to discuss some 
important results in relation to job aspirations, community belonging, friendship patterns, 
the role of the education or gender roles thoroughly. 
The language throughout the interviews and focus group discussions was mainly 
Turkish, but on several occasions the interviews were conducted in English. Some 
young people preferred to use both languages; starting with one and continuing with 
another or by using some English words when they spoke Turkish, and vice versa. Since 
I kept detailed notes of my observations and interviews with teachers and the parents 
and the discussions of the young people during the interviews and tape recorded the 
focus group discussions and some of the interviews, I had a considerable quantity of 
qualitative data. I transcribed all the recorded data, but did not translate all of it into 
English. I only translated the data used in the thesis to support the argument, to 
substantiate the quantitative material, and stick as closely as possible to the original. 
This was also the case for other qualitative data. I did not translate all of it in English. I 
only translated those which I have explicitly and fully reported here. 
I am aware that translation from one language to another might lose some of the 
meaning, yet I did my best to reduce this to minimum. In fact, the risk of losing the 
meaning does not only belong to cross-cultural studies. For some theorists, language is 
important in every research project aimed at examining and delineating aspects of a 
social context in which we are prone to assume everyone "speaks the same language" 
(Deutscher 1984: 239). 
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1. Religious and Ethnic Identities: 
Studies on ethnic and religious identities in general and Muslim and Turkish identity in 
particular, usually claim that religious (Muslim) identity as culture overrides ethnic 
identity (Turkish) as social, and then they impose distinctions between mainstream 
social values as secular, western and/or Christian and ethnic minority values as 
religious, traditional and/or Muslim. These approaches also have a tendency to ignore 
the practical implications of religious and ethnic identities. Instead, they focus on the 
importance of public representation of Muslim identities, and the role of the community 
based associations in the public sphere, while overlooking the meaning of religious and 
ethnic identities for individuals in the private sphere. 
In this chapter, I will argue that the Turkish-speaking 'community' is a case which 
challenges those understandings in some respects. The Turkish-speaking adolescents' 
ethnic and religious identities should not be analysed mainly in terms of the conflict 
between the values of the mainstream society and the values of the Turkish-speaking 
'community'. The sources of their ethnic and religious identity are the conflicts that have 
existed in the community for centuries (Enneli 1996). The basis of their identity is 
'Muslim Turkish Cypriot', 'Muslim Turk', 'Alevi Turk, 'Muslim Kurd' and 'Alevi Kurd'. Apart 
from having religious and ethnic identities as a symbol, some members of the ethnic 
minority groups also observe religious practice individually, without participation in the 
activities of religious organisations. 
The chapter is composed of three parts. In the first, the theoretical questions raised in 
the literature will be examined with specific reference to Muslim communities in Britain. 
In the second part, the role of religion in the public sphere in the Turkish-speaking 
'community' will be discussed in the context of Muslim associations and organisations. In 
the final part, the role of religion in private sphere will be studied in the context of 
religious self-identification and the religious practices of both the young persons and 
their families. 
1.1 Theoretical Introduction: 
In the literature, it is often assumed that religious identities are cultural and ethnic 
identities are social. Rex (1991) connects ethnic identities with interactions of people in 
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their social settings, whilst cultural identities, which involve religious identity as well, are 
not products of ad hoc interactions of individuals or groups but are inherited from the 
past and impose themselves on the present. Rex (1991: 13) argues that: 
the population who share a culture may be larger or smaller than that whose members are 
involved in group action or who share an ethnicity. The two populations may not 
completely coincide. Hence it is necessary to see cultural identity as something distinct 
from group or ethnic identity. 
In the case of Turkish-speaking young people, it seems difficult to draw a line between 
ethnic and religious identities at the base of 'social' and `cultural'. As far as my data on 
Turkish and Muslim identities are concerned, they are both cultural and social. Their 
identities might be called 'culturally constructed social identities'. Moreover, their 
religious and ethnic identities are mixed with each other, they are not separated. 
The second concern in the literature relates to the nature of the relationship between 
religious and ethnic identities. Is it possible to identify a religious group as a part of a 
larger ethnic group? As Barot (1993: 7) argues, 
Although it is perfectly possible to show that links do exist between a particular group and 
their religion in specific cases, there is no more a one-to-one relationship between ethnicity 
and religion than there ever was between race and culture. 
In contrast with Barot's (1993) reservation about a one-to-one relationship between 
ethnicity and religion, Basit (1997) has endorsed a collective Muslim identity which 
embraces different ethnic groups: 
While British Muslims are not a homogeneous group, a collective Muslim identity 
transcends the regional and sectarian differences when living in a non-Muslim country 
which is their adopted homeland (Basit 1997: 437). 
On the other hand, some studies show that ethnic minority groups choose several ethnic 
identities, instead of one. When Lyon (1997) studied the relationship between being 
'British', being 'Pakistani' and being 'Asian', he discovered that in daily life these are not 
conflicting identities, but reflect a different status in different circumstances. 'British' 
identity refers to a political and cultural status. 'Pakistani', 'Bangladeshi' or 'Indian' 
identities are cultural and 'Black' or 'Asian' show political alliances. Furthermore, in all 
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different sorts of identifications, Lyon saw the acknowledgement of boundaries as 
crucial. He argues that: 
'Ethnicity' involves a classification based on duality. Logically, ethnicity expresses 
relationships of both inclusion and exclusion. It is a classification involving a set and its 
subset. An ethnic group, then, is an acknowledged subset of an acknowledged set; all 
members of A are also members of B; some members of B are also members of A (Lyon 
1997: 187). 
There are several studies to show the difficulties in identifying a single Muslim 
community. Andrews (1993), for instance, identifies different Muslim groups in both 
Pakistan and the UK with special reference to Jamaat-i-Islami. He argues that the 
movement of Jamaat-i Islami found support from middle class intellectual Muslims but is 
not supported by rural people, who believed in traditional Islam. 
Similarly, Eade (1993) studies the tensions between the 'real' local people and Muslim 
outsiders in two areas of London, Tower Hamlets and Ealing. Whilst highlighting the 
struggles of a Muslim community trying to build their own public space in a non-Muslim 
environment, the article is interesting because it illustrates the variety of Muslim groups 
who are seeking recognition. In the case of Tower Hamlets, until the early 1980s, the 
members of the Bangladeshi community defined their needs in secular terms such as 
housing and education, for instance. The defeat of the Labour party in the 1986 borough 
election broke the alliance of this secular Bangladeshi group with white radicals and the 
weak influence of secular activists strengthened the position of those Bangladeshis who 
wished to emphasise the Islamic needs of the community. Then, two Mosque 
organisations came on the scene to fight for their interests. One of the Mosques 
belonged to the Bangladeshi Community and was controlled by the Bangladeshi High 
Commission in London, and the other mosque was financed by Arab states in the Middle 
East. The first one had a low profile, but the second one drew attention to itself by 
broadcasting the calls to prayer (azzan). The white local residents are against both of 
the mosques under the guise of the preservation of historical buildings and noise 
pollution etc. 
In fact, religious and ethnic identities do not always overlap. All groups we can call 
Muslim can differ from each other in terms of their religious practice and their perceived 
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religious identities. This differentiation can create boundaries between them such that on 
occasions some of the group members feel alienated, and totally excluded. 
The third concern in the literature in relation to how ethnic and religious identities are 
defined and shaped, is the relationship between the dominant groups and ethnic minority 
groups: the roles of dominant groups, and other minorities and what the internal 
dynamics are within a specific group. The studies usually focus on the effect of dominant 
societies on the ethnic and religious identities of ethnic minority groups. For instance, 
Ullah (1985) in his study of second-generation Irish young people in catholic schools, 
argues that Irish group formation depends on how the group is viewed negatively by 
those in the English culture. Some of them totally ignore their Irish identity and define 
themselves as 'English', but some of them reject negative Irish stereotypes and create 
their own negative English stereotypes such as 'selfish English' or 'boring English'. 
Kuusela's (1993) main argument in the study of Turkish Muslims in Sweden is that 
residential, economic and social segregation of Turkish Muslims, combined with 
increasing anti-migrant feelings among the Swedish people in response to a 
deteriorating economic situation, along with the disappearing prospect of returning to 
Turkey all made Turkish cultural identity stronger than before. Kuusela (1993: 48) points 
out that: 
They turned to Islam as it constitutes a very basic framework for Turkish cultural identity. 
This is especially relevant for people with close connections to village life. 
Other studies too assume that there is an increasing sympathy among the second 
generation young people with involvement in religious activities due to the economic, 
social and cultural disadvantages they face in Western societies. In this sense, religion 
is analysed as a mechanism to escape from the pressure of their difficulties. In her study 
of West Yorkshire Muslim women, Afshar (1993) argues that racism in education and at 
work destroys the delicate balance of conflicting values and identities that third 
generation girls, in particular, had maintained over the years. She suggests that: 
With the racial lines drawn and the Muslims as a community threatened, many amongst 
the youngest generation found that they had no choice other than returning to the fold and 
suspending all criticism of the biraderi. They have chosen to return to Islam, the religion 
that offers them a sense of identity, of belonging not only to a small immigrant minority, but 
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to a vast, vibrant and vocal community, an umma that is prepared to defend the cause 
against all odds (Afshar 1993: 66). 
Basit (1997) disagrees with the idea of a conflicting culture between home and school 
for British Muslim girls. Nevertheless, she observes that young children adopt what they 
like in British culture and reject what they dislike in it, and by doing this they create 
multiple ethnic identities. The girls in her study do not seem to have conflicts about 
freedom and control with their parents and they want to become effective members of 
British society through education, without losing their Islamic religion (Basit 1997: 436). In 
a similar study, Jacobson (1997) however argues that young British Pakistanis prefer 
having a Muslim identity only, which is perceived as universal and clear-cut, instead of 
having multiple identities. 
There are three problems in this conceptualisation of ethnic minority values versus 
mainstream values. One problem relates to religious differences between the dominant 
society and minorities. Is it Christianity versus a Muslim minority? If this is so, it is difficult 
to define a single Christian community. Differences exist not only in Muslim communities 
but in Christian communities as well. Nesbitt (1993) studied children who are Irish 
Catholics, Orthodox Greek Cypriots, Ukrainian Catholics and finally Punjabi Christians in 
Coventry. She found that their churches are the centre of cultural continuity, as 
reminders of children's separateness from mainstream British Christian traditions. 
Another problem relates to the ethnic or 'racial' identity of the dominant group. Is it 
'English' versus ethnic minority? In fact, on some occasions, the English 'white' values 
can be articulated with values of 'black' communities in order to create nationalist 
discourse against other ethnic minority groups at the local level. Back (1993) studied the 
white peer groups' identity in relation to local neighbourhood culture, black peer groups 
and Vietnamese young people. He suggests that, at a local level, the idea of sharing 
neighbourhood and cultural syncretism including common macho attitudes result in 
inclusion of Afro-Caribbean children into the White peer groups, whilst excluding 
Vietnamese children as cultural outsiders. 
Finally, the analysis of ethnic and religious identities in the context of conflict between 
majority and ethnic minority values under-emphasises the importance of differences 
within an ethnic minority group. Nye's work (1993) on the 'Hindu' community in 
Edinburgh emphasises two main groups in terms of place of origin: Gujuratis and 
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Punjabis. These two groups had different religious ceremonies, though they are both 
'Hindu'. They managed to build a common temple and celebrate certain religious 
festivals which are shared by both Gujuratis and Punjabis. On the other hand, during the 
Nawratri festival, which is not as popular among Punjabis as is it among Gujuratis, there 
is far less emphasis upon the common forms used at other times. She argues that: 
Cultures are, of course, dynamic products of complex social situations. But too often the 
stress is put upon looking for cultural change in terms of reaction to external influences, 
rather than looking at the internal dynamics within cultures that lead to change. This is 
especially true of the study of religions among minority ethnic groups, where complex 
traditions are reduced to being mere expressions of a vague sense of ethnic or cultural 
identity (Nye 1993: 123). 
In the light of these discussions, it can be argued that ethnic identity is not necessarily a 
result of ethnic minority and majority group conflict. In his study of Turkish ethnic identity 
in the Netherlands, Verkuyten (1997: 583) argues that this way of conceptualising ethnic 
identity is: 
a restricted and one-sided view of the process of self-definition among people from ethnic 
minority groups. On the one hand, it ignores or underestimates the importance of continuity 
or the imagined history and culture of these groups. On the other hand, it implies a 
tendency to place ethnic minority members in a position of helpless victims. 
He shows that when Turkish people talk about their identity and their place in Dutch 
society, they separate themselves from not only Dutch society and other foreigners, but 
from traditional Turks and first generation Turks as well. However, these different 
features of their identity are not in contradictory positions, rather they complement each 
other (Verkuyten 1997: 572-577). 
Furthermore, some of the studies show the effects of the homeland of immigrants in 
creating ethnic and religious identities. Lewis (1997: 126) argues that: 
Developments in communications technology, transport and information, mean that 
contextualised local versions of Hinduism, Islam or Sikhism will have to be located within 
such a global perspective. This means that Britain is not immune to the impact of inter- 
religious tensions in South Asia or the Middle East, and this renders any homogenising 
discourse about black or Asian identity increasingly problematic. 
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In the analysis of religious beliefs among West Indian, Indian and Muslim immigrants in 
Britain, Rex (1993) observed that, in each group, there are a variety of religious sects 
corresponding to the members' places of origin or their economic and social positions in 
Britain. For instance, Sikhs have more sympathy with working class and Labour politics 
and they are more likely to be members of the Marxist Indian Workers Association, 
which provides a bridge with domestic labour. However, at the same time, they continue 
to be involved in the politics of the Punjab and they are divided in terms of their attitude 
to an independent state of Khalistan. Rex (1993: 19) argues that: 
In the contemporary European societies today we have a wide range of religious and 
ethnic groups whom we have to understand as developing their beliefs and practices not 
merely in relation to the world of the here and now, but in relation to past and distant social 
and political contexts. 
Tatla (1993) studies the relationship between homeland politics and religious institutions 
in Britain in the case of the Punjabi community. He points out that after the invasion of 
the Golden-temple in 1984, many Sikhs in Britain began to support independence for 
their homeland. The political interests of both the Indian and British Governments put 
extra pressure on British Sikhs who support independent Khalistan. Tatla (1993: 106) 
argues that: 
events since 1984 may have turned this confident ethnic community into a psychological 
state of 'homelessness' and the idea of a sovereign Khalistan has, perhaps for that reason, 
found a distinct chord of endorsement from a section of the community. 
There is also a lack of studies to show the practical implications of religious and ethnic 
identities. Instead, they focus on the importance of public representation of Muslim 
identities, and the role of the community based-associations in the public sphere, while 
ignoring the meaning of religious and ethnic identities for the individuals in the private 
sphere. Indeed, ethnic and religious identities can bring members of ethnic minority 
groups together with a common goal, such as having a Mosque in the area, the 
introduction of religious education in schools or having weekend classes in their own 
language for the pupils. The ethnic and religious organisations are also taken into 
account as representatives of the communities at official level. They might be seen as 
the recognised 'voice' of the community. 
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Although religious and ethnic organisations are important places to study the cultural 
and social characteristics of ethnic minority communities, the lack of participation in 
these kinds of organisations does not necessarily mean that ethnic and religious 
identities are not important for these communities in their private sphere. 
Modood (1997a: 297) points out that religion is central to the self-definition of the majority 
of South Asian people, given that 96 per cent and 95 per cent of Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis respectively in his research identified themselves as Muslim (Modood 
1997a: 298). This is more or less true for the Turkish-speaking young people as well. The 
majority call themselves Alevi or Muslim. In this sense, if the practical implications of 
these identities such as fasting, praying and mosque attendance, are taken aside, it 
might well be assumed that these identities are indeed very important for the young 
people. 
However, as far as existing literature is concerned, there is no detailed research in this 
area. Although Modood (1997a) has some findings about attendance at religious 
services including Church, Hindu temples and Mosques, his research did not include 
other religious practices. Sixty five per cent of the South Asian Muslim men and 48 per 
cent of the women who are aged between 16 and 34 visit mosques once a week or more 
(Modood 1997a: 304). 
Four points emerge so far. Firstly, both religious and ethnic identities are cultural and 
social. Secondly, we cannot talk about a single Muslim community. Thirdly, religious and 
ethnic identities are not necessarily a product of the conflict between the values of the 
mainstream society and immigrants. The other ethnic minority groups and the different 
values within an ethnic minority group due to the cultural and social heritage of the 
homeland country of immigrants are also important. Finally, ethnic and religious 
identities should be analysed in two areas of the minorities' lives: public and private. 
Within this context, the following sections will analyse Turkish-speaking young people's 
ethnic and religious identities. 
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1.2 Religion and Ethnicity in the public life of the Turkish-Speaking 
`Community': 
1.2.1 Sub-groups in the Turkish-speaking `Community': 
The Turkish-speaking 'community' divides into two religious groups. It is also made up of 
three sub-communities in terms of differences in their place of origin. Moreover, political 
alliances cause a number of divisions in the community. The differences based on these 
political distinctions derive from developments in Turkey and Cyprus, and in the Turkish 
communities in other countries. In the following sections, these differences will be 
discussed in the context of the political and social developments in Turkey and Cyprus 
and in the context of Turkish community associations in Europe. 
Heckmann (1997) studied Turkish community organisations in both a German and 
French town. She observed divisions among the communities affected by political 
alliances in Turkey. She chose two community organisations in order to show the 
struggle among Turks, between Turks and other ethnic groups and between Turks and 
the authorities. Heckmann (1997: 107) argues that: 
Despite their recent emergence, Turkish migrant associational activities are only partly 
shaped by local factors. Both in France and in Germany, powerful transnational 
organisations act upon Turkish migrants as sources of both information and political 
motivations. As a result, associational activities have expanded across national 
boundaries, be it from Turkey to Germany and France, or from Germany to France, often 
despite legal and organisational barriers and borders. 
The following sub-sections will identify the background of these distinctions in more 
detail with reference to historical development in Turkey and Cyprus. 
1.2.1.1 Alevis and Sunni Muslims: 
There are two religious sects among the Turkish-speaking 'community': Sunnis and 
Alevis. Alevi faith is a form of Shiism which emphasises the importance of All in addition 
to Allah and Mohammed. Ali was the husband of Mohammed's only child and father of 
Mohammed's two grandsons, Hasan and Huseyin. Together, All, his sons and next nine 
generations came to be called the 12 Imams (Dierl 1991: 94-115). However, apart from a 
belief in All and the 12 Imams, the Alevi sect differs from Shiism, as well as Sunni Islam 
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in terms of political and social relations. While the Sunni religion is more conservative 
and more strict in religious practice, Alevis are often regarded as nearer to left wing 
political parties and Kemalist who support the ideas of Kemal Ataturk (Ercan 1997). 
The lives and teaching of the 12 Imams rather than the 'Quaran' are the basis of Alevi 
philosophy. Alevis believe that the first three Caliphates after the death of Mohammed 
were deviant and distorted the original messages of the Quaran, while creating their own 
'Quaran' referring to the existing 'Holy Book' of Sunni Islam to serve their interest. Most 
importantly these Caliphs killed Ali and caused the death of Mohammed's only child, 
Ali's wife Fatma, and later they killed Ali's two sons. 
There are also differences in the religious practices of Sunni Muslims and Alevis. Alevis, 
unlike Sunni Muslims usually do not go to mosques and do not pray. On the other hand, 
they have their own religious ceremonies called 'Cem' and the place called 'Cem Evi' 
(Place of Cem). But (as far as Alevis are concerned) Cem Evi is not as distinct as a 
Mosque, for any house or a building which allows people to come together could be 
called 'Cem Evi'. Both men and women participate in these ceremonies together under 
the supervision of a person called 'Dede' (Grandfather). 'Dedes' are the persons who are 
believed to be descendants of the 12 Imams. Unlike the ceremony in the mosque, music 
and dance are at the centre of 'Cem' ceremonies and the latter have no definite 
timetable. In the villages in Turkey, the ceremonies are held once a week during the 
winter time, but not regularly. In fact, in Europe, the 'Cem' ceremonies are not conducted 
very often at all (Ercan 1997). Alevis fast, but not for thirty days. They fast only twelve 
days of the year in memory of the 12 Imams. 
1.2.1.2 Turks, Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Kurds: 
In Cyprus, Turks are Sunni Muslims. However, there are differences between Sunni 
Muslims in Cyprus and on mainland Turkey. In Cyprus, although to be a Turk and a 
Muslim are one and the same thing, the situation of living with Greek Cypriots on the 
same island made Turkish identity more important than being a Muslim. There is always 
more emphasis on the Turkish identity than the Muslim one. It seems that there has 
never been a shared Cypriot identity. As Kyle (1997: 5) reports: 
There were Turkish quarters in all of the main towns and, of the villages in 1960,114 or 
about 18 per cent were mixed (though this was only a third of the number 70 years before). 
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Even in the mixed villages, however, it was possible to tell the Greek and Turkish quarters 
apart. 
In particular, the severe clashes between the two communities resulting in separation in 
1974 has exaggerated their Turkishness. Constantinides (1977: 276) claims that before 
1974, relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in London were very good and that 
even after this crisis, individual and working relationships still remained good. Ladbury 
(1977: 314-5) suggests that relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots should be 
good because of the economic dependence of Turkish Cypriots on the Greek Cypriots, 
since the number of Greek Cypriots was bigger than that of Turkish Cypriots and there 
were not enough Turks in sufficiently varied occupations for them to be ethnically self- 
reliant. Moreover, a higher percentage of self-employed Greeks meant that they were 
more likely to be employers of Turks, but in social life the contact of the two communities 
is very limited. 
Moreover, in Cyprus the experience of living under British rule until 1960 has created an 
extra dynamic, which is non-existent in the lives of Sunni Muslims in mainland Turkey. 
The situation under British rule exaggerated the underlying ambition of some Greek 
Cypriots to achieve enosis- union with Greece. This ambition of Greek Cypriots 
encouraged Turkish Cypriots to align with the British rulers (Kyle 1997: 5). In fact, as 
early as the late 1950s, when the EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) 
made their demands for self-determination, they started to burn Turkish villages (Kyle 
1997: 8) 
In Turkey, none of the ethnic groups represents a unique religious affiliation and vice 
versa. All ethnic and religious groups are heterogeneous (Enneli 1996). There are Sunni 
Turks and Kurds, together with Alevi Turks and Kurds. Although to discuss the ethnic 
and religious affiliations in Turkey in detail is beyond the scope of this thesis, it should be 
noted that the people have various ethnic origins such as Lazs, Gypsies, Albanians, 
Bosnians, Tatars, Caucusians, Arabs and Kurds etc. In England, the majority of Turks 
from mainland Turkey are Sunni Muslims, while the majority of Kurds are mostly Alevi. In 
Turkey there are conflicts between secular and religious movements. The radical 
challenge to the Islamic Ottoman Empire and Caliphate by the secular Turkish Republic 
in 1923 put the emphasis on being Turkish, rather than on being a member of the 
Muslim Ummet. In 1928 Islam as a state religion was abolished. Ataturk's idea of 
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Turkishness had no reference to a common religion or common race. The idea referred 
to those people who accept being a Turk. In this sense, Turkishness does not 
necessarily overlap with blood ties, and was blind to ethnic differences (Pope and Pope 
1997: 59). In support of this, Sayyid (1997: 65) quotes from the Republican Party 
Secretary's speech: 
We consider as ours all those of our citizens who live among us, who belong politically and 
socially to the Turkish nation. Our party considers these as absolutely Turkish in so far as 
they belong to our community of language and ideal. 
The ideal of banishing religion from state affairs was encouraged by secular education, 
outlawing Islamic schools and organisations, the introduction of a new Civil Constitution 
based on Swiss laws and the introduction of Western style clothes and calendar system. 
The secular project has been relatively more successful in the cities than in the villages 
(Mardin 1986). Research conducted among workers in Izmir in 1968 discovered that 50 
per cent of the workers said they were Turk, while 38 per cent identified themselves as 
Muslim. Furthermore, 51 per cent of the workers who identified themselves as Turkish 
defined the people in the country as citizens, while 89 per cent of the workers who 
identified themselves as Muslim defined the people in the society as Muslim brothers 
(Mardin 1986: 121-23). A recent survey in 1993 shows that only four per cent of those 
questioned in Istanbul still define themselves simply as Muslims: 21 per cent prefer to be 
called Muslim Turk, while two-thirds identify themselves as Turk (Pope and Pope 
1997: 332-3). 
A study of Turkish peasants found that nationalism is thought to be a major 
characteristic of Turks by a majority of high school students in the villages, compared to 
a very small number of illiterates who overwhelmingly define themselves firstly as 
Muslim (Toprak 1987: 221). 
On the other hand, Ataturk's Republican People's Party found great support among the 
Alevi populations in both cities and villages. They even believed that Ataturk was an 
Alevi (Ercan 1997) and they have been strong defenders of Ataturk's reforms since the 
birth of the republic (Pope and Pope 1997: 324). The following example might illustrate 
the respect given to Ataturk among the Alevis. During my fieldwork, one of the Alevi 
mothers talks about how she came to name her son: 
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When I was pregnant with my son, my father-in-law had a dream of Ataturk. At the top of 
our house's stairs, he [Ataturk] looked at him and smiled. Next day, my father-in-law told 
me I was going to have a son and we were going to call him Kemal [first name of Ataturk]. 
Then I got my son, and we gave him that name. 
Moreover, Alevis and Sunnis usually keep to their own villages and had minimum 
contact with each other and no intermarriages. The political and social differences 
between Alevis and Sunnis is reflected in the characteristics of voters for the religious 
Welfare Party. The party rose to power in the 1994 local election and the 1995 general 
election. The Welfare Party has exclusively Sunni support from Turks in Central Anatolia 
and Kurds in Eastern Anatolia (Ayata 1996: 53). But there have been several occasions, 
such as the 1978 Maras' Events, when Sunni Muslims killed their Alevi neighbours. At a 
more recent incident in 1993, Fundamentalists burned twelve people in a hotel during 
the Alevi festival in Sivas. Alevis seldom declare their identity openly. They are often 
accused of being involved in incest during Cem ceremonies by their Sunni neighbours. 
In relation to the secular ideologies of the Turkish republic, Keddie (1997) argues that 
the state accepted a secular ideology not as a project but as a strategy to strengthen its 
position against the powerful religious class (Ulema) in the Ottoman Empire. In that 
sense, it can be argued that the state in the 1980s used not secular ideology but Islam 
to secure itself against the increasing effects of left wing organisations prior to 1980. The 
government built mosques at the villages where the villagers were Alevi and as indicated 
before Alevis, unlike Sunni Muslims, usually do not go to mosques and do not pray. The 
government also made religious education compulsory in the schools. Mosque 
construction averaged 1500 a year in the 1980s and the number of mosques rose from 
54667 in 1984 to 62947 in 1988, a mosque for every 857 people (Ahmad 1993: 221). In 
this respect, Alevis have become more vulnerable following the 1980 military coup and 
the conscious strategy of the Government to give religion (Sunni Islam) priority against 
Leftist organisations. 
Furthermore, since the 1980s, considerable amounts of Islamic capital have flown into 
Turkey from oil rich Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia. This capital is also used for 
increasing Islamisation among the Turkish community in Europe. Islamic capital is used 
to initiate many Quaran courses in both Turkey and Europe. In Turkey, it is used to 
support poor university students and to provide free health services to poor people in 
Gecekondu areas (squatter settlements). But, most importantly, it supports small 
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enterprises in several towns. Several Islamic banks opened after 1980, such as Faisal 
Finans and Al Baraka Turk. They encourage interest-free investments. They collect a 
substantial amount of money from the Turks in Europe and people in Turkey to invest in 
Islamic firms. According to Sener (1997), Islamic capital coming to Turkey amounts to 
about 5 million dollars per year. 
We can talk about four Islamic associations in relation to Turks in Europe. They are 
Diyanetcis, Milli Gorus, Suleymancis and Nurcus. Diyanet (The European federation of 
mosque associations under the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs) is controlled by 
the Turkish state and tries to control other mosque organisations and Quaran courses in 
Europe. The organisation was not effective until the 1990s. But once the others became 
threats to the secular Turkish state, Diyanet tried to influence the Turks in Europe to 
conform with official Islam. In 1980, there were only 20 officials from the Directorate 
working abroad, but by 1989 this figure had risen to 628 (Ahmad 1993: 221). 
Milli Gorus is the European branch of the Welfare Party in Turkey. They argue that the 
current Turkish political system is not Islamic and that society should not be ruled 
according to the vote system (Turan 1991: 46). The organisation helps the Welfare 
Party's leaders in several municipalities in Turkey, including Istanbul, by collecting 
money from its supporters. For instance, in 1997 it managed to collect four and half 
million DM to support the Welfare Party during the election campaign (Bal 1997). 
Suleymancis are followers of Suleyman Tunahan who is a Turkish migrant in Germany. 
The organisation is identified as a modern version of the Naksibendi Order which existed 
from the fifteenth century onwards in a mystic and orthodox Sunni form (Mardin 
1991: 127). Suleyman Tunahan gathers radical Muslims around him, has organised 
Quaran courses since the 1970s and opposes the Turkish official Islam. 
Another one is Nurcus. According to Mardin (1991: 132), Nurcus is the modern version of 
the Naksibendi Order. Nurcus are followers of Said-i Nursi, a Kurdish Sunni Sheikh who 
emerged in the 1920s. Although the Nurcus' basic doctrine is the same as that of other 
religious organisations, Acar (1991: 292), in her study of Islamic women's journals, 
argues that the Nurcus' journal seems more 'liberal', compared with the others, though 
its stand on some critical issues such as non-believing women is very ambiguous. The 
Sabah newspaper (1997) alleges that there are 500 Nur Medrese in western Europe, 
especially in Germany. A typical Medrese includes a classroom, a playroom, a refectory 
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and dormitory. There are sub-groups among Nurcus, the most famous of which are the 
supporters of Fettuhlah Guven. The group has two newspapers, one journal, one 
television and several radio channels. It has about 300 schools in and outside of Turkey, 
200 of them in middle Asian countries, such as Azerbejian. The schools give education 
in English and Turkish (Atakli 1997, Ozturk 1997). 
In Turkish communities in Europe, especially in Germany, the various religious 
organisations are very powerful in representing the community at the local and national 
level. Schiffauer (1997: 149) reports that when the German Ministry of Culture, Education 
and Church Affairs prepared an Islamic textbook for Turkish children, three Islamic 
groups out of five approached the ministry. However, after a second meeting they pulled 
apart in their actual objectives and the ministry said 'everybody out, we'll do it ourselves'. 
In recent years, Alevis, like Sunni Muslims, have seemed well organised around 
religious associations in Germany (Ercan 1997, Heckmann 1997). However, their power 
is very limited compared with Sunni organisations. Beside, they have had some 
difficulties in being recognised by German officials. The German Culture Ministry 
recognised only Sunni Islam, when dealing with the Turkish community. However, a 
group of Alevi workers introduced some German studies on the Alevi sects in Turkey, 
and in the late 1980s were given permission from the German Culture Ministry to 
organise their own association called the Federation of European Alevis (Ercan 1997). 
Based in Köln, the building, which cost them four million DM, had a place for Cem 
ceremonies and dormitories for women, young, disabled and unemployed Alevis. 
Moreover, the head of the organisation wanted to show German society that the Turkish 
community is not only radical and fundamentalist; there is a secular and modern Turkish 
community as well (Ercan 1997). 
How these developments affect the Turkish-speaking 'community' in London will be 
analysed in the following section. 
1.2.2 Religious Involvement of the Turkish-Speaking `Community' in 
London: 
One of the main characteristics of the Turkish-speaking 'community' in terms of religion 
observed during the fieldwork, is that the members of the community think of religion as 
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a private activity rather than a public one. In this sense, their engagement with religious 
organisations is very limited. 
The Turkish-speaking 'community' in London has religious associations as well. There 
are four Sunni organisations: Aziziye Mosque, the London Islamic Culture and Education 
Organisation, the London Turkish Islamic Association and finally the Centre of England 
Turkish Islamic Culture. Moreover, in Autumn 1998, the Sulaymanis (Suleymancilar) 
opened a mosque called Suleymaniye. In 1996, Feytullah Gulen opened London 
Meridian College and in 1998 they enlarged the school to include primary and secondary 
school students. At the moment, they have about 50 Turkish students. There are two 
Alevi organisations in London. These are the Cultural Centre of Alevis and Cemevi, and 
the Union of London Cans (Soul, Life, Living Being). 
However, the Turkish-speaking 'community's' involvement with these organisations 
seems limited in comparison with the situation in other parts of Europe. Karakasoglu 
(1996: 168) alleges that about 80 per cent of the Turkish workers living in Germany are 
members of the Islamic Associations. In a similar manner, Kuusela (1993) describes 
how the Turkish minority group in Gothenburg in Sweden struggled to build a mosque 
and faced considerable opposition from Swedish people. In her study, the respondents 
come from a village of Konya in Central Anatolia and, although she does not mention it, 
they are Sunni Muslims. Additionally, Konya is specifically recognised both for its 
potential to vote for the Refah Party and for having the biggest Islamic company 
(Kompassan). The majority of the shareholders of the company are Turkish workers in 
Germany. In 1997, one of the highest ranking managers of the company was arrested at 
Esenboga Airport with 15 million DM and 28 gold bracelets when he returned from 
Germany (Cetinkaya 1997). 
The majority of Turkish Sunnis in London come from rural areas, like Turks in other 
European countries. Their religious identity seems more relevant to them than their 
ethnic identity. One might expect them to be more involved in religious organisations 
because of the centrality of religion in their lives. However, only a small number of Sunni 
Turks have relatives or co-villagers in other European countries where religious 
organisations are more dominant and well organised than England. Moreover, in London 
Turkish Cypriot Sunnis are older settlers than Sunnis from mainland Turkey and their 
connections with the religious sects in Germany and Turkey are not close. 
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The community members do not believe and trust the organisations' ability to represent 
the Turkish community's interests at an official and cultural level. This belief is 
proclaimed on various occasions by the parents and the young people. One of the 
Turkish parents explains how he sees the religious leaders, such as the Imam in a 
mosque 
They don't care about you. The only thing they care about is the money. I have known one 
man since he came here a long time ago. He had nothing, we all helped him to find a job 
and a house, anything. Then he become a religious person, a very influential one. Within 
one or two years money has became nothing for him to be ashamed of. But don't 
misunderstand. Not everybody can benefit from these organisations in money matters. 
Only a small minority. The rest are the stupid people. Stupid enough to believe them and 
give them donations. 
During a discussion with Cypriot and Turkish girls about whether the Mosque 
represented Turkish culture and community interests, they argued that if somebody 
wants to learn about the Turkish community and culture, the Mosque is not a place for 
getting information: 
Cypriot Girl 1: Basically go and talk to people themselves. Because nobody can represent 
every part of the community. 
Cypriot Girl 2: The school [Turkish schools], because the school's based on being Turk, 
not on religion. 
Cypriot Girl 3: They [Turkish schools] give you an idea what Turkish people are like, then 
you can also go to ask at Mosques as well, if you want. 
The boys were also sceptical about whether the Mosque represented the community's 
culture and interests. One of the Turkish boys, for instance, says that: 
If you go to the Mosque, they might help you. But they cannot represent the Turkish 
community. The Imam [Priest] says 'don't go to the community, come to the Mosque'. He 
says 'come and become a member of the Mosque'. You can, if you want, but I can't say 
the same thing if you ask me about the Turkish community culture. 
There are several reasons for the lack of interest of Turkish and Cypriot people in the 






contact with the organisations that emphasise their Turkish rather than Muslim identity. 
Ladbury (1977: 307) emphasises the lack of participation of Turkish Cypriots in religious 
ceremonies in the 1970s. When the Turkish Islamic association was offered money by 
another Muslim country to buy a place to convert to a Mosque, the leaders of other 
organisations preferred to use the money for an all-purpose community centre instead. 
Turkish Cypriots do not ignore the importance of the religious establishment, but they do 
not give these organisations a central role in their lives. As one Cypriot father explains: 
In our early years in London, we had some problems because there were no Turkish 
mosques. We had to use the places where Pakistanis went. But honestly they are dirty and 
besides it is not the same thing like having your own Mosque. Now the situation is 
different. Mosques are necessary to remember the important religious days and celebrate 
them together with family members and community and give proper service to our dead. 
Also they are important for old people to spend their time in more religious activities. 
Otherwise life goes on in its normal path. 
Some good examples of non-religious organisations are Saturday and Sunday Turkish 
schools, the Turkish Cypriot Women's Organisation, the Turkish Cypriots' Association for 
Elderly People and the Turkish Youth Centre. The London Boroughs supplied the 
buildings for the organisations and they work under the supervision of the Borough to 
which they belong. They offer their members a variety of services such as translating 
official letters, helping them with hospitals and Councils. For instance, the Association 
for Elderly people is visited by a Turkish doctor and a barber on certain days of the week 
to provide free services. 
The most popular non-religious organisations are the Turkish schools. The teachers in 
the schools especially emphasise their secular character. One of the English teachers in 
a comprehensive school reported that: 
There is a Sunday school here for Turkish pupils. When I asked the teachers about what 
sort of religious education they teach the children, they told me they are progressive 
Muslims. They are against head scarves. They don't cover up themselves. One of the 
teachers also told me [it is] because Ataturk gave the women the right to vote before any 
European countries - by the way is that true? 
PE: Yes. 
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Oh, very good then, anyway the teachers told me they don't want to put women in second 
place. That's why women's education is so important for them. 
The Turkish schools were first introduced in 1960 to help underachieving Turkish 
students in British schools. Now there are about 42 of them in North London. The 
schools use the comprehensive schools' buildings during the weekends. They ask for a 
small fee from each child in order to pay the teachers' salaries. The Turkish Government 
of North Cyprus also helps some of the schools by supplying teachers from Cyprus. 
The curriculum is more or less the same in each school though some of the schools 
provide extra GCSE classes in Mathematics and English along with Turkish classes. The 
age range of the students is from six to eighteen. In most of the schools there are also 
folk dance courses. The students first sing the Turkish National Anthem in the school 
hall, then they are allocated to the classes. The schools celebrate all Turkish and North 
Cyprus National days. One of the Turkish Cypriot mothers explained why it is important 
to bring her son to the school: 
These children were born here, they can see their country only once a year or two years. 
When we are dead, who is going to continue our language and our culture? I don't want 
my son to lose his Turkishness. In this school, he learns about his culture, speaks his 
language. 
These schools not only provide a Turkish education for the students, but also act as a 
kind of club for the families to socialise in. They bring their snacks, they gossip, they 
read community newspapers, and participate in the ceremonies conducted by the 
schools. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that the majority of the families who use these 
schools are from Cyprus. In other words, there is little chance of finding Kurdish Alevi 
students in these schools. Besides, Alevi organisations are not popular among the 
community members to a large extent. Several families who were interviewed did not 
know that such Alevi organisations existed in London. Even when they did hear about it, 
they were very reluctant to send their children to these organisations. 
One of the reasons for this probably lies in the fact that the majority of Alevis came from 
two main cities: Maras and Sivas. In both these cities, the Alevis were subjected to 
serious violence from their Sunni townsmen. They are unlikely to admit their religious 
49 
identity for years, and most of them have been in Britain for about ten years. It might be 
too soon for them to dismiss their reservations about this issue. Moreover, although their 
networks with their relatives and co-villagers in other European countries are more 
intensive than that of Sunni people, the Alevi organisation in Germany is a very recent 
phenomenon as mentioned before. 
Moreover, Alevi organisations in London have to share their power with several leftist 
and Kurdish organisations. It is generally observed that Alevis in London have divided 
loyalties to different leftist and Kurdish groups. In general, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers 
Party) tries to promote an exclusive Kurdish identity. However, observations during the 
fieldwork suggest that the Alevi Kurds in London have a tendency to label PKK as a 
Sunni dominated organisation. Moreover, its way of collecting money for the 
organisation is not always welcomed. Normally, each year in a certain week, the groups 
collect money from the individual families or shops. People call these weeks 'campaign 
weeks'. 
One Kurdish Alevi girl talked about an incident in which a campaigner visited their home 
and asked for a donation, but her mother refused because her husband was 
unemployed. The campaigner then said that they were better off here in England than 
the people who are fighting in Turkey and accused her family of concealing their real 
situation, claiming that they had a large amount of savings. In the end, her mother 
became very angry and asked the campaigner to leave the house immediately. 
During the PKK campaign, two sympathisers visited a Kurdish Alevi house in which I 
stayed during the fieldwork. At the time, the house was full of family members. After an 
hour of introduction about the aims and achievements of the organisation and the 
importance of Kurdish nationalism and conspiracy about the State's role in creating 
fractious religious and sectional differences among the Kurds, the campaigner asked the 
household men and older women what they thought about these issues. One of them 
replied that they were here to listen and learn. In the end, the campaigners asked for 
donations but the head of the house replied that he had not yet got his week's salary. 
The campaigners insisted on getting his work address to collect the money and after 15 
minutes, he complied. After they left, one of the men started to swear and said: 
They talked too much about meaningless things. These people are filthy (metaphorically 
this means bad person in Turkish]. They are Saffi (a very Orthodox Kurdish Sunni Sect]. 
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They don't like us. They say, they don't believe in Alevi - Sunni separation, but if they get 
you, they will cut your head off. If they really don't believe in discrimination, why don't they 
talk about humanity, democracy whatever you are? But instead all they talk about is being 
Kurdish, being Sunni, not being human. With this attitude these people miss the men who 
approach them. But my group [THKP Turkish People's Communist Party] listen to you, 
they are all human, democratic. Not like these filth. 
In fact, wedding ceremonies are far more important than these organisations in most 
Kurdish people's social lives. Almost every weekend, there is a wedding. During these 
occasions, people socialise, exchange news and the latest gossip and entertain 
themselves. The ceremonies are almost all organised around co-villagers. Everybody 
knows everybody, and outsiders are recognised immediately. 
On the other hand, this does not mean that religion is not important in their lives, 
particularly in the younger generations' lives, they simply do not present it in the public 
sphere. 
The following section will analyse the Turkish-speaking young people's religious identity 
in two steps. First, self-identification will be discussed, then young people's practical 
involvement in religion will be explored in relation to that of their parents. Mosque 
attendance, fasting and praying are selected to measure the practical effect of Islam in 
the young people's lives. Although mosques are open to the males rather than females, 
they offer some religious courses to young people regardless of their gender. In order to 
discuss parents' religious activities, fasting and mosque attendance are chosen for the 
fathers and fasting and praying for the mothers. 
1.3 Religion and ethnicity in the private lives of the Turkish-speaking 
'community': 
The following analyses are based on two steps: the first relates to the origins of self- 
identification, the second to the level of involvement in religious activities. In fact, these 
two dimensions are interrelated with each other. 
1.3.1 Self-identity in terms of religion: 
Turkish-speaking young people have a clear idea of their religious identity. When they 
were asked about their religious identity, 87 per cent of them chose to be called either 
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Muslim or Alevi. Moreover, there is a polarisation among the Turkish-speaking young 
people in terms of religious and ethnic identity. When we look at Table 1.1,78 per cent 
of the young people from Kurdish populated areas called themselves Alevis, while 82 
per cent of Turkish and 90 per cent of Cypriot young people referred to themselves as 
Muslim. 
Table 1-1: Reliaious Identity by Places of Oriain (%1 
Religious Identity 













78 12 4 (4) 5 (5) 100 (92) 
Other places in 
Turkey 
3 82 9 (3) 6 (2) 100 (34) 
Cyprus 90 10(5) 100(50) 
Mixed 13 64 17(5) 7(2) 100(30) 
Total 137(72) 50 103 1 6(12) 7(14) 100 206 
Those young people whose parents are from different sects. 
** Category of others includes young people who call themselves Christian, non- 
believer, believer of anything and not sure. 
In addition, being a Muslim or Alevi has a distinct meaning for these young people. They 
do not think of themselves as belonging to a larger Muslim community because of their 
Muslim identity. For instance, one of the Cypriot girls explains what sort of person she 
would like to marry: 
I don't think every Muslim is OK. He must be somebody like what you are, like Turkish. You 
can not pick up any Muslim you want among the others, it is not like that. 
Besides, the young people have their own criteria in order to determine their religious 
and ethnic identity. The young people from mainland Turkey seemed to be more aware 
of the Alevi-Sunni distinction than those from Cyprus. For instance, one Turkish girl said 
that: 
Girl: Alevis don't like Muslims. They don't recognise Allah, also they say bad things about 
Muhammed. 
PE: How do you know, have you ever discussed these issues? 
Girl: Ooooh, lots of times. Some of them even don't recognise Muhammed. Take Ayse [an 
Alevi girl in the school] - she is the most militant one. 
52 
Alevis are also keen to emphasise the differences between Muslims and themselves. 
During a discussion with two Alevi girls, they talked about how important being an Alevi 
was and how severe are their differences: 
Girl 1: During the Maras events, they killed my aunt. She was pregnant. It was her next 
door neighbour. One night before, they are in her house for the dinner. But think about it, 
even your enemy does not kill you like that. But don't misunderstand me, it is not us who 
discriminate against them, but they do discriminate against us. For me, everybody should 
worship in his own way. We are all human. 
Girl 2: It is true, you know. There is a girl in my class. I know she is a Muslim. I heard she 
called me Gavur [Heathen] behind my back. They see us as Gavur. 
Turkish and Kurdish young people's religious self identification seems to not confirm the 
popular misconception of Muslims as a whole and undivided community. According to 
Tyler (1999: 1), because 'they believe in God - and actually dare to show it - British 
Muslims are something of a challenge to a secular society'. And, the Turkish and 
Kurdish young people seems to be a challenge to the misconception of the idea that 
Muslims are opposed to the secular. 
On the other hand, Cypriot young people think that everybody from Turkey is Turkish 
and Muslim. The following extract from a discussion between Turkish and Cypriot girls 
about whether Alevis are a part of the Turkish community or not gives a good example of 
young people's different priorities: 
Cypriot Girl 1: 1 don't know what is Alevi. 
Turkish Girl: They are Kurd. 
Cypriot Girl 1: Kurds have got the same traditions, cultures, religion. 
Turkish Girl: No. They don't believe in Muhammed or the Quaran, they just believe in Ali 
actually. They practice their own religion. They just don't believe the Quaran. They just 
don't go to the Mosque, stuff like that. Totally different religion. 
Cypriot Girl 2: But, they [Alevis] are really Turkish, because practically everything [is the] 
same. I know their language is slightly different. Do you know what I mean? 
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Cypriot Girl 3: It is not like Greeks, because Greeks and Turks got big things, isn't it? Like 
in the dance last week, do you remember? [to the others] 
Cypriot Girl 1: When we played folk dance, there were Greeks in the dance hall, probably 
the same age as us. They shouted to us 'fall down and die'. This is their background, how 
they are brought up. 
Cypriot Girl 3: It's their parents. We are in this culture now, we are not in Cyprus, not in 
Turkey now. We try to get along, you know. Forget that barrier for a moment you know. But 
even though she is not brought up in south Cyprus, she just has that hatred because of her 
parents, what they tell her. Our parents told us what Greeks did them in Cyprus, but we try 
to get along with them. But she don't want to know. 
Cypriot Girl 2: Deep down, Greeks and Turks hate each other, a group of Greeks and a 
group of Turks are doing this. Of course, that doesn't include every single Greek. 
In this context, it is clear that the Turkish Cypriot young people's self identifications are 
influenced more by different historical backgrounds than are those of Turkish and 
Kurdish young people. In fact, the young people's place of origin not only shapes their 
religious identity, but their ethnic identity as well. As can be seen from Table 1.2,72 per 
cent of all the young people from Kurdish populated areas call themselves 
overwhelmingly Turkish Kurd or Kurd (72 per cent), and 47 per cent of the young people 
from other places in Turkey describe themselves as Turks. The percentage of young 
people from Cyprus who call themselves Turkish Cypriot or Cypriot is 58 per cent. 
Furthermore, Table 1.2 shows that religious and ethnic identities are paired off according 
to young people's places of origin: Alevi-Kurd, Muslim-Turk, Muslim-Turkish Cypriot. 78 
per cent of the Alevi young people from Kurdish populated areas identified themselves 
as Turkish Kurd or Kurd, while half of the Muslim young people from other parts of 
Turkey called themselves Turk and 58 per cent of the Muslim young people from Cyprus 
refer to themselves as Turkish Cypriot or Cypriot. It can be argued that young people 
usually think of their ethnic and religious identity as interchangeable. In other words, 
they use Turk for Muslims (or Sunni) and Kurds for Alevis. The following extracts from 
the structured interviews show how young people use Kurd for Alevi and Turk for Muslim 
interchangeably: 
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Turkish Girl 1: The person I will marry should be Turk. Because, we can't marry with Kurds. 
They don't practice our religion. 
Turkish Girl 2: If I marry with a Kurd, my Mum will cut me in pieces. He should be a Muslim. 
Kurdish Girl: I would like to marry somebody like me. Not a Turk. My family don't let me 
otherwise. They don't want somebody going to Mosque or praying. 
Ethnic and religious identities are blurred for their parents as well. For instance, when 
one of the Alevi Kurdish parents talked about his Sunni Kurd neighbour, he said: 
They can speak Kurdish, but they are Turk, they fast during Ramadan and they have all 
Arabic-written home decoration. They know we are Alevi, so they avoid speaking about 
religion. But we know as well. 
However, this overlap makes the young people who are not 'Alevi and Kurdish' or 
'Muslim and not Turkish' confused about their identity. This is especially the case for the 
non Turkish Sunni young people. Table 1.2 reveals that almost five in ten call 
themselves Turk, while only one in ten of their Alevi counterparts do so. One of the 
interviews with the 'Kurdish' boys who are Sunni and Alevi Kurds shows the blurred 
boundaries between being Kurdish and being Alevi: 
Sunni boy: I am a Turk, I go to Mosque and fast, everything. 
Alevi boy: But you are with us, aren't you? 
One day after, the same Alevi boy talked about the Sunni boy's 'other' friends in the 
Turkish Youth Centre, which belongs to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot young people, 
and how they saw him enter the centre several times. One of the boys said: 
He [Sunni boy] is a nice person, he seems [to be] enjoying himself when he is with us. But I 
don't know exactly what he is doing with others. 
Although in the sample there is only one child who is Alevi and Turkish, it could be 
argued that being Alevi and not coming from a Kurdish populated area is no easier 
either. They call themselves Alevi, but neither Turkish, or Kurdish, thus ignoring their 
ethnic identity, whilst sticking to their religious identity. 
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Table 1-2: Religious Identity by Ethnic Identity (%) 
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Turk 10 46(5) 13 
Turkish Kurd/Kurd 78 36(4) 100(4) 40(2) 72 
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British 11 18(2) 60(3) 14 
Other* 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
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Total 100 100 100 100 100 
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58 60 (3) 58 
British 33 20(l) 32 
Other* 20(l) 2 
Total 100 100 100 
Mixed 









Turk 26(5) 120(l) 20 
Turkish Kurd/Kurd 50 2 51 20 1 
Turkish 
Cypriot/Cypriot 
42 (8) 27 
British 50(2) 26(5) 60(3) 100(2) 40 
Other* 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
*Category of others includes the young people who insisted on identifying themselves 
only in religious terms rather than in ethnic terms or were not sure. 
When the Turkish-speaking young people construct their identities, they identify a 
Muslim Turk not only different from English Christian identity, but from Pakistani and 
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Bangladeshi Muslim identity as well. During a group discussion with Turkish and Cypriot 
girls, they separated Turkish Muslims from others, including English and Pakistani 
communities in Britain. One of the Turkish girls put it like this: 
I don't eat pork. In the English school, they eat pork. But other than that there is alcohol, 
some Muslims, I mean Turks, drink raki [Turkish drink]. But in Quaran, alcohol is forbidden. 
A Cypriot girl argued that the differences basically originate in their culture: 
Different culture, such as people from Pakistan. They are Pakistanis, aren't they? They are 
Muslims, but still they have different, they have different beliefs. Although they are 
Muslims, in their culture, let's say their cooking is different from us and the way they treat 
their children is different from our children. You know what I mean? 
Another Cypriot girl concentrates on the appearances and behaviour which differentiate 
Turkish Muslims from others: 
Ours is just culture, we are not really religious. We do not wear head scarves. Nothing like 
that. We walk around wearing make-up, everything. That's our culture. We are not religious 
basically. We eat pork, I have never been in the mosque. 
Another ethnic identity with which the young people associate is British. During the focus 
group discussions with Turkish and Cypriot young people, the cultural and social 
meanings of being British, if any, were questioned. It might be suggested that if 
somebody was born in Britain, the chance for him/her to call himself or herself British 
would increase. However, it does not seem to be the case for Turkish-speaking young 
people. Although nine in ten Cypriot young people and only six in ten Turkish young 
people were born in Britain, the proportion of Turkish young people who feel themselves 
British is greater than that of Cypriot young people who feel themselves British. As can 
be seen from Table 1.2, Cypriot young people (32 per cent) do not call themselves 
British as often as do Turkish young people (50 per cent) and only 14 per cent of the 
Kurdish young people believe themselves to be British. 
Britishness was defined as a form of citizenship by the young people. To an extent the 
young persons simply believe that if somebody is born in this country or has a British 
passport, this person is a British citizen. 
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Turkish boy: British means people who live in this country. If they are on holiday, they are 
not British, but if you are born here and live here, you are British. But we are less British 
than English people, because English people originate in this country. I was born here, my 
family came from Turkey, generations are in Turkey. 
Cypriot Boy: My mum was born here, dad in Cyprus, he came here when he married with 
my mum. He has been here now for 20 years. So then my dad could be British, but not as 
much as an English person is, because he was born in a different country. 
Turkish boy: If one English person go to Turkey and have a family and a child, because the 
child is born in Turkey, he is Turkish more than English. I think like that. 
Turkish-speaking young people are also aware of the cultural dimension of being British: 
being British does not make them similar to other British young people, but more 
different from the young people in Cyprus or Turkey. 
Cypriot Girl 1: You could not exactly say how you feel about [being] British. To me I love 
this country. When I go to Cyprus or Turkey, I feel different. I feel more relaxed in this 
country. I don't know, it is more freedom, because in Cyprus, everybody knows everybody, 
too close. 
Cypriot Girl 2: Yes, when I go to Cyprus, I put on an act to impress my uncle. You have to 
follow them to everywhere, make all the coffees, everything. When I am here, I can say to 
my uncle, 'why you don't go and make your tea yourself. But if I said this to my uncle in 
Cyprus, I think I'd be dead. 
In that sense, by being British, they feel themselves more free than their counterparts in 
Cyprus or Turkey. However, when the question is whether they feel themselves British in 
relation to other British people in Britain, they think that British identity belongs to English 
people more than it belongs to the Turks. 
Cypriot Girl 1: I suppose I don't use this British thing. I think British people use it more than 
Turks. But the thing is that when we went to Cyprus a year ago, the first thing people said 
to us there, was 'you are English'. But how can we be English, you know? Our roots are 
Turkish, my parents are Turkish, my grandma's Turkish, my grandpa is Turkish, my whole 
generation is Turkish. So maybe I am British, because I was born in this country, but I still 
count myself Turkish. And I am proud to be Turkish, you know. 
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Cypriot Girl 2: When I said I am Turkish Cypriot, they say to me 'but where's you born in? ' I 
said I am a British citizen, but I am still Turkish Cypriot. Because I was born here in Britain, 
doesn't make my culture, my traditions and my blood any different. 
Similar responses to the relationship between being English or British and white was 
reported in a study of 14-18 year-old Londoners (Phoenix 1998). Phoenix (1998: 119) 
argues that many black and mixed parentage young people construct themselves as 
excluded from the nation. 
Turkish-speaking young people generally argue that even if somebody is born in this 
country, she or he could not change the culture they inherit from their family background 
and that culture determined their identity, rather than place of birth. On the other hand, 
when they visit their parents' country of origin, they feel different to the rest of the 
population and this difference originates in the country of birth, namely Britain. Their 
feelings about Britishness, need to be investigated with respect to their friendship 
patterns in order to understand the implications of this identification. 
1.3.1.1 Friendship Patterns of the Turkish-speaking Young People In 
Relation to Their Ethnic and Religious Identities: 
Verkuyten and Hagendoorn (1996) investigated the preferences for contact with ethnic 
out-groups among ethnic majority - Dutch - and minority - Surinamese, Moroccans and 
Turks - young people living in the Netherlands. They reached several conclusions. First, 
all ethnic groups preferred contact with in-group members. Second, among each group 
there was an agreed hierarchical pattern of preferences in acceptance or rejection of 
other ethnic groups. Third, among the Dutch, Surinamese, Moroccans and Turks, there 
was a consensus on the ethnic hierarchy which is Dutch at the top followed by 
Surinamese, Moroccans and Turks respectively. Fourth, the Dutch young people 
rejected other groups more significantly than did ethnic minority young people 
(Verkuyten and Hagendoom 1996: 1115-6). 
In Britain, there are similar patterns of rejection among the young people from different 
backgrounds. Davey (1983) argued that children in British primary and secondary 
schools have strong preferences for own-group friends which is established at an early 
age and intensifies with age. 
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Similarly, in the USA Kelly and Schauffler (1996: 50) observed the prejudices and 
antinomies among Nicaraguan, Cuban, Haitian, Mexican and Vietnamese migrants and 
their children against each other and inner city blacks. Some of the children describe 
themselves as having more self-respect, more sense of cleanliness, a work ethic, 
compared with others, especially Blacks (Kelly and Schauffler 1996: 50). 
Furthermore, in his study of a Mexican community, Smith (1998: 212) found that the 
second generation young people have negative views about Blacks and Puerto Rican 
neighbours and embracing American racial and ethnic hierarchies helps them feel like 
they are fuller members of American society. 
The Turkish community in Germany also has very restricted social contact with other 
groups. Caglar (1995: 310) observes that, compared with other foreigners, Turks have 
less contact with Germans and it is true for the second generation Turks too. Kursat- 
Ahlers (1996: 117) observes that most of the young Turks have only Turkish friends and 
no contact with Germans. 
In London, Turkish-speaking young people spent most of their time within their groups, 
usually amongst their relatives too. Moreover, their contacts with other groups in the 
same area are very limited. In order to analyse the Turkish-speaking young people's 
relationships outside of their immediate social environment, they were asked to choose 
an ethnic group or groups in which they have a friend and then, they were asked to 
choose a group or groups from which they would have reservations about choosing a 
friend. 
As shown in Table 1.3, the overwhelming majority of the young people, regardless of 
their places of origin, have friends from other ethnic backgrounds such as English, 
Indian or Pakistani. On the other hand, the level of involvement with these friends is not 
as high as their involvement with their Turkish-speaking friends. As one English teacher 
observed: 
Turkish children are always together. They eat together, they leave school together. Boys 
and girls alike. But I think the girls are more open to having friends from other groups as 
well. 
The young people's involvement with other groups is usually restricted in the classroom. 
They sit together or sometimes they engage in a common project with the others. 
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Moreover, when a Turkish-speaking child has an inter-ethnic friendship, s/he usually has 
another Turkish-speaking friend's company at the same time. In other words, they do not 
engage in an inter-ethnic friendship on their own. In fact, outside of the school, they are 
with their Turkish-speaking friends. 
It is reported that none of the young people have invited a friend from another ethnic 
group to their house or have been invited by these friends to their houses. Most of them 
think that their friendship might not be approved by their parents. On the other hand, the 
parents think more positively about their children's involvement with certain groups, 
while they disapprove of involvement with others. They like their children's friendships 
with (white) English pupils, and dislike their friendships with black children. In fact, they 
are proud to send their children to what they call an 'English school' which means that 
the majority of the pupils are white English. 
They believe that if they manage to send their child to an 'English school', the child might 
be more successful than the other Turkish-speaking children. One of the Cypriot 
mothers said: 
In my son's school, there are no Turks. All of the students are English. He can't speak 
Turkish in the school. His English is better than the other Turkish children. I encouraged 
him to come to this school [Saturday Turkish School] to learn his culture, but the rest of the 
week, he is together with the English students. It is best for him. 
The Turkish-speaking young people, like their parents, value friendship with English 
students in the school in terms of their academic success. As one of the Kurdish boys 
said: 
I want to change my school. I want to go to an English one. There I can have a chance to 
be with English children. At other times I am with my Turkish friends, but it is not good for 
my English. 
Although the majority of the young people have foreign friends, they also have 
reservations in having a friend from some groups. As can be seen from Table 1.3, the 
negative feelings against some groups among the Turkish and Cypriot young people are 
not as intense as among the Kurdish ones. Seventy three per cent of the Kurdish young 
people have some reservations against some groups, while 47 per cent of the Turkish 
and 26 per cent of the Cypriot young people admit that they prefer not to have a friend 
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from a certain group. This percentage is 36 per cent for the mixed origin young people. 
On the other hand, none of the young people have reservations against (white) English 
young people. Most of them have negative feelings about black and Irish young people. 
The common reasons they gave for their rejection of Irish children is Irish children's 
violent behaviour. In rejecting black children, the Turkish-speaking young people claim 
that black children have no moral and family values, and that they can easily steal. 
Furthermore, negative feelings against foreigners are higher among the boys in each 
group, though the gender differences are less obvious for the Kurdish and Cypriot young 
people. Seventy per cent and 75 per cent of the Kurdish girls and boys respectively 
admit that they have some reservations about choosing their friends from certain groups, 
while less than three out of ten Cypriot girls and three out of ten of the Cypriot boys said 
that they do not want to have that sort of friendship. On the other hand, over a third of 
the Turkish girls said that they would choose not to be a friend with somebody from 
certain groups, compared with about six out of ten Turkish boys. Moreover, less than two 
out of ten mixed origin girls and half of the mixed origin boys reported that they have 
negative feelings towards certain groups. 
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Table 1-3_ Foreign Friends by Plar_p of Arinin low U 
Kurdish Populated Areas 
Having Foreign Friend Having Negative Feelings about 













Yes 93 81 86 70 75 73 
No 8 19 14 30 25 27 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Other Places in Turkey 
Having Foreign Friend Having Negative Feelings about 













Yes 94(16) 77(13) 85 35(6) 59(10) 47 
No 61 124(4) 15 165(11) 41 7 53 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Cyprus 
Having Foreign Friend Having Negative Feelings about 













Yes 97 100(17) 98 24 30(5) 26 
No 3 2 76 71(12) 74 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Mixed 
Having Foreign Friend Having Negative Feelings about 













Yes 85(11) 94(16) 90 15(2) 53(9) 36 
No 15(2) 1 6(l) 10 1 85(11) 47(8) 63 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
To some extent, it could be argued that the young people's reservations about some 
ethnic groups are not a result of their actual experiences with these groups, but rather a 
function of some common prejudices of the majority population in Britain. In fact, as 
Table 1.4 indicates, whilst only 48 per cent of those who have an inter-ethnic friendship 
admit negative feelings towards some groups, that percentage is over eight out of ten of 
those who have no inter-ethnic friendship. 
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Table 1-4: Having Negative Feelings About Some Foreign Groups by Having 
Foreign Friends (%) 
Ravin Foreign Friends 
Having Negative Feelings About 
Some Foreign Groups 




Yes 48 82 52 
No 52 18 48 
Total 100 100 100 
It should be noted that the actual social boundaries around the Turkish-speaking young 
people might even not cross the inner boundaries of the sub-communities. As can be 
seen from Table 1.5, many young people choose their friends from the same group. 
Sixty four per cent of the Kurdish, half of the Turkish and 64 per cent of the Cypriot 
young people only have friends who are Kurdish, Turkish and Cypriot respectively. 
Young people from mixed origins show an even distribution amongst the groups. 
Furthermore, although the girls' friendships within the network of close relatives and 
villagers are more acceptable for their families, there is no persistent pattern to suggest 
that girls are more likely to choose their friends within their own group than the boys. 
Indeed, Kurdish girls seem to have Kurdish friends less often than the Kurdish boys. On 
the other hand, Turkish girls seems more dependent on their own groups for friendship 
than the boys. More than six out of ten Turkish girls have a Turkish friend, compared 
with just over third of the Turkish boys. Moreover, the Cypriot young people, regardless 
of their gender, prefer another Cypriot for friendship. 

























55 71 64 12(2) 24(4) 18 3 6(1) 4 8(1) 29(5) 20 
Olper Places in 
T 
28 17 22 65(11) 35(6) 50 24 6(1) 18 31(4) 29(5) 30 
Cylorm 5 4 4 18(3) 24(4) 21 64 65(11) 64 39 5 41(7) 40 
Don'tITw 13 8 10 6(1) 183 12 9 244 14 233 0 10 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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In conclusion, it can be argued that Turkish-speaking young people are divided in terms 
of their religious and ethnic identities and these divisions were reflected in their 
friendship patterns too. However, religious and ethnic identities do not only depend on 
self-identifications. Religious practice is also an important part of religious identity. It is 
important to describe the relation between these two dimensions. 
In this context, the following section will analyse young people's religious practice in 
relation to their self-identified religious identity. Moreover, in order to explore the nature 
of their involvement with religious activities, their parents' religious involvement will also 
be taken into account. 
1.3.2 Religious Practice: 
There are three characteristics of the Turkish-speaking 'community' in terms of religious 
practice. Firstly, the members of the Turkish-speaking 'community' are not keen to 
practice religion in general. Secondly, there is more involvement of women in religious 
activities than men and, finally, there is a clear differentiation according to place of origin 
in terms of religious practice. Young people's engagement with religion in their daily lives 
corresponds more or less with that of their families. In other words, they do not engage 
in religious practices very often. However, the girls are more involved in religious 
practice than the boys, and their origins and particular religious sects have effects on 
their religious involvement. 
Religious practice will be analysed in terms of three basic activities: fasting, praying and 
mosque attendance. However, when comparison between different sects is made in 
terms of religious practice, fasting is chosen since it is common to all sects whereas 
praying and mosque attendance are not. 
Although eating habits such as abstinence from pork products or alcohol can also show 
the effects of religion on daily lives, it is difficult to determine whether eating habits might 
directly link to religious affiliations or are part of general cultural habits. None of the 
households, which were observed during the fieldwork, consumed pork, but nor did they 
consume sea foods except fish; brussels sprouts; some exotic fruits and frozen 
vegetables. Moreover, although alcohol consumption among females is very rare 
compared with males, again it is difficult to define this as a result of religion rather than 
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as a result of traditional patriarchal rules. In fact, smoking was also very rare among the 
women. 
Furthermore, the families purchase cosmetics such as lip sticks or facial creams and 
snacks such as crisps, without paying attention to whether the products contain pork fat 
or alcohol. The issue of Halal meat, which is meat from animals slaughtered in 
accordance with Islamic rules, does not seem crucial for the majority of the Turkish- 
speaking 'community'. They consume meat from the main supermarkets and the 
younger generation visit well known burger houses such as McDonalds. Besides, the 
label of 'Halal Meat' in the window of most Pakistani shops rarely appears in Turkish 
Kebab Houses or food stores. 
1.3.2.1 Fasting, Praying, Mosque Visits Among the Parents: 
In general, the fathers do not seem keen to keep a religious routine. As revealed in 
Table 1.6, about 62 per cent of them do not fast at all, while nearly 69 per cent do not go 
to the mosque at all, even once a year. However, there are clear differences among the 
fathers in terms of their place of origin and in terms of religious affiliation. 
Fathers from Kurdish populated areas in Turkey are less likely to fast and attend 
mosque services, while the fathers from other places in Turkey overwhelmingly seem to 
fast and go to the mosques. Like most of the fathers from other places in Turkey, Cypriot 
fathers are Sunni Muslims too. Yet their attitudes on religious practices show a similar 
pattern to those from Kurdish populated areas in terms of fasting and mosque 
attendance. Moreover, in general Sunni fathers are clearly more keen to fast than Alevi 
fathers. Only 17 per cent of the Alevi fathers fast compared to 57 per cent of Sunni 
fathers. 
When we look at Alevis and Sunnis' fasting practice in terms of places of origin, it is 
clear that Kurdish fathers, both Alevi and Sunni, engage in religious activities slightly 
less than their Turkish counterparts. Only 26 per cent of Turkish Sunni fathers do not 
fast, compared to less than half of Kurdish Sunni fathers and only half of the Turkish 
Alevi fathers. It can be seen from Table 1.6 that Kurdish Alevi fathers are at the bottom 
in terms of engagement in religious activities. 
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Other places in 
Turkey 
Cyprus Total 
Fasting AN Sin 
1 
Tot ALM Simi Tot 
41 
Sumi Total Alevi Smi Total 
Yes 16 58(7) 23 50(l) 74 71 41 37 17 57 38 
No 84 42(5) 77 50(1) 26 29 59 63 83 43 62 




(67) (12) (91) (2) ice) (41) (39) (46) (70) (6) (178) 
Yes 0 67(8) 10 0 80 73 41 37 0 61 32 
No 100 33(4) 90 100 20 27 59 63 100 40 69 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
In contrast, the mothers seem more engaged with religious activities. 55 per cent of the 
mothers do fast, compared with only 38 per cent of the fathers. Although the number of 
the mothers who pray is slightly less than that of the fathers who go to the mosque (23 
per cent of the mothers compared with 32 per cent of the fathers), most of the fathers go 
to the mosque only once or twice a year during the religious holidays, while the mothers 
pray daily. There is a clear asymmetry between the fasting behaviour of Alevi mothers 
and Sunni mothers. While 64 per cent of the Alevi mothers do not fast, most of the Sunni 
mothers do (73 per cent). 
Moreover, the difference in place of origin of the mothers reflects similar patterns to 
those of the fathers in terms of religious practices. Table 1.7 shows that the mothers 
from Kurdish populated areas in Turkey are less interested in religious activities than 
those from other places in Turkey. Besides, the Cypriot mothers like the Cypriot fathers 
do not engage in religious activities as much as the Turkish mothers. 
Again, when we look at Alevis' and Sunni's fasting practice in terms of place of origin, 
the gap between Kurdish Sunni mothers and Turkish Sunni mothers is not as obvious as 
it is for the fathers. Nine out of ten Kurdish Sunni mothers and nearly the same number 
of Turkish Sunni mothers fast. Also, Kurdish Alevi mothers like their husbands are at the 
bottom in terms of engagement in religious activities. 
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Other places in 
Turkey 
Cyprus Total 








Yes 34 90(9) 42 75(3) 87 79 67 59 37 73 55 
No 66 101 58 251 13 21 33 41 64 27 45 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Praying (10) (4) (43) (74) 1 
Yes 0 60(6) 7 0 53 35 42 41 0 44 23 
No 100 40(4) 93 100 
4 
47 65 59 59 100 56 77 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 , 100 
As a result, it can be said that young people from Turkish Sunni family backgrounds 
have grown up in a more devout religious environment than the other young people. The 
young people least affected by religion are those from Kurdish Alevi families. The 
following section will analyse the young people's involvement in religious activities, and 
the extent to which their families' religious involvement affects them. 
1.3.2.2 Fasting, Praying and Mosque Visits Among the Young people: 
Table 1.8 indicates that the majority of the Kurdish young people (62 per cent) do not 
fast at all. Furthermore, although most of the Turkish and all of the Cypriot young people 
are from the Sunni sect, more than half of the Cypriot young people do not fast, while 
only 23 per cent of Turkish young people do not do so. Mosque attendance among the 
Cypriot young people is also not very high, compared to that of Turkish young people. 
Only 18 per cent of Cypriot young people go to the Mosque, while half of the Turkish 
young people do so. 
When we look at mosque attendance of the young people, again Kurdish young people 
like Cypriot ones do not go to the Mosque as often as Turkish young people. Moreover, 
the praying practices among the young people reflect the same pattern. Forty four per 
cent of Turkish young people pray, while only five per cent of Kurdish and 24 per cent of 
Cypriots do so. However, like their parents, there is a clear differentiation between young 
people from Alevi or Sunni sects. When we look at Table 1.8 in accordance with 
religious differences, an opposition can be seen between Alevi and Sunni young people. 
68 
Sixty six per cent of the Alevi young people do not fast, while about the same 
percentage of Sunni young people do. Furthermore, like their mothers, Kurdish Sunni 
young people are slightly more engaged in religious activities than Turkish Sunni young 
people. More than seven out of ten Kurdish Sunni young people fast, compared with 
more than half of Turkish Sunni young people. Like their parents, Kurdish Alevi young 
people seem the group least likely to engage in the specified religious practices, though 
a comparison with non Kurdish Alevi young people could not be made, since there is 
only one child who is non Kurdish Alevi in this sample. 







Other places in 
Turkey 
Cyprus Mixed Total 








Total Alevi Simi Total 
Yes 33 64(1) 38 100 
(1) 
82 76 42 42 25(1) 613) 57 34 60 48 
No 67 36(4), 62 18 24 58 58 75(3) 1 32 43 66 40 52 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10()l 1001 100 100 
Moscm 
ALZLkIL 
(7 (11) m (1) M (A (45) (m) (4) (19) C Cm (14 P 
Yes 0 73 9 0 57 50 18 18 0 32 20 0 37 19 
No 100 27(3) 91 10D 
(1) 
43 50 82 82 100 66(13) 80 100 63 81- 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
11 1 4 1 
Yes 0 46 5 0 54 44 22 24 0 Q 20 0 35 32 
No 100 55(6) 95 100 
(1) 
46 56 78 76 10D 66(13) 80 100 65 69 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
In order to measure the effect of parents' religious involvement on the young people's 
relationship to religion, the fasting practice, which is common among all the sects in one 
form or another, is chosen as a criterion. This permits the inclusion of Alevis - who do 
not go to the Mosque and do not pray - in the sample, for the purpose of analysing the 
effect of religious practice on their young people's religious practices. The analysis omits 
non Turkish Sunni, non Kurdish Alevi young people and those from mixed origin, in order 
to study the effects of the parents from the main groups, which are Kurdish-Alevi, 
Turkish-Sunni and Cypriot, with further clarity. 
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In general, regardless of their origin and religious identity, girls are more keen to fast 
than boys. As shown in Table 1.9, more than half of the girls with a Kurdish Alevi 
background fast, while only two out of ten boys from the same background do so. The 
girls least involved in religion are Cypriots and the most involved are Turkish Sunnis. 
Cypriot girls see religion as a matter of personal faith, and they do not feel that it is 
necessary to show it with a religious practice like fasting. 
Cypriot Girl 1: A lot of people just hide behind their religions as well. People who hide 
behind their religion just say 'you are less Muslim than me, because I practice better than 
you'. You know it does not make you a better Muslim. Some people hide behind their head 
scarves, behind their religion which to me I don't think I like it. Like a woman I know. She is 
a quite religious woman. I have no disregards, I think good OK. But the thing is the way 
she is coming out with things. She's just talking about rights and wrongs. You know she is 
a helper. But when you look at her children, they are not grown up better than me or my 
brother and sister. Because her children are just wild. I was sorry for her, she is just a quite 
religious person, but her children have no respect for her. 
Cypriot Girl 2: You don't have to cover up and wear all these head scarves, you know just 
to be a Muslim. I mean if you are still a believer and, you know, leave it to the God. You 
know, trying to do right things, not the wrong things and that makes you Muslim as much 
as the person who may cover her head. 
Furthermore, the Turkish Sunni boys are involved in religious activities more than 
Kurdish Alevis and Cypriot boys. They even practice religion more than Kurdish Alevi 
and Cypriot girls. The differences in terms of religious involvement not only depend on 
gender, but on place of origin as well. Turkish Sunni young people are more religious 
than the others and, most importantly, Turkish Sunni girls are the most religious group. 
Just under nine out of ten of these girls fast. Furthermore, the Cypriot boys and girls' 
involvement with the fasting practice are considerably less than other Sunni young 
people. 
When we look at the effects of family involvement on religion, we should be cautious 
about drawing a final conclusion, since this research lacks a sufficient numerical base of 
the mothers and fathers for some categories. Nonetheless, the comparisons might be 
able to give a general idea, rather than definitive answers. 
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Kurdish Alevi girls and boys are more affected by their mothers' religious involvement 
than their fathers'. When their mothers do not fast, they do not fast either and vice versa. 
More than six out of ten Kurdish Alevi mothers who fast have daughters who fast as well, 
while nearly the same proportion of the mothers who do not fast have their daughters not 
fasting too. Nearly six out of ten Kurdish Alevi girls' fathers who do not fast have 
daughters who do not fast as well, while all of the Kurdish Alevi fathers who fast have 
daughters who fast. 
The mothers' effect is much more powerful for Alevi Kurdish boys. More than nine out of 
ten non fasting mothers have sons who do not fast, while nearly seven out of ten fasting 
mothers have sons who fast. When their fathers fast, there is no profound effect on their 
sons, but when the fathers do not fast, nearly nine out of ten of their sons do not fast 
either. 
Turkish Sunni girls are affected by both their parents, especially the parents who do not 
fast. Bearing in mind that the young people's accounts report parental behaviour, it is 
clear that when the parents fast, both fathers and mothers, more than eight out of ten of 
their daughters fast as well, and when their parents do not fast, they don't fast either. 
Turkish Sunni boys are influenced by the mothers who are fasting and their fasting 
behaviour appears to be independent of their fathers' religious involvement. 
Cypriot girls, like Turkish Sunni girls, are influenced by both parents. If their parents fast, 
they fast as well and vice verse. On the other hand, Cypriot boys are affected by their 
mother rather than their father. Especially, if the mothers do not fast, seven out of ten of 
them have their sons not fasting as well. 
In the final analysis, what is obvious is that if at least one of the parents is reported to be 
involved in religious activities, the chances for children getting involved increases. It is 
difficult to say if the mothers are more influential than the fathers or vice versa. However, 
we can say that the mothers' involvement in religious activities has an effect on both 
girls' and boys' religious involvement, regardless of their origins and sects. In other 
words, if the mothers are reported to fast, the children fast too and vice versa. The 
mothers appear to create an encouraging atmosphere in the home. Organising food and 
arranging time tables for suppers during the Ramadan and the Alevi fast are the 
responsibilities of the mothers. In that sense, if the mothers do not fast, it is more likely 
71 
that the children do not fast either. The young people seem to accept their families' 
religious attitudes in their lives. For instance, one of the Cypriot boys said: 
My family is not religious. My wife should adapt herself to us. Especially my mum doesn't 
like her daughter - in - law to pray or fast and cover her hair. 
The effects of the fathers' fasting behaviour, unlike that of the mothers, is differentiated 
by gender, religious sects and origins. As can be seen in Table 1.9, the effects of fathers 
who fast can be observed on the fasting behaviour of their daughters regardless of their 
origin. When the fathers do not fast, this affects all children from Kurdish Alevi and 
Cypriot background and only girls from Turkish Sunni background. It can be argued that 
the religious fathers, especially Turkish Sunnis like to control their daughters' behaviour 
and they want to see their daughters more religiously involved. One Turkish Sunni girl 
explains how her father is impressed when he sees her and her sisters fast and pray. 
She says: 
My father likes to talk about religion with me. When I finished to read all the Quoran in 
Arabic, he was very impressed. Because I keep my religion, he trusts me more. Because 
you know he sees all the Turkish girls with their boyfriends, stuff like that. And he believes 
religion protects us from this kind of thing. He likes at least one of us to be educated in a 
religious school in Turkey, but in that case we should stay with one of our relatives in 
Turkey, but he does not like the idea to send us away from home. 
Alevi tradition does not have the same kinds of restrictions on women's social behaviour 
as the Sunni tradition. The religion itself is less sexist, compared to Sunni Islam. The 
Cem ceremonies include both men and women, unlike the men only rituals in the 
Mosques. Beside, the Alevi women are not obliged to cover their hair. On the other 
hand, religiously involved Alevi fathers, like their Sunni counterparts, want their 
daughters to adopt the Alevi religion to prevent any possibility of inter-sect marriages. 
One of the Alevi girls explained the fears of her family, especially her father, about her 
making that kind of 'mistake': 
One of my dad's nieces married with a Turkish boy. Her family did not like it, but there was 
nothing they could do about it. The girl escaped from home with the boy. But then, her 
mother-in-law forced her to cover her hair and become a Muslim. They beat her. When she 
had a son, her mother-in-law did not let her feed her baby with her milk. They said her milk 
was not Halal for their grandson. She had brothers in Germany. All the family, including my 
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dad, sent money to Turkey to arrange her to go to Germany, she manage to escape, but 
left her son with her husband's family. Now all her life is ruined. My dad said to me to take 
an example from that girl's mistakes. If I make the same mistake, he promises he will never 
help me, let me die. 
Non religious Sunni parents do not approve of their children being involved in religious 
activities as often as religious Sunni parents approve of their children practising religion. 
One Cypriot girl talked about her experience with her parents: 
My family doesn't like any sort of extremism. I had a friend in the school last year. She 
covered her hair and stuff like fasting. She liked to talk about religion. I believed some 
things she told me and I decided to fast too. When I told my decision to my mum and dad, 
they disapproved. My mum said, 'we don't bring you up to have backward-looking ideas. 
You are young. These things shouldn't be in your mind now. You should only think about 
your education, your future. ' My dad has forbidden me to see that girl again. My mum 
asked my other friends whom she knows personally to tell her if they saw me with that girl 
in the school. Now, I don't speak with that girl. 
On the other hand, non religious Alevi parents do not refer to religious Alevis in negative 
terms, unlike non religious Sunni parents. It seems that they give relatively more 
freedom to their children to fast or not to fast. A girl explains her parents religious 
affiliations as: 
We are Alevi, but we don't exaggerate about being Alevi. My mum always says to me 'the 
important thing is your heart. If your heart is clean, it is not important whether you practice 
religion or not. Watch your mouth, watch your hands and watch your waist [This is the pillar 
of Alevi philosophy. It means avoid harming others by your words, avoid stealing -with your 
hands- and avoid sex outside marriage]. The rest is nothing. It is totally up to you'. It is 
what being Alevi is about. 
In short, our numbers have sometimes been small, but it is still quite clear that it is 
difficult to define uniform religious attitudes among the Turkish-speaking 'community' in 
general and among the Turkish-speaking young people in particular. There are 
differences in terms of place of origin and in terms of religious sects. Alevis seem to 
have more relaxed attitudes towards religious practice. Cypriots have attitudes which are 
almost as relaxed, although they share the same faith with Turkish Sunnis. 
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Table 1-9: Youna People's Fasting Practice by Pnronfc' i=ocfinn Qrmn+irn IOL 




Frequency Fathers' Fasting Moff s' Fasting 
Yes No Yes No 
Nunter of Cases (31) (4) (25) 14 (16) 
Kurdish Alevi Females Yes 52 100(4) 44 64(9) 36(6) 
No 48 0 56 36(5) 63(10) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
NumberofCases (41) (7) (29) (9) (30) 
Kurdish Alevi Males Yes 20 57(4) 10 67(6) 7 
No 81 43(3) 90 33(3) 93 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Numberd Cases (14) (9) (3) (12) 2 
Turkish Sunni Females Yes 86(12) 83(7) 0 85(10) 0 
No 14(2) 17(2) 100(3) 15(2) 100(2) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
NuTberof Cases (14) (9) (3) (12) 
Turkish Sunni Males Yes 79(11) 78(7) 67(2) 83(10) 50(l) 
No 21(3) 22 2 33(l) 17(2) 50(l) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
NumberofCases (28) (8) (15) 16 (10) 
Cypriot Females Yes 43 63(5) 33(5) 63 10 20(2) 
No 57 38(3) 67(10) 38(6) 80(8) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
hharber d Cases (17) (7) 6 (9) (6) 
Cypriot Males Yes 41(7) 43(3) 33(2) 56 5 33(2) 
No 59(10) 57(4) 67(4) 44 (4) 67 (4) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
1.4 Conclusion: 
Broadly speaking, in order to understand the dynamics which shape religious and ethnic 
identities, it is better to avoid any generalisations and comparisons such as a 'Muslim 
community' versus 'secular British society' or of 'Turkish community' versus 'British 
society'. The construction of religious and ethnic identities can not be explained only by 
comparison of the values of ethnic minority groups with those of the dominant group. 
The values of a particular group are shaped by the internal dynamics as well. 
Moreover, the relationship between religion and ethnicity is complex. They do not always 
go hand in hand. It is absurd to call all members of the Turkish-speaking 'community' in 
London solely 'Muslim' and 'Turkish'. Making assumptions about religious identity is not 
a good starting point for analysis. When we assume a group's identity as Muslim, we can 
make three basic errors. First, we can miss the differentiation at the level of self- 
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identification of the individuals. In other words, because somebody calls another a 
Muslim, does not necessarily mean that they regard themselves as a Muslim. Secondly, 
some practical implications of this identity can be missed. There are many differences in 
terms of religious practice. In other words, there are people who practice their religion 
and others who don't and this is an extra dimension of their identity. Thirdly, by 
assuming a group of people to be Muslim regardless of the differences, the religious 
associations might be mistakenly assumed as 'real' representatives of the community. In 
fact, the ethnic minority associations are not necessarily representatives of a particular 
community. However, these consideration do not suggest that religion and ethnicity are 
not important for the members of the community. On the contrary, they are very keen to 
keep their religious and ethnic identities. 
Members of the community are not only aware of their differences in comparison to the 
members of the dominant society, they are also yet more aware of differences within 
their community. The fragmented nature of the Turkish-speaking 'community' further 
creates fractions based on religious and ethnic identity. These fractions are not creations 
of a process of interaction with the dominant society, but rather a product of internal 
processes of interaction between various Turkish religious and ethnic sectors. In other 
words, when the young people I interviewed identified themselves in religious and ethnic 
terms, their reference point is not British society, not even other non-Turkish-speaking 
Muslim communities in Britain, but the ethnic and religious differences within the 
Turkish-speaking 'community'. Their identity started from a micro level affiliation: Turk- 
Muslim, Kurd-Alevi and Turkish Cypriot- Sunni. It means that they do not identify 
themselves as 'Muslim' or 'Turkish' when they make a comparison with mainstream 
values, preferring to keep their micro level identities. 
The differences in self identification are also connected to the young people's practical 
involvement in religion, but their involvement with religion depends on a number of other 
factors too. It is not simply a matter of where they are from or the sects to which they feel 
they belong. It is rather a matter of more complex social relations, depending on whether 
they are male or female and whether their mother and father practices religion or not. 
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2. Turkish-speaking Families in London: 
2.1 Theoretical Introduction: 
Contemporary studies which concentrate on Turkish families in Europe point to a fixed 
notion of the so called 'traditional' Turkish family represented by parents in conflict with 
the modern, emancipated Western family exemplified by children, especially daughters. 
Morck (1998: 136), for example, claims that Danish society is gender-free compared to 
the strict gender ideology in Turkish culture: 
One great difference between the gender ideology that dominates the homes of the young 
immigrants compared with those of the rest of Danish society is that among the former, an 
ideology of difference dominates whereas in the latter an ideology of sameness rules. 
She also claims that: 
In the Western world, youth or the 'teenage years' has a different meaning than it does in 
Turkey or Pakistan. In the countries of origin it is not common to use the category of 
'youth', because someone is ether a child or married adult (Morck 1998: 140). 
In another study of Moroccan and Turkish runaway girls in the Netherlands, Brouwer 
(1998: 163) suggests that: 
The low social position of Moroccan and Turkish migrant families, and their sometimes 
unstable family situation, makes for a very complex situation in the Dutch context. Parents 
want to protect their daughters against 'bad' Western influences by exerting severe control 
over them and restricting their movements. 
Tan and Waldhoff (1996: 139) argue that children import the norms of German society 
into the family and interact with their parents according to these norms, and their 
attitudes create generational conflicts. 
In relation to the second generation young people in Britain, studies have often claimed 
that their families' ethnic and cultural values are different and that these differences 
create conflicts with the mainstream values. Using this perspective, Weinreich (1979) for 
instance, separated ethnic minority young people in accordance with the degree of 
conflict in their self-identification. Weinreich (1979: 101-103) argued that Asian boys and 
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girls have conflicting identification in relation to the native white population, but not, 
significantly, with their parents' ethnic background; Caribbean boys had a conflicting 
identification in relation to both their own ethnic background and the native white 
population; Caribbean girls had conflicts with the community, their families, but not with 
the values of the native white population. Ballard (1979: 114) also writing in the 1970s, 
argued for a more complex picture: 
The second generation participate in the British educational system and they are exposed 
to the values of their British peers. A gulf between them and their parents is inevitable, but 
it is usually neither so wide nor so clear-cut as outsiders may assume. 
But, Ballard (1979: 118) then added that: 
The fact that many Asian parents find themselves culturally and linguistically handicapped 
when they come into contact with British people and British institutions can have far- 
reaching effects on the balance of authority in the family. 
However, there are disagreements about the practical implications of such conflict. 
Some recent research argues that these conflicts prevent the possibility of change in 
families and encourage the children to keep their family values in their later lives. 
According to Tyler (1999: 1), 
young British Moslems are caught as they are between the strict culture of their parents 
and the easy-going ways of their peers. When they reject the rules of their home- no 
alcohol, no sex before marriages - they tend to reject everything. 'This kind of person will 
explode'. 
The danger of explosion seems to discourage the second generation from changing and 
later they become 'full time Muslims'. Pedersen (1998: 83) describes a typical Turkish 
boy in Denmark in the following way: 
A nice, polite and respectful Turkish boy paying regards to his family can quickly turn into a 
stylish conversationalist among Danish youth. The poster in a young man's bedroom might 
juxtapose the actor and martial arts champion Bruce Lee with religious signs. When they 
marry, they may well choose 'a quite normal girl with long black hair and light, brown eyes' 
because the time has come to be a full-time Muslim. In other words, there is a time to be 
young and a time to be a Muslim. 
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On the other hand, some authors believe that this conflict resolves into the assimilation 
or integration of the second generation young people into mainstream society. There are 
several theories to identify this process. Rumbault (1996), Waters (1996) and Zhou and 
Bankston (1996) classify them into two main models. According to the 'straight-line' 
model, second generation young people are expected to adapt to the white middle class 
life style at the end point of a process that begins with acculturation, proceeds through 
structural assimilation and intermarriage, and is accompanied by an absence of 
prejudice and discrimination in the core society. This model is sometimes thought to be 
applicable to second generations of European immigrants in the USA (Rumbault 
1996: 125). 
The second model, 'segmented assimilation', proposes that the adaptation of second 
generation young people is not expected in a unilinear line, but multiple ethnic identities 
may emerge, corresponding to distinct modes of immigrant adaptation and social 
contexts of reception. This model assumes that some second generation members may 
retain strong ethnic attachments and identities, while achieving socio-economic success 
and others may assimilate into mainstream sub-cultures with limited socio-economic 
mobility (Waters 1996: 176). Thus, according to this model, an explanation of differential 
patterns of adaptation must take into account the normative qualities of immigrant 
families and the patterns of social relations surrounding these families (Zhou and 
Bankston 1996: 201). 
Such approaches, on the other hand overlook similarities between the families from 
various ethnic backgrounds, while emphasising the 'different' nature of families 
regarding ethnic variations. This line of argument often oversimplifies the characteristics 
of ethnic minority families. As Morgan (1996: 62) argues: 
Popular white discourses, indeed, often identify different groups according to their 
supposed family practices: 'Asians' are considered to be more family orientated, more 
caring, have arranged marriages etc., while Afro-Caribbean families are perceived as 
being more disorganised, more prone to breakdown. If we are to avoid the danger of 
reproducing widely held stereotypes we require more detailed analysis. 
The family practices characterised as specifically immigrant activity might be valid for 
non-immigrant groups too. In a study of immigrant households in South Florida, Perez 
(1996: 118) makes similar claims that: 
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the importance of parenting arrangements and socio-economic variables in determining 
household structure among non-immigrant groups also may hold true for immigrant 
households, despite the tendency to attribute immigrant patterns primarily to cultural 
variability. 
In Britain, for instance, as Bhachu (1991a: 401) points out: 
Sikh women's cultural locations are constantly renegotiated and filtered through the same 
economic, political and media forces that affect white 'indigenous' women. 
In the late 1950s, in a study of working class families in an East London district, Young 
and Willmott (1957) found very powerful kinship ties, especially among the women. They 
argued that: 
In an unstable economy, nearly all men were at some time unemployed and at all times 
frightened of it; and even when they were in work, they frequently kept their families short 
of money. So the wife had to cling to the family into which she was born, and in particular 
to her mother, as the only other means of assuring herself against isolation. The extended 
family was her trade union, organised in the main by women and for women, its solidarity 
her protection against being alone (Young and Willmott 1957: 158). 
More than three decades later, in another study of this kind in Manchester, Finch and 
Mason (1993: 163) claim that extended family support is still alive and has a tangible 
reality in most people's lives. Moreover, they did not observe a straightforward 
relationship between the degree of support which members of a particular family might 
offer each other and these members' social status, gender, occupation, ethnicity or 
incomes (Finch and Mason 1993: 164). In fact, they admitted that: 
we are struck more by the similarities in the experience of our white interviewees and 
those of Asian or Caribbean descent, than by the differences between them (Finch and 
Mason 1993: 165). 
Moreover, even if there are differences between immigrant families and non immigrant 
ones in terms of household types such as single or extended, these differences do not 
automatically bring given degrees of kin network support. For instance, Bien, Marbach 
and Templeton (1992) find in their study of social networks of single-person households 
in Germany that although the percentage of lone households has increased since the 
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1950s from 18 per cent to 35 per cent of all households, people living alone in 
households have a family support network as dense as the whole population. 
In this respect, the assumption that lone parenthood and cohabitation, which are more 
common amongst Caribbeans, brings less family solidarity and lack of kin support is 
questionable too. In fact, in a study of living arrangements, family structure and social 
change among Caribbeans in Britain, Chamberlain (1999) observes that the siblings 
played an important role in childhood and child-bearing and the social responsibility for 
children is beyond the sole obligation of parents, but extends to the wider family and 
neighbourhood. Chamberlain (1999: 142) adds that: 
to look at the Caribbean family through a particular conjugal prism may not offer the most 
useful perspective for understanding Caribbean life, and may simply replicate... 
'categorical error' which sees, and has seen, Caribbean families as anarchic and 
dysfunctional. 
Positioning existing generational conflict as a result of differences between immigrant 
families and non-immigrant ones, might also ignore the fact that non-immigrant children 
cannot be assumed to be immune to conflict with their parents, regardless of the degree 
of severity. As Jamieson and Toynbee (1990: 103) indicate; in contemporary British 
families the parents, especially mothers, became vulnerable because their children's 
own social networks may provide knowledge of alternative, more liberating life styles and 
examples of extravagant generosity with which to torment their own parents. 
Indeed new conditions in the receiving country change the ethnic minority families. But 
change cannot simply be explained by the assimilationist effects of the mainstream 
society. Emphasising the conflicting existence of migrant values misses the constantly 
changing nature of the family both in sending countries and in receiving countries. 
It is evident that ethnic minority families have been constantly changing and these 
changes cannot be reduced simply to the influences of the dominant society, since the 
families in the sending countries are not static either. Indeed, the Turkish-speaking 
family has been changing continuously, both in Turkey and in other countries. As 
Kagitcibasi (1982: 4) points out, widespread social change is almost an everyday matter 
for people in Turkey. Even Turkish villages, through market relations, have already 
experienced many changes that affect the family. Similarly, Nichols (1996: 1) 
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emphasised the massive change in Turkish society since the advent to power of Ataturk 
in 1923. Kandiyoti (1990: 96) has argued that when capitalist penetration initiates the 
erosion of extended families, this erosion is faster among landless families than others. 
The proportion of nuclear families in rural areas in Turkey was found to be 44 per cent 
among farmers, 64 per cent among share-croppers, and as high as 79 per cent among 
agricultural wage-workers. 
As far as Turkish migrant families are concerned, there are differences between the first 
generation and second generation families and this is true not only for the international 
migrants but national migrants too. Erman (1998a, 1998b) observes that the younger 
generation migrant women in Ankara's squatter settlements questioned their position in 
society, especially their relations with their husbands. Most of the women become free 
from some aspects of oppression by moving away from the control of in-laws and strict 
norms of the village, and this is a major source of satisfaction for the first generation 
migrant women, while younger ones want more since younger women do not have an 
experience of direct control of in-laws who are in the village. 
In this chapter, it will be argued that Turkish-speaking young people's attitudes and their 
own parents' family structure do not fit well with Muslim family stereotypes. It will also be 
suggested that assimilation discourses do not provide an adequate basis for 
understanding these attitudes and the changing nature of Turkish-speaking families. 
In this respect, it is not reasonable to assume a fixed traditional Turkish family, and 
rather than making a comparison between the typical Turkish family in London with a 
typical western style, it is better to concentrate on changes within the Turkish-speaking 
family. In this chapter, first of all, the existing changes in authority relations in favour of 
young people, especially the girls, will be discussed. Secondly, young people's attitudes 
towards sexual relationships before marriage will be analysed in order to show the 
extent and limitations of change. In this context, the next part will concentrate on the 
young people's attitudes towards inter-ethnic marriages. In the fourth part, however, it 
will be argued that the Turkish-speaking young people prefer to have smaller family 
sizes and do not like their families interfering in decisions about marriage partners. They 
are also against the idea of the extended family. In particular, the scarcity of the 
extended family form itself works as a 'buffer institution' against a changing family 
structure (Kiray 1982) and engenders a considerably higher level of lone motherhood. 
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Kiray (1982) argued that extended family members provide the working couples in the 
nuclear families with support for child care and domestic responsibilities and in this 
sense, extended family work as a 'buffer institution' against a changing family structure. 
Then, in the last two parts, in the context of their changing attitudes, young people's 
perceptions of gender roles will be analysed. 
2.2 English as A Bargaining Lever against Parents: 
The most obvious change in Turkish-speaking families has occurred in relationships 
between parents and children. Apart from the patriarchal division of labour, the Kurdish 
and Turkish families' limited English language skills creates a new dynamic in terms of 
the authority relations in the household. Levine (1982: 340) argues that in the Turkish 
family, adults dominate children in all aspects of life and children do not have any rights 
until they are grown up. Moreover, in Cyprus too, the children are taught gender roles 
from an early age. In particular, girls' chastity and modesty are directly related to their 
families' honour (Ulug 1981: 20-23). 
Fisek (1982) argues that in Turkey while the status of children is low, boys definitely 
have higher status than girls. The expectation of the obedience of children to authority 
transcends differential sex role expectations. Compliance, meekness, respect and 
quietness are rewarded, while activity, liveliness, curiosity, talk and initiative are 
punished in both the boys and the girls. Thus, the individual's use of initiative and 
autonomy would be constricted, and only expressed through approved outlets, such as 
militarism, heroism, and over-valuation of maleness. 
Furthermore, Fisek (1982: 302) claims that early sex role training leads to an early and 
intense identification with the parent of the same sex and an early adoption of adult roles 
and attitudes, which further serve to inhibit curiosity and initiative and to foreclose on the 
experimentation of childhood and youth. 
However, in London, this authority structure has been changed. When the parents need 
to see their GP or deal with a council matter, they take their children to translate. A 
Turkish education officer believed that this is the main reason for children's truancy. The 
children also deal with letters and bills etc. This factor gives them extra power and 
makes their parents dependent upon them. A Turkish teacher claimed that: 
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Language gives these children power over their parents. After spending some time doing 
translations for their families, they don't respect their families. They think they are cleverer 
than their father or mother. And because they believe they have more knowledge than their 
parents, they start not to listen to their parents. This creates a lack of a proper role model 
in their life. Their friends become the only role models. 
The young people use their linguistic skills to provide a limited kind of freedom for 
themselves. On the other hand, as will be discussed later, losing authority is debatable. 
The parents do not lose authority, but the young people obtain a certain amount of 
freedom or a bargaining power. 
As can be seen in Table 2.1, only four out of ten Kurdish young people can 
communicate in Kurdish in their household. In addition, most of the young people can 
only understand the language, but not speak it. The majority of the Kurdish families use 
a Turkish-Kurdish mix, rather than pure Kurdish. Kurdish mothers who are older than 40 
seem more comfortable speaking Kurdish than Turkish. Language is a serious burden 
for the mothers, especially older ones. Their generation usually did not have any formal 
education and they are illiterate in both languages. Erturk (1995: 143) compares Kurdish 
men and women in Eastern Anatolia: 
Many of the women over 30 years of age, in the region, do not speak Turkish- the 
official language; many are married by religious law which is not recognised under 
the modern/secular legal system; many are not registered with the central population 
bureau and thus do not "officially" exist. Although there may be men who share 
similar status, by and large, they are more integrated into the institutional nexus. For 
reasons of schooling, the military, and employment, male children are registered at 
birth or shortly thereafter. 
Kurdish women's limited language ability makes it difficult for them to learn English in 
this country. They cannot use free public services to learn English, because the lessons 
are in Turkish. They are totally dependent on their husbands or other family members. 
Moreover, they cannot understand official letters, even if they are written in Turkish. 
Kurdish fathers do not have these problems since the majority of them can read and 
write in Turkish. However, their problem is with English. Most of them have no ability to 
speak or write in English. 
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The problem of illiteracy is not unique to the Kurdish mothers. It is also a fact for the 
Turkish mothers. The older generation of Turkish mothers, like their Kurdish 
counterparts, have a dependency on other family members in their public life. These 
family members are usually their children. The dependency of the mothers on their 
children has reduced their authority over the children's lives. If she cannot understand 
what exactly is going on, then she can not control them. One of the Turkish boys 
explains his relations with his mother as follows: 
My mother is a very nice person, you know. Even if she become suspicious about 
something I did, I can convince her otherwise very easily. My father does not bother about 
my life too much. In fact, he is always in the shop. For instance, when the school sent a 
letter, I showed it to my mum. But even if I show it her up side down, she can't recognise it. 
Then she asks me about its content. If it is something bad, I lie about it. If it is something 
OK, then I might say the truth. 
Although both parents suffer from a lack of language ability, it has more effect on the 
women. The women's restricted movement in the public sphere seems a common 
phenomenon among migrant groups. As Yuval-Davis (1997: 197) points out, wives of 
immigrants are often excluded from the public sphere because of legal restrictions, lack 
of work opportunities or linguistic inadequacies. 
Turkish-speaking men in London prefer to spend most of their time in the public sphere. 
In fact, they have very long working hours and very short leisure time. However, even if 
they are unemployed, they leave the house after having their breakfast. They visit their 
friends' shops and usually go to the coffee houses. Since most of their friends are 
Turkish-speaking men, they do not need to speak English at all. For instance, one of the 
Kurdish fathers replied to a question concerning the difficulties in his life due to a lack of 
English skills: 
I have lived here for nearly ten years now. I know the surrounding area very well. By my 
car, there is no where I could not go without any help. Outside, I have my friends. As you 
can see I don't need any English. Anyway it is too late for me now. But the children should 
learn the language well not only for their own sake, but for helping us as well. 
The women manage to visit their relatives within walking distance. However, when they 
need to travel long distances, they need their husbands to give them a lift. Alternatively, 
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if they go to somewhere together with other female relatives, one available male 
member picks up all of the women and gives them a lift. 
This condition might not be peculiar to the Turkish-speaking young people in London, 
but the young people from other ethnic minority groups and Turkish young people in 
other European countries as well. Khan (1979: 50) observed in a study of the Mirpuri 
community in Britain that: 
children who were born in Britain or have undergone most of their schooling in this country 
have a greater facility in communication than their parents. Elders may feel threatened or 
insecure, and although many minors maintain the public authority and respect due to 
elders, occasions arise when minors publicly question or disobey their elders. 
Tan and Waldhoff (1996: 144) point out that first generation Turkish migrants have a lack 
of language skills and can only communicate with the 'German world' through their 
children's translation. Brouwer (1998: 153) reports the same phenomena among the 
Turkish community in the Netherlands. 
However, there is a fragile balance between having freedom from the parents and being 
under their control. From the young people's points of view, their linguistic ability means 
freedom, while from the parents' points of view, the help children offer is simply an 
extension of the children's responsibility in the family. Ultimately, both sides tend to find 
a middle way. The condition certainly creates bargaining power for the young people. 
For instance, one of the families needed their daughter to go to a doctor with them. At 
first she refused because of important lessons she needed to attend the following day. 
Her mother said that she should go with them, because there was nobody else. After 
fifteen minutes discussion, the daughter accepted on condition that she could buy a 
dress she saw in a shop. 
On the other hand, the young people's power has its limit too. If they push the 
boundaries too far, punishment will follow accordingly. For instance, one of the Turkish 
teachers talked about one experience of this kind: 
One Kurdish boy had not been in the school for two weeks. The school sent letters both in 
Turkish and English, and forced the boy to bring the signed reply letter from his parents 
and he did. However, he continued his truancy. Then, the class head asked me to call his 
parents by phone and we understood that he just wrote the reply letters and his mother put 
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her name at the end. I told his mother about his truancy. Next day he came to the school 
with a donkey hair cut [this is a common punishment in Turkish school for the boys who 
have unsuitable hair cuts or are not clothed according to the school's proper dress code. 
The teacher cuts the children's hair in an ugly way and they end up with very short hair cut 
to correct it]. Then I felt so bad. I didn't mean him to get hurt, I just wanted them to speak 
with him. 
Furthermore, as can be observed in Table 2.1, an overwhelming majority of the young 
people prefer to speak Turkish and English with their brothers and sisters. It should be 
noted that when young people said they speak Turkish and English, they do not mean to 
speak five minutes of English only, than the next five minutes of Turkish only. They 
usually create a mixed language (perhaps best called 'Turkish and English'). They 
sometimes use Turkish words for English ones such as: 
20 pounds - 20 lira. 
On other occasions, they use the grammatical structure of Turkish with English words: 
She invited me her birthday party - Beni birthday partisine cagirdi - Beni dogum gunune 
cagirdi. 
I went shopping - Shoppinge gittim - Alisverise gittim. 
Or they use a direct translation from English into Turkish: 
I took a taxi - Taksi aldim [in Turkish it means that I bought a taxi] - Taksiye bindim. 
Tan and Waldhoff (1996: 145) observe a similar situation in Germany. They point out that 
the second generation Turks speak a mixed language, which is neither Turkish nor 
German. This language includes a particular form of grammar, phonetics, and even 
pitch, breathing and intonation. This Turkish-German mixed language has various forms 
from the simple use of German words such as 'Tschüß' (bye bye) into a Turkish 
conversation, to changing spoken Turkish into the logical pattern of German, or using 
German suffixes with Turkish words, or changing some German names into the Turkish 
ones according to sounds (Tan and Waldhoff 1996: 146-7). Tan and Waldhoff (1996: 145) 
also emphasise that: 
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The speaker of such a mixed language does not perceive his or her communicative ability 
as Halbsprachigkeit (a partial command of language)- as a deficiency- since both 
languages together constitute the linguistic repertoire and cannot be separated. This 
pattern of speech and communication is a specific form of bi-lingualism and not the 
restricted code of semi-competence. 
Moreover, only 11 per cent of Kurdish young people speak Kurdish with their brothers 
and sisters. Mixed usage of Turkish and English increases considerably when the young 
people speak with their brothers and sisters. The percentages of Turkish and Cypriot 
young people who speak Turkish and English with their brothers and sisters is even 
higher than among the Kurdish young people, 88 per cent and 92 per cent respectively. 
Speaking English is a very good way to escape from parents' control in the home. This is 
especially true for the girls. A Turkish girl talked about how speaking English is useful for 
her to escape her mother's attention: 
When I am together with my friends in the home, we talk about girl stuff, you know, 
something like boys. But if my mum heard, or understood, it will be disastrous. Then we 
speak English. We can't go to the other room, because if we go, then our mums ask if we 
are planning something secret, we should sit with them. If they bother to ask what we are 
talking about, we just reply we are studying English and talk about our lessons. 
Again on an occasion, a Kurdish mother did not like the colour of her daughter's nail 
polish. She asked where she found this 'bitchy colour and told her to remove it. Her 
sister said: 
Annemi ignore et [Ignore mum]. Nice renk [nice colour]. Nice degil mi [Isn't it nice]? 
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Tahle 2.1- Snnkan Laneuaee In tha hnhIsphniric by niaro of nrinin toil 
Language spoken in the 
home with the parents 
Kurdish Populated 
Areas (92) 








Turkish 53 71 34 53 52 
Turkish-English 8 29 66 47 31 
Other* 39 18 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Language spoken among 
the young people 
(92) (34) (50) (30) (206) 
Turkish 29 12 8 14 19 
Turkish-English 61 88 92 87 77 
Other* 11 5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
*this category includes 'Kurdish', 'Turkish-Kurdish' and 'Kurdish-English' 
On the other hand, in spite of their new bargaining power in the family, these young 
people are not so keen to change on two issues relating to the family: cohabiting and 
inter-ethnic marriages. 
2.3 Attitudes Towards Sexual Relationships Before Marriage: 
In Britain, according to data collected by the ethnic minority survey, 11 per cent of white 
and 18 per cent of Caribbean and only 2-4 per cent of South Asian partners of all ages 
are cohabiting (Berthoud and Beishon 1997: 28). In my sample of the Turkish-speaking 
young people, none of them have cohabiting parents. Furthermore, none of the Turkish- 
speaking young people have never-married lone mothers, compared to about 32 per 
cent, six per cent and one per cent of the Caribbean, whites and South Asian families in 
Britain respectively (Berthoud and Beishon 1997: 39). 
In this respect, the Turkish-speaking parents do not accept the family forms based on 
arrangements other than a marriage. The following observation is a typical attitude of the 
parents towards cohabitation. At a party for Women's Day at the Islington Council Hall, a 
speech was given about having children outside of marriage. The speaker said that: 
We as women should have a right to choose when and with whom to have a child, and if 
we want, we should be able to have a child outside of marriage. 
A middle aged woman interrupted the speaker and said: 
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Look, you told us there was a party for women and I brought my daughter. Now what sort 
of things are you trying to say in front of these young girls? They are not good examples for 
the young brain. 
On the other hand, in his study of ninety-three Turkish young people in London, 
Kucukcan (1998) found a high approval rate of pre-marital sexual relations. Although he 
admitted that his respondents (42 boys and 51 girls aged 12-18) were reluctant to talk 
about the subject, according to him, the reason behind this approval is that: 
The first generation is not successful in transmitting religious values to their children. It 
may also be suggested that the young people are adopting some of the values of the 
larger society where such relations are regarded as natural and practised by their peers 
(Kucukcan 1998: 126). 
The findings of my research do not support his result and his assumptions. In terms of 
Turkish-speaking young people's points of view, the family forms based on cohabitation 
seem not to be a reasonable option. As indicated in Table 2.2, the majority of the young 
people, like their parents, do not approve of having a sexual relationship before 
marriage. As discussed in the previous chapter, the majority of the young people also 
have their friendships within their own peer group. Besides, since in my research the 
young people, especially girls, are very keen to speak about these subjects, their 
responses show that the subject is not simply a matter of approval or exposing the 
'conflicting value system and multiple group belonging' (Kucukcan 1998: 127) or 
emerging 'British-Turkish identities' (Kucukcan 1998: 128). 
Table 2.2 reveals that more than half of the young people do not think that it is 
appropriate to have a sexual relationship before marriage. The number of girls who 
disapprove of this kind of relationship is slightly less than that of the boys who are 
against the idea. Moreover, the number of boys who think they can get involved in a 
relationship before marriage is more than that of girls. It means that the girls' attitudes 
towards sex are more liberated than boys, but they feel more social control than the 
boys. One Turkish girl explained that: 
It will be nice to share the same house with my boyfriend before marriage to know him 
better. But there shouldn't be any sexual relationship between us. Because, if I don't like 
him anymore, I can't leave him then and I have to marry him. Anyway, this is out of the 
question for me. Because even if nothing happened between us, you can not explain it to 
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your family or any body else. In the end, you have to marry him anyway, so what is the 
meaning of this trial? Also, if you accept a sexual relationship with your boyfriend before 
marriage, what happens to you if he changes his mind and refuses to marry you? Who is 
going to accept you anymore? 
Furthermore, both the girls and the boys think that this decision must be made by the 
girls and both of them agree that possible negative results affect the girls, not the boys. 
One of the Cypriot girls gave an example: 
If my son has a relationship and has a child at the end, I can force him to marry the girl. 
Even if he refuses me, nobody will condemn him. But if my daughter has a child in the 
same condition, how can I force somebody else's son to marry my daughter? Didn't his 
family ask me where was your daughter's mind, when she made this mistake? What can I 
answer them? Then how can I accept her? What might people say about us? 
In another interview, one of the Turkish boys explained the differences between boys 
and girls in this matter: 
We as men are not clever. It is easy to trick us. In some situations, you know what I mean, 
man cannot control himself, but a girl must always behave herself. They should not be 
tricked. I don't like the idea of a relationship before marriage, but even if I made a mistake, 
I can turn my back and forget. But for a girl, it is not something to be ignored. Life for her 
finishes. 
This unbalanced distribution of responsibility seems to create a paranoia between boys 
and girls about each other. A discussion with a group of Kurdish girls is a good example: 
Girl 1: If a boy really loves and respects you, he will never ask you something like that. 
Because he knows you are not that type of girl. 
Girl 2: But may be he tries. If you say yes, then he thinks you are that kind of girl, 
sometimes boys do this kind of things you know. I don't experience something like that 
myself, but I heard from other girls. Anyway, you should be very careful. 
In an example of mistrust from the boys' side, a Kurdish boy claims that: 
If a girl says she loves me and if we had this kind of relationship, how can I be sure that I 
can trust her. If she does it now, she can do it later with somebody else. 
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Question: But she can do it, even after you are married. How can you guarantee 
something like that? 
That's why you should not get married with somebody in the first instance. You should 
evaluate everything very carefully. You must be sure you can trust her fidelity and love and 
she should know her responsibilities as your wife. 
Table 2-2: Sexual Relatienshins hafnrp marriana by Plano of Arinin 1041 
Is it OK b have a Kurdish Other Places in Cyprus Mixed Total 
sexual Populated Turkey 
relationship before Areas 
mwiage? 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
(40) (52) (17) (17) (33) 17 13 17 (103) (103) 
Yes 28 27 29(5) 29(5) 42 41(7) 62(8) 29(5) 37 30 
No 68 65 53(9) 65(11) 42 35(6) 31(4) 53(9) 52 58 
Don't Know 5 8 18(3) 6(1) 15 24(4) 8(1) 18(3) 11 12 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Could you have a Kurdish Other Places in Cyprus Mixed Total 
sewxal Populated Turkey 
rela&nsi p berme Areas 
mmiage? 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
40 (52) (17) (17) (33) (17) (13) (17) (103) (103) 
Yes 8 31 18(3) 35(6) 36 47 8 46 (6) 47 (8) 23 37 
No 88 64 82 (14) 53 (9) 52 24 (4) 46 (6) 41 7 70 52 
Don't Know 5 6 1 12(2) 12 29 5 81 12 2 7 12 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Apart from their attitudes towards sexual relationships before marriage, the young 
people also do not approve of inter-ethnic marriages, though the number of those who 
were not against the idea, is considerably higher than the existing number of inter-ethnic 
families. 
2.4 Attitudes Towards Inter-Ethnic Marriages: 
Berthoud and Beishon (1997: 31) in their study of ethnic minority families in Britain 
comment that there was virtually no sign that the various minorities saw each other as 
forming a common pool from which to select non-white partners. 
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Indeed, choosing a future partner from another ethnic community is an important 
indicator to show whether the community will be able to open its boundaries to others in 
the future or not. In relation to this subject, Kibria (1997: 524) argues that: 
for members of ethnic groups, inter-marriage often poses a 'boundary dilemma' or a 
conceptual space within which to consider questions about one's ethnic identity. That is, as 
they reflect on the meaning and consequences of out-marriage for their ethnic affiliation, 
group members also inevitably confront questions about the definition, meaning and 
significance of the boundaries that mark their identity. 
It is a fact that very few Turkish-speaking young people prefer to marry somebody from 
outside their communities, though they approve of marriages between sub-groups. The 
boys seem more open to accept a partner from other groups in Britain than the girls. 
Table 2.3 indicates that 28 per cent of the boys and only 14 per cent of the girls said that 
they would like to have a partner who is English, Irish, Pakistani and so on. On the other 
hand, some groups seem more preferable than others, as with their friendship patterns 
discussed in the previous chapter. Most of those who would prefer to marry somebody 
outside the Turkish-speaking 'community' want an English person, followed by other 
white groups such as Irish, Scottish, Italian and so on. There are only two girls who want 
to marry a Caribbean man, while none of the boys would prefer to marry a black girl. 
Moreover, these young people seem to have an open mind with regard to marrying 
somebody whose origin might cross the inner boundaries of the Turkish-speaking 
'community'. Half of the girls and more than half of the boys would prefer to marry 
somebody within the Turkish-speaking 'community', regardless of his or her origin or 
religious affiliation. The number of the boys who want to marry a girl from a specific 
religious group is very low. Only one per cent of them admit that kind of preference. 
Similarly, only seven per cent of the girls have some religious preference. For these, 
their husbands should be either Alevi or Muslim. 
On the other hand, it does not mean that they have no prejudices about each other. For 
instance, some of the Kurdish and Turkish girls think that Cypriot boys are less 
trustworthy compared with the Kurdish and Turkish boys, while some Cypriot and 
Kurdish girls claim the Turkish boys are more religious and Kurdish boys more traditional 
and rural compared with their own group. For instance, one of the Kurdish Alevi girls had 
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a Turkish boyfriend, and her friends thought that if she continued this relationship, it 
would be very harmful for her. One of them said: 
This girl [pointed to the girl with Turkish boyfriend] is blind with her love. She could not see 
the future. What happens if she marries him? They will probably be very strict on her. 
The girl with the boyfriend replied: 
As you know [to her friends], Ahmet is not like that. He is not like others. He is not religious, 
he is a modern man. 
Furthermore, some Kurdish and Turkish boys believe that the Cypriot girls are less 
committed in a relationship, while some Cypriot boys are afraid of the family pressure on 
Turkish and Kurdish girls. 
There are some differences between the preferences of boys and girls in terms of their 
places of origin. As can be seen from Table 2.3, Kurdish girls seem more reluctant to 
marry somebody from outside the Turkish-speaking 'community' than the other girls. 
Moreover, over a quarter of the Turkish girls admit to preferring to marry somebody 
outside the Turkish-speaking 'community'. This number is the highest, compared with 
the other girls. Some of them think inter-marriages are a kind of protest against their 
families' preferences for them. For instance, a Turkish girl talks about how intimidating 
her uncles' beliefs about inter-marriages are: 
My uncles like arranged marriages. To me it seems odd. They don't really know what this 
person is really like. All my uncles are married. One of my aunts is English. I have another 
one who is Irish, and another one who is half Indian, half English. But, even though they 
married outside their culture, they still come up to me and start preaching how I should 
actually marry up, and not get involved with Arabs [Arab refers both to somebody who is 
Black or Arab in Turkish], not get involved with English people, they don't have respect 
ever. One of my uncles preach to me about how I should marry inside my culture. But his 
wife is Indian. She is Asian. But he still thought he has the right to come to preach to me 
about his wrong doings. I mean it is just stupid, if I want to marry with someone, I should 
have the right to marry him. It is nothing to do with my uncle. 
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Table 2-3: Ideal Ethnic Identity of the Partners hu Vni, nn nonnlo&c I=4hnt - L4. *;.. 10/-1 
Kurdish Other Places in Cyprus Mixed Total 
Populated Turkey 
Areas 
Ethnic Female Male Female Male Female Male Fernale Male Female Male 
Preferences (40) (52) (17) (17) (33) (17) (13) (17) (103) (103) 
for Future 
Partner 
Don't mind 3 4 12(2) 12(2) 18 29(5) 31(4) 6(1) 13 10 
Non-Turkish 10 33 29 (5) 24 (4) 15 24 (4) 24 (4) 14 28 
Speaking 
Turk* 65 54 47(8) 59(10) 39 35 6 39(5) 65 11 51 53 
Turk/T. Cyp. /T 13 10 27 12 (2) 23 (3) 6 (1) 17 8 
. Kurd Muslim/Alevi 10 12(2) 10(l) 1 8(l) 7 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
"includes somebody from Turkey or Cyprus, regardless of places of origin or religious 
affiliation. 
The young people with mixed origin show more or less similar attitudes with others on 
this issue. On the other hand, while the number of the girls with mixed origin who don't 
mind their future partner's ethnic identity, is higher than that of girls in other groups, 
none of the mixed origin girls want to have a partner outside of the Turkish-speaking 
'community'. This pattern is also observed among five girls and four boys one of whose 
parents were outside of the Turkish-speaking 'community'. None of these girls want to 
marry somebody outside the Turkish-speaking 'community' either and half of these boys 
want to marry somebody from the Turkish-speaking 'community'. 
Broadly speaking, the hierarchical order based on age in the Turkish-speaking family 
was damaged under the influence of living in London. The families' lack of English 
language gives their children a bargaining power in the family. Yet, at the same time 
these young people do not approve of sexual relationships outside of marriage and do 
not prefer inter-ethnic marriages, though the number of young people who wish to marry 
somebody from outside the community is greater than the existing number of that kind of 
marriage. Their reservations about sexual relationships and inter-ethnic marriages can 
be regarded as 'the reflections of differences between a Muslim family and western 
values'. Even so, however, a deeper analysis of the issue shows that young people 
would not fit a common Muslim family image in many respects. 
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2.5 'Unrealistic Dreams of Youth'? 
As discussed earlier, it is sometimes assumed that, although young ethnic minorities are 
influenced by the values of the dominant society, such influences hardly create 
substantial changes in their family life. In this part, it will be shown that young people, 
first of all, have very different ideas on various issues from the classical Muslim family 
typologies. However, it will also be argued that such differences do not imply 
fundamental differences from their own families, since their families might not fit the 
classical Muslim family typologies, either. Given that most of the parents are first 
generation migrants in the UK, their differences cannot simply be discussed within the 
context of the influences of the receiving country. Therefore, the young people's different 
attitudes from conventional Muslim family understandings, cannot be understood without 
referring to the changing family structure in Turkey. 
2.5.1 Preferences regarding the number of children: 
In terms of the number of children in the household, Turkish families in London are 
similar to Pakistani and Bangladeshi families. The majority of the white, Caribbean, 
Indian and African Asian families have one or two children, while more than half of the 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi families have three or more children (Berthoud and Beishon 
1997: 41). 
Regardless of the place of origin, having only one child or two children is not common 
among the families in the Turkish-speaking 'community'. On the other hand, Cypriot 
families are smaller in size, compared with others including families having one of the 
parents from outside the Turkish-speaking 'community'. More than six in ten Cypriot 
families have one or two children, while only about three in ten Kurdish families and half 
of the Turkish and mixed families do so. As can be seen from Table 2.4,72 per cent of 
the Kurdish families have three or more children, compared with 36 per cent of Cypriot, 
46 per cent of mixed and 53 per cent of Turkish families. 
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Table 2-4- Number of the children in the Hnusphnlrlc hu Piaco of Clrinin 10/-% 
Kurdish Populated 
Areas (92) 








up to 2 children 29 47 64 53 44 
Three children 44 32 26 33 36 
More than three 28 21 10 13 20 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
As shown in Table 2.5, Turkish-speaking young people, especially Kurdish ones do not 
want the size of their future families to be similar to their existing ones. More than 60 per 
cent of Turkish-speaking young people prefer a small number of children. Nearly six out 
of ten Kurdish young people prefer to have up to two children. Other young people also 
want smaller families for themselves, though the differences between their preferences 
and the actual size of their families is not as dramatic as it is for Kurdish young people. 
Moreover, the girls in each group are more likely to prefer to have fewer children than 
their families. The difference between Turkish boys and girls is especially apparent. 
There are differences between the boys and girls in terms of the reasons to want less 
children. When the girls explained their preferences, they thought not only in terms of 
financial problems, but also in terms of the physical and psychological responsibilities of 
bringing up a child. But the boys seemed only interested in the financial side of the 
problem. 
Tahla 9.5- Prpfarrad Numhpr of Chilr(ran by Place of Öriain (%1 
Kurdish Other Places in Cyprus Mixed Total 
Populated Turkey 
Areas 
Fen M#; Tä Fen Mb Tä Fan M#; Td Fan M#; Td Fan Mb Tä 
1 1 
None or up 63 56 59 71 53 62 61 70 64 1 54 59 56 63 59 61 
to 2 children 12 9 (12) 10 
Three 33 37 35 24 41 32 33 12 26 23 35 30 30 33 32 
children 4 7 2 6 
More than three 5 8 7 6(1) 6(l) 6 6 18 10 23 6(1) 13 8 9 8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Is this difference simply a result of the unrealistic ambitions before being a 'full time 
Muslim'? No. It is not. Having two children - one girl and one boy - is very preferable 
among the young Kurdish and Turkish families and their preferences seem to be 
encouraged by the older generation. As one father said: 
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My father could not know all of us by our names. We are twelve brothers and sisters. Then 
I married at 18 years old. My wife was only sixteen. I had five children. Three girls and two 
boys. Bringing up all these children is very difficult job. But believe me if I had my current 
views, I probably would have stopped at three. The new generation are more clever than 
us. Though economic conditions also force them to have less children. Children want more 
now than before. 
In fact, the average number of children per family in Turkey has been in decline too. The 
ratio of the children in the age group 0 to 14 years old, compared with rest of the 
population has declined from 78 per cent to 58 per cent between 1935 and 1995 (SIS 
1996: 72). Moreover, the average number of children aged 0 to 14, per household has 
also declined from 2.6 to 1.8 between 1965 and 1990 (SIS 1971,1996). 
2.5.2 Attitudes towards Arranged Marriages: 
The Turkish-speaking young people even oppose the idea of arranged marriages as the 
main features of the family in traditional societies. Marriage without their parents' 
consent is difficult for the girls. In practice it means breaking all ties with their families. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that if everything goes all right in the marriage, the 
families gradually tend to accept their son-in-law. However, if something goes wrong 
with the marriage, the girls know that it is difficult to ask for help from their parents. 
Moreover, there is a general belief that when the girl gets married without her parents' 
acceptance, her parents-in-law might treat her badly or they can take advantage of her 
helplessness. A Kurdish girl talked about her own family experiences: 
My family were against my sister's marriage, because she was so young and the boy 
worked in his father's shop. He was not independent. But she didn't listen to them and 
escaped to him. They are now married and have a daughter. She has some problems with 
her mother-in-law, because they live in the same home. But my mum never let my sister 
talk about her problems. She said to her 'You are on your own, we have no power to 
intervene now. What do they say to us? They probably say that we didn't want your 
daughter. She came herself. ' I think my mum is right, she can't intervene now. Because of 
this, if I found myself in the same situation, I might think twice. For instance, I will never 
marry somebody without a job, I will never marry somebody if we will live with his family. 
The families do not give up on their sons, except in extreme conditions. For example, 
one of the Turkish families has a son who married his maternal uncle's ex-wife. Their 
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relationship started when she was still married to his uncle. When the family heard about 
it, they refused to see both their son and his uncle's wife. At present, only his sisters 
have contact with him. However, the parents do not know about this. Other than these 
kinds of conditions parents do not refuse to see their sons, and after a couple of years, 
the parents have usually accepted their son's wife and marriage. 
The families' various attitudes to the girls' and boys' marriages makes the girls relatively 
more cautious when they think about marriage. Although, like the boys, the girls prefer to 
make their own decisions, they believe that in order to reject their families' opinion about 
their boyfriend, the relationship with him must be more powerful than that with their 
families. As one Turkish girl explained: 
If my family do not like the person I wish to marry, first I will ask them about their 
objections. If they are reasonable, I will think again. I will try every possible way to convince 
them. But if I really love the boy and trust him more than I trust my family, I might escape. 
However, if their family rejects their relationships, the boys are reluctant to leave their 
girlfriends. For example, a Cypriot boy said that: 
There is only one condition in which I listen to my family. That is if they saw my girlfriend 
with somebody else. But not on the street or something. If they saw her hand in hand. 
Even then, I would not break my relationship. First I would ask her if it is true or not. If I 
trust her answer, then I don't listen to my family. 
On the other hand, the young people believe that the possibility of their family's rejection 
of prospective partners will be very small because their choice will be responsible. A 
responsible choice means that, as much as possible, the person should meet the basic 
cultural and economic criteria of the families, that is being Muslim or Alevi and/or having 
a means of earning money. As one of the Cypriot girls explained: 
My family trust me. They know I am capable of avoiding wrong things and doing right ones. 
If he has a good job, earns good money, has a good house and a good family, they don't 
mind what religion he is. Of course, a big catch like that might not come to me. 
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Table 2-6: Marriage against family wiehaa hu Plnrn of nrinin roil 
Kurdish 
16, 
Other Places in Cyprus Mixed Total 
Populated Turkey 
Areas 
Marriage Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
against iam1y (40) (52) (17) (17) (33) (17) (13) (17) (103) (103) 
wish 
Do not marry 40 12 24 4 18 3 18 29(5) 31(4) 6(1) 29 15 
Marry against 60 89 77 82 82 71 69 (9) 94 71 85 
my family wish (13) 1 (14) 1 (12) (16) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 000 100 
One again, is this difference simply a result of unrealistic ambitions before becoming a 
'full time Muslim'? Again, no. It is not. Young people's attitudes towards arranged 
marriages could not be understood as a result of being in Britain, in fact arranged 
marriages are not common among the majority of people in Turkey (although this is 
dependent on family background). Gokce et al. (1993: 115) found that in Ankara, Istanbul 
and Izmir Gecekondus [urban settlement built over night], 65 per cent of men and 67 per 
cent of women do not have arranged marriages. The proportion of the arranged 
marriages was 16 per cent in Western Anatolia, 22 per cent in South Anatolia, 33 per 
cent in Inner Anatolia and 33.3 per cent in the Black Sea Region (although this kind of 
marriage is the norm in Gecekondus in Eastern Anatolia, where 57 per cent of the men 
and 46 per cent of the women in the area observe this tradition). This is more or less 
true for Cyprus too, arranged marriages in Cyprus have become less and less a 
common practice. 
Ulug (1981: 22) notes that in Cyprus arranged marriage, despite a common assumption 
that girls are forced into this form of marriage, is usually a form of match making. The 
boy and girl are introduced to each other by their families and if they like their 
companion, marriage will be arranged. However, at any point, both sides can change 
their minds. 
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the young people, irrespective of gender, 
indicated that if their families were against their choice of a partner, they would go ahead 
with their decisions. In addition to their willingness to have fewer children and make their 
own decision on their future partners without their family's interference, the young 
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people's attitudes towards the extended family as a traditional family form, are also very 
negative. 
2.5.3 Attitudes towards the Extended Family: 
In order to measure attitudes towards extended families, the Turkish-speaking young 
people were asked whether they would like to share the same household with their 
parents or parents-in-law after marriage. The majority of them did not like the idea and 
their answers were negative. 
The number of girls who were against the idea was larger than that of boys. There are 
not such large differences in terms of the places of origin. The attitudes of the young 
people whose parents were from outside of the Turkish-speaking 'community', are also 
similar to the rest of the young people. As can be observed in Table 2.7,86 per cent of 
the girls and 78 per cent of the boys do not like the idea of sharing the same home with 
their families after marriage. The girls think that living with parents-in-law gives, to the 
latter, extra control and allows more interference. A Kurdish girl admitted that she does 
not like the idea of sharing: 
Today, even village girls in Turkey don't accept living with their parents-in-law. I don't like 
that idea. If you live with your husband's parents, they will always interfere in your relations 
with him and your children. There will be no personal life. Also the house could never be 
yours, it will be your mother-in-law's home. She will probably try to control you. No, not for 
me thanks! 
Like the girls, the boys do not want to share the same household with their parents. They 
think that it is not a matter of losing control, rather that it shows a lack of personal 
responsibility for their life. One Turkish boy believed that: 
If you want to marry, you should have the responsibility to provide a home, food and 
everything else for your wife and children. If continue to live with your family, it means you 
still depend on them to look after you and your own family. If your mother and father need 
your support, like if they are ill or something, if they cannot live on their own, then of course 
I should look after them and they can live in my house, but not the opposite. 
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Table 2-7: Sharing the same household with parents after marriage by place of 
orinin 1°I 
Kurdish Other Places Cyprus Mixed Total 
Populated in Turkey 
Areas 
Sharing the same Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Mile 
household with (40) (52) (17) (17) (33) (17) (13) (17) (103) (103) 
pas after 
madage 
Yes 3 15 12(2) 16(l) 9 18(3) 35 6 6 18 
No 88 81 83(14) 177(13) 85 71(12) 92(12) 53 (9) 86 74 
Notknow 10 4 6(1) 18(3) 6 12(2) 8(1) 12(2) 8 9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Is this difference simply a result of unrealistic ambitions before becoming a 'full time 
Muslim'? Again, no. As shown in Table 2.8, the extended family household is not 
common in existing households in London. Turkish-speaking households are usually 
nuclear families. Due to this characteristic, Turkish-speaking families are clearly different 
from Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Indian/African and Chinese families, and similar to white 
and Caribbean families. In Britain, 49 per cent of Pakistani/Bangladeshi, 42 per cent of 
Indian/African Asian and 40 per cent of Chinese households have three or more adults, 
compared to 17 per cent of white and 18 per cent of Caribbean households (Berthoud 
and Beishon 1997: 46). As can be seen in Table 2.8, there are no grandparents, uncles 
or aunts in 81 per cent of the Turkish-speaking homes. 
When the newly married couple live with their parents (usually the husband's family), the 
condition is temporary and it would be discussed before marriage. Otherwise, the bride 
has the right to cancel the marriage or return to her family house. In one such situation, 
a Kurdish family found a suitable bride for their son from Turkey, the couple were 
married there, and they planned a later ceremony in London. However, the groom's 
family did not explain to the bride and her family that they would be living with the 
groom's family for a time. When she understood the situation, she asked for a divorce 
and left the house to live with her relatives in London. It took another six months for the 
boy's family to persuade her to live with them for not longer than one year. Finally they 
agreed and the London marriage ceremony was conducted. 
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Turkish-speaking women, especially, do not like to share the same home with their 
mothers-in-law. At the party in Islington Council Hall described above, one speech 
concerned the financial freedom of women by virtue of having separate bank accounts. 
But one of the old women shouted: 
I was here with my daughter-in-law. We supplied everything she asks, even more. If my 
son abused her in any way, he should deal with me first. But by these words, you put bad 
thoughts between husbands and wives. The young generation is lucky anyway. In my time, 
we even couldn't speak in front of our parents-in-law. [She turned to her daughter in law, 
and asked her to say something, she was a very young and shy girl and just smiled. ] 
4 
The woman next to me said in a very low tone: 
I am glad mine [her mother-in-law] is in Turkey. I am sure this one interferes in everything 
between her son and her daughter-in-law. 
Tahla 9. R" nthar Famiiv Mamhprc in the 14nmp by Place of Orinin (%1 












No 84 91 76 70 81 
Yes 16 9 24 30 19 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
It might be assumed that the majority of the grandparents of Kurdish and Turkish 
families are in Turkey or Cyprus and when the first generation became older, they might 
share the same household with their children. However, the extended household is not 
common in Turkey and Cyprus. Senyapili (1982: 237) claims that the family has always 
been nuclear with between two and four children in the rural as well as urban areas in 
Turkey. Olson (1982) also observed that in rural and urban areas in Turkey, regardless 
of their backgrounds, families are usually nuclear. 
4 These words were recorded in shorthand and fully reconstructed immediately following the 
meeting. 
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Duben (1982: 76) indicated that as early as the 1950s (the beginning of the mass 
migration from rural areas to the cities) only 25 per cent of the Turkish rural households 
were extended. Moreover, in the Gecekondu areas the percentage of the nuclear 
families were even higher than in the metropolises as a whole. The literature on the 
Turkish family in Cyprus is very limited. However, it could be argued that family 
structures and relations are not substantially different from those in mainland Turkey - as 
Ulug (1981: 20-23) asserts, typical Cypriot families are nuclear. 
It is important to note that where there is some continuity of the extended family form, 
even with its lower incidence, it now has new functions due to changing needs of the 
Turkish-speaking families. As the Turkish scholar Kiray (1982) indicates, the extended 
family form serves structural changes in Turkey. As a 'buffer institution', extended 
families enable both parents to work by sharing the responsibility of child-bearing with 
their own parents (Kiray, 1982: 61). Noticeably, my findings in London also imply that 
extended family structure functions as a mechanism of structural change in family life. 
The proportion of lone mother families is not so much different than the overall average 
of lone parenthood in the United Kingdom as will be explained below. 
2.5.3.1 The Extended Family as a `Buffer Institution': 
When there are not two parents present in the household together, the other family 
members seem to substitute for the absent parent. As can be observed in Table 2.9,15 
per cent of the young people have only one of their parents in the home. In other words, 
about one in seven Turkish-speaking young people live in one-parent families. In terms 
of the percentage of lone parents, Turkish-speaking families are a little lower than 
Caribbean and white families, and higher than South Asians. In Britain, 72 per cent of 
white families with children have two formally married parents, compared with 40 per 
cent of Caribbean, and 90 per cent of South Asian families (Berthoud and Beishon 
1997: 39). 
In the Turkish-speaking sample, there is a strong relationship between family types and 
places of origin. Young people from mixed origin and Cypriot backgrounds are more 
likely to have a lone parent, compared with Kurdish young people. Two out of ten Cypriot 
and just under a quarter of mixed households are lone parents. This number increased 
to more than half of the families in which one of the parents was from outside the 
Turkish-speaking 'community'. That proportion is reduced to just over one in ten of the 
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Kurdish households and of the Turkish households. In other words, in my study the lone 
parenthood pattern among the families from mainland Turkey is similar to that of South 
Asians, while that of Cypriot and mixed origin families are similar to whites and 
Caribbeans respectively. 
In the Turkish-speaking sample, lone parenthood is usually the result of divorce, rather 
than death. Divorced parents made up one in ten families. According to Berthoud and 
Beishon (1997: 39) 15 per cent of white parents, 13 per cent of Caribbean and six per 
cent of South Asians are divorced. In other words, Turkish-speaking families are more or 
less similar to the white and Caribbean ones. 
About 68 per cent of the Turkish-speaking lone parents had divorced their partners. The 
rate of divorce among the Cypriot lone parents is the highest. Nine out of ten Cypriot 
lone parents had divorced their partners. Mixed origin families follow the Cypriot ones in 
terms of divorce. Most of the lone parent households are female-headed. 
Whilst the reasons behind such divorces are important, it is difficult to get detailed and 
accurate data about these sensitive issues from the young people. On the other hand, 
according to an officer at a Turkish-speaking women's organisation, the most common 
reasons for divorce are violence, men's adultery, and/or gambling problems. 
The officer added that divorce has more dramatic consequences for Kurdish women 
than other groups. When Kurdish women ask for asylum for the first time, they are 
registered as dependent on their husbands, rather than as a single asylum seeker. All of 
their income support is organised under their husband's name and, if they work, they 
give all of their earnings to their husband. When they escape from their husband's 
violence or if their husband leaves them for another woman, Kurdish women face 
extradition to Turkey. This is probably the reason why lone parenthood is rare among 
Kurdish families compared with others. 
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Table 2-9: Tvoes of Households by Place of nrinin 1% 
Types of Households Kurdish Populated 
Areas 
Other Places in 
Turkey 
Cyprus Mixed Total 
Lone Parent Households 11(10) 12(4) 20(10) 23(7) 15 (31) 
DvorEees Cl. of al bne 
pared howehdds 
60 (6) 25 (1) 90 (9) 71(5) 68 
Widows (% of al bne parent 
households 
40(4) 75(3) 10(l) 29(2) 32 
Two Parents Households 89(82) 88(30) 80(40) 77(23) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
When a mixed marriage breaks up, ex-partners usually have no contact at all. In this 
situation, the support of the other family members becomes even more essential for the 
moral and financial well being of the children. For example, one boy whose father is 
Pakistani and whose mother is Cypriot, talked about how important his grandmother and 
grandfather were in his life: 
When I was five years old, my dad decided to go to Pakistan, because he missed his 
family. But my mum thought about our future and education, and refused to go. Then they 
divorced and he settled down in Pakistan. When I was small, he telephoned us, now he 
doesn't. We heard he married again. Since he left, my grandfather and grandmother have 
settled down with us. My mum works as an interpreter in a law company. I can say we 
have grown up with my grandfather and grandmother rather than with my mum. They are 
like a father and mother to me. 
It is true, in general terms, that ex-husbands have difficulties continuing contact with 
their children, especially if they have remarried and have a new family. One boy whose 
mother is Irish and father is Turkish talked about his experiences with his step mother: 
My father never forgot me. We still have regular contact. He has a factory in this area. 
Before my father remarried, my relationship with my father was better. His new wife is 
Turkish. Even, at the beginning of their marriage, I stayed with them for a while. After they 
had a child of their own, she started to dislike me. She thinks me a threat to her son's 
heritage. That's why I moved to my mum. Now, I visit my dad at the factory instead of at his 
home. 
When the parents are separated, other family members substitute for the absent parent. 
In this sense, the extended family works as a 'Buffer Institution'. As can be seen from 
Table 2.10, more than half of the lone parent households have other family members in 
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the house, compared with 13 per cent of two parent households (lone parent households 
regardless of their origin appreciate support from a family member). The proportion of 
them is especially considerable among mixed lone parent families, nearly nine out of ten 
of them having a family member in their household. This figure is not different for the 
lone parents whose ex-partners were from outside of the Turkish-speaking 'community'. 
British lone parents also sometimes share the same household with other family 
members or had support from them. Drake (1994: 5) notes that in 1983-4,41 per cent of 
single lone mothers occupied a household with kin outside the immediate family - nearly 
a third living with their own parents, (although this ratio was 64 per cent of all single lone 
parents in 1975). Furthermore, in her study of lone mothers living on a large inner city 
council estate in North London, Standing (1999: 125) emphasises how essential it is for 
the women to get practical and emotional support from other female family members for 
child care. 
Tahlp 2_10. Other Family Members in the Home by Tvnes of Household (%1 
Having Kurdish Other Places in Cyprus Mixed Total 
Others in Populated Turkey 
the home Areas 
Lose Two Tcd Irrte Two Tc Lore Two Taal Lore Two Total irre Two Total 
Numbers: (10) (82) (E2) (4) (30) (34) (10) (40) (50) (7) (3) (30) Cý) (175) 
No 9D(1) 88 84 50 97 91 60(6) 80 76 14(1) 87 70 45 87 81 
(2) 
Yes 50(1) 12 16 50 3 9 40(4) 20 24 86(6) 13 30 55 13 19 
(2) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
The evidence so far clearly indicates that young people's attitudes to the family were not 
simply a matter of their unrealistic ambitions before being a 'full time Muslim'. In this 
sense, their attitudes on gender roles are also worth analysing. The gender roles are 
analysed with respect to two levels. Firstly, the young people's ability to identify female 
and male roles outside of family boundaries will be discussed. It will show the degree of 
readiness of these boys and girls to think of women outside the home. Secondly, their 
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attitudes on the division of labour will be analysed. This will show degree of acceptance 
of change in relation to women's domestic responsibilities. 
2.6 The Attitude of Turkish-speaking Young People Towards Gender 
Roles: 
Bott (1971: 53) classified the organisation of familial activities in terms of relationship 
between spouses in three ways: 'complementary', 'independent' and 'joint'. In 
complementary arrangements, husbands and wives have different activities which are 
separate, but fit together to form a whole. In independent partnerships husbands and 
wives have separate activities without reference to each other. In joint ones husbands 
and wives act together or do the same activity at different times. In terms of this 
classification, the existing Turkish-speaking families have a high degree of segregation 
of conjugal roles both in the public sphere and private one. Yet, at the same time, some 
of their activities complement each other. 
In the Turkish-speaking families, women are responsible for the social representation of 
the family outside of the home. The women decide whose wedding or circumcision 
ceremony they should attend and what sort of gift they give. There are many factors they 
have to take into account: the degree of their relation with the other family, the social and 
economic status of their own family and the other family; the quantity and quality of the 
gifts which they have already exchanged; and the timing of the possible gift exchange 
between families. As one Kurdish woman explained: 
I try to attend every wedding ceremony. If I can't, I send my gift with one of my relatives. 
On some occasions, you need to give a whole coin [24 ct gold coin valued about £50], 
sometimes a half coin. I have my son's circumcision ceremony in the near future and I am 
going to have another child very soon. All these gifts will return to me very soon. Because I 
go to theirs, they will come to mine. 
There is a very sensitive balance between giving too much and too little. If a woman 
gives too much, the other women label her and her husband as naive, and if they give 
too little, they can easily be called greedy. This labelling does not only affect her, but her 
husband as well. For example, if the family needs financial support, the others might 
refuse it because the family does not have the ability to make enough money to pay it 
back, or because in the past they did not give enough. 
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In other words, the sexual division of labour does not only provide Turkish-speaking 
women with domestic tasks, but rather it gives different tasks to both men and women in 
the public sphere as well. Davis (1991) argues that women's disadvantaged position 
could not simply be explained as a result of their subordinate position with respect to 
men in power relations. On the contrary, she observes that: 
women routinely undermine asymmetrical power relations or display some degree of 
penetration of what is going on, despite being unable or unwilling at that particular moment 
to do anything to alter the course of events (Davis 1991: 80). 
In her study of divorced parents in Britain, Smart (1999: 105) claims that while a mother 
has a disadvantaged place as an independent citizen in the public sphere, compared 
with a father, she is clearly far from powerless in terms of inter-personal relationships, 
especially her relationship with her children's father as a mediator between him and the 
children. 
On the other hand, instead of the power that women might gain in certain conditions in 
relation with their husbands inside the home, men are doing nothing and all the burden 
of the household is carried by the women. Even when women work outside of the house, 
they are still responsible for the household's maintenance. Unemployed men with 
working wives think that they help their wives in the household tasks, but the majority of 
them heat their food or cook a light snack for themselves and sometimes wash the 
dishes afterwards. On the other hand, because they are all considered to be female 
tasks, the men think that they have made enough sacrifice. (In fact, most of the women 
think that way too. ) One of the Kurdish mothers who works in a textile factory explains 
her husband's recent difficulties because of unemployment: 
I feel sorry for him. He has not been working for six months now. I prepare his breakfast 
before going work. He wakes up later and eats. In the lunch time, he comes home and 
prepares his own food and sometimes, when I have to work late, my daughter prepares 
dinner. But he said 'he became like a woman, he cooks like a woman should do'. He is 
right. But what we can do? 
Moreover, the women usually do not criticise the division of labour in the households. In 
fact, with the help of technological household tools, some of them assume that their 
household tasks are easier than men's outside jobs. In the party at the Islington Council 
Hall, described earlier, speakers talked about the double exploitation of women in the 
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home and at the work place and having bank accounts separate from their husbands in 
spite of very low participation of women in the labour market. Due to the nature of their 
discussions most of the women in the hall gossiped with each other. One of the young 
Turkish women with two small children whispered to the women next to her that: 
Mine [her husband] never let me work. The poor soul drives a taxi the whole day and most 
of the night to bring home our bread. In the home, all the jobs are done by machines, I 
personally never put my hand into hot or cold water [I do not do any physical jobs]. Now, if I 
tell him that he exploits me, even my son laughs at me. Life is easy for women here. 
However, this domestic division of labour is not peculiar to Turkish-speaking families. 
Beishon, Modood and Virdee (1998) emphasised that in Caribbean, African Asian/ 
Indian, and Pakistani/ Bangladeshi families, the household division of labour is 
asymmetrical - that is, women perform all the household tasks such as cleaning and 
cooking. On the other hand, this is not characteristic of only ethnic minority families, as 
Gittins (1993: 131) describes: 
However a society or household is organised, there has always been the assumption that 
a certain core of domestic work is by definition woman's work. This is regardless of 
whether she engages in paid work, whether she is totally or partly dependent on a 
husband or father, regardless of whether she is single, married, widowed or divorced, 
young or old. There is no equivalent assumption for men. 
Turkish-speaking young people's attitudes towards gender roles show both similarities 
and changes in relation to the existing roles in their families. In general, Turkish- 
speaking girls are more critical of the existing situation, while in contrast the boys are 
more likely to prefer the existing roles and this is also true for the young people whose 
own parents were from outside of the Turkish community. In order to understand how 
the young people perceive gender roles in relation to the family, they were asked to 
define their ideal men and women, and subsequently the answers were categorised in 
terms of whether they are family related or not. Family related preferences are those 
concerning the roles and responsibilities of females and males in the home, for example 
those on maintaining the household such as nursing the children, cleaning, cooking and 
being a breadwinner. It should be noted that none of the family related references used 
for the 'ideal man' relate to cleaning, cooking and nursing, instead they were earning 
money, protecting the wife and the children, and educating them in a good manner. 
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Those which described non-family related references are physical appearances and 
general moral characteristics such as being honest with friends, being brave in a fight, 
hard working in school and in the work place. 
As can be observed from Table 2.11, the perception of the ideal woman varies from 
Kurdish young people to others and from girls to boys. Half of the Kurdish girls think that 
the ideal woman is not defined by the family criteria, while half of the Kurdish boys define 
the ideal woman with reference to the family. It should be noted that there are some 
differences between non-family related references for girls and for boys. Girls are more 
likely to choose characteristics such as working and self-confidence. A Kurdish girl 
defined an ideal woman as: 
A woman who trusts herself. She should look after herself, if she becomes alone. She has 
to earn her money. When she speaks, she should be able to make everybody listen to her. 
On the other hand, the majority of girls, including Kurdish ones, concentrate on the 
image and material possessions of this self-confident woman, rather than her 
qualifications, and they link the successful self-confident image with money: 
She has a nice car, house, and nice clothes. She should own her business, or work in an 
office. But, she should definitely have money. Because if you have money, everybody 
respects you, it doesn't matter if you have won a lottery or have your own shop. 
More than half of the Turkish girls, unlike Kurdish ones, are keen to identify women with 
reference to the family. On the other hand, they think women's roles in the family differ 
from their mother's ideals. Their mothers have their responsibilities in the house 
independent of their husband, but complementary to him. On the other hand, Turkish 
girls introduce a new dimension into wife and husband relations. They identify a 
household as belonging to both women and men together. 
When my father comes to the home, he says, 'he is so tired', then he expects everything 
from us, even that we bring him water when he feels thirsty. If I refuse, my mum says, 
'because he works outside for our well being, we should do our best to comfort him'. But 
mum is working at home as well. 
On the other hand, there are not many differences between Kurdish and Turkish boys' 
definitions of an ideal woman. More than half of the Kurdish boys and just over four out 
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of ten Turkish boys define their ideal woman in terms of family criteria. However, unlike 
Turkish girls, the boys do not expect women to have reciprocal relationships with their 
husbands. The boys define the existing women's role as ideal. A Turkish boy defined an 
ideal woman as: 
A good cook. She always listens to her husband. She never does anything against her 
husband's wishes or without having his approval. She gives respect to her husband and 
her older relatives and disciplines her children in a proper way. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the boys who use the non-family related references do 
not use the same criteria as the girls who refer to the non-family related categories for a 
woman. The boys use physical beauty, instead of self-confidence or self-image. 
An ideal woman is a beautiful woman, especially her face. She is like Hulya Avsar [a 
famous Turkish singer]. When you look at her, you could not turn away. If she is beautiful, 
it doesn't matter how clever or how educated she is. 
Both Cypriot boys and girls think of women outside of the family, just over one out of ten 
of them give family roles for an ideal woman. However, like their Kurdish counterparts, 
Cypriot boys refer to physical appearances such as a beautiful face or a slim body, while 
Cypriot girls use self-confidence or being career-oriented. Young people from mixed 
origins show a similar pattern to Cypriot ones. Seven out of ten of both boys and girls 
identified the ideal woman in terms of non-family related criteria such as appearance and 
career. 
Apart from the Turkish young people, and regardless of their gender, young people 
overwhelmingly define their ideal man in terms of non-family related references. 
However, the gender differences observed in the non-family related references for the 
ideal woman are not the case for the definition of the ideal man. Only a small number of 
girls use appearances as criteria for their ideal men. Both girls and boys who define their 
ideal man in terms of non-family related criteria choose self-respect, confidence, career, 
and honesty. However, the boys concentrated on non-family related moral codes for an 
ideal man, while the girls who chose non-family related criteria refer to material assets 
as well as moral codes for an ideal man. A Turkish girl stated: 
111 
An ideal man trusts himself to do everything successfully. He works hard and has lots of 
money. Everybody asks his advice and he is a clever man and never makes a fool of 
himself. 
A Kurdish boy identified an ideal man from a different perspective: 
An ideal man is a best friend, trustworthy. He never turns his back on his friend, when they 
need help. He is also a brave man. When he stands up in front of somebody, that person is 
scared. He always says what he thinks openly. He never gossips like a woman. 
Turkish girls, unlike others, define the ideal man in terms of his family obligations. About 
53 per cent of them think that an ideal man should fulfil his responsibilities in relation to 
his wife and his children, he should be faithful to his wife. As a Turkish girl stated: 
An ideal man spends all his money and his time with his family. He doesn't look at other 
women or lose all his money in the gambling machines. He tries to provide everything his 
wife and children asks for. He should live for them. 
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Table 2-11: Ideal Women and Men by Place of Origin (%) 
Kurdish Po ulated Areas 
Ideal Woman Ideal Man 













Non Family Related 
References 
50 46 48 60 71 66 
Family Related 
References 
43 52 48 38 27 32 
Other* 8 2 4 3 2 2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Other Places in Turkey 
Ideal Women Ideal Men 













Non Family Related 
References 
35 (6) 24 (4) 29 35 (6) 35 (6) 35 
Family Related 
References 
53 (9) 41(7) 47 53 (9) 29 (5) 41 
Other* 12(2) 1 35(6) 24 12(2) 35(6) 24 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
C rus 
Ideal Women Ideal Men 













Non Family Related 
References 
64 65(11) 64 55 65(11) 58 
Family Related 
References 
12 12 (2) 12 27 12 (2) 22 
Other* 24 24(4) 24 18 24(4) 4 20 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Mixed 
Ideal Women Ideal Men 













Non Family Related 
References 
69 (9) 71(12) 70 62 (8) 82 (14) 73 
Family Related 
References 
15 (2) 24 (4) 20 23 (3) 6 (1) 13 
Other* 15(2) 6(1) 10 15(2) 12(2) 13 
Total 100 . 100 100 100 100 100 
Includes those replies with 'don't know', 'having no ideal woman or man', 'don't believe 
any criteria to be set as ideal' 
In conclusion, the Turkish-speaking young people's perceptions of gender roles are 
different from their fathers' and mothers' perceptions of their roles and responsibilities. 
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Besides, there is no doubt in their parents' minds concerning these roles. It could be 
argued that these various understandings of men's and women's roles among the 
Turkish-speaking young people might cause tension between the sexes in terms of 
power relations in the future. The following section will discuss the expectation of the 
young people in relation to the division of labour. 
2.7 The Attitude of Turkish-speaking Young People towards the Division of 
Labour: 
As indicated in the previous section, most of the girls define an ideal woman outside of 
the family criteria, while the boys define an ideal woman in relation to the family. This 
gap in their perceptions became less obvious when they were asked about their 
preferences for an ideal partner's occupation. Thorne (1993) points out that gender 
relationships might not always be understood as 'separation and difference': 
To move our research wagons out of the dualistic rut, we can, first of all, try to start with a 
sense of whole rather than with an assumption of gender as separation and difference. 
One way to grasp this complexity is by examining gender in context rather than fixing 
binary abstractions like "boys emphasize status, and girls emphasize intimacy. " Instead we 
should ask "which boys and girls, where, when, under what circumstances? " (Thorne 
1993: 108). 
It seems that there is an agreement among the boys and girls about the gender division 
of labour in the household. The husband is regarded as the main breadwinner, while the 
wife is thought either complementary, if she works, or dependent if she is a housewife. 
Table 2.12 shows that except for Kurdish girls, the majority of the girls do not mind about 
their partner's occupation as long as he is not unemployed. A mixed origin girl claimed 
that: 
I don't have any specific ideal about my future husband. He shouldn't be a lazy person. He 
should always find a way to bring money to the home. Actually, if he can't earn enough 
money, I don't mind working as well. But if he lays down in the home and I work, I mind 
very much. 
Unlike other girls, most of the Kurdish females want a professional partner. They prefer a 
professional partner not only because professional jobs are more prestigious compared 
114 
to the others, but because they believe that the other alternatives are worse than being 
unemployed. 
If I am destined to marry somebody who works in a factory or has a shop, I would rather 
stay single. For me, these occupations mean being unemployed or even worse. Because 
when he is unemployed, at least he does not work to death for nothing. So the only option 
open for me to marry somebody with a proper job such as office worker, council worker, or 
teacher. 
In fact, the number of girls who prefer a non-professional or self-employed partner is not 
high among any category. The girls seem to value these alternatives only under certain 
conditions. As a Turkish girl explained: 
Who am I going to marry depends on what sort of job I might have in the future. If I had a 
professional job such as lawyer or doctor and so on, my husband should be a professional 
too. But most importantly how much money I might be going to have in the future. We 
should at least earn an equal amount of money. But preferably he should earn more than 
me. On the other hand, if I can't do well in the future, I don't mind what sort of job my 
partner might have. Then it really depends on luck. He can be a professional or a shop 
keeper or a factory worker. But the most important think is that he should be better off than 
me. If he is worse off, then we can't be happy. Because he will always feel inferior. Also 
everybody thinks he is not man enough, because he spends my money. I can't respect him 
either in that position. Because I always look at him from above. 
There is not much differentiation among the boys' preferences for their future partner's 
employment status. The majority of the boys want their future partner not to be 
employed at all. They want their wife to be a housewife. On the other hand, the boys 
explain their preferences not with reference to the roles of the women, but to the roles of 
men. In other words, if their wife will be other than a housewife, they would not feel like a 
'real man'. A Kurdish boy said that: 
I don't want my wife to work. If she works in the house, it is enough. I think a man should 
be capable of providing his wife with whatever she needs. If I can't do that, it is better for 
me not to marry at all. In fact, all the girls I know want to marry somebody who has money, 
so if you tell them there is a possibility they might need to work after marriage, they will 
probably run away. 
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In a similar vein, the following discussion between a Turkish and Cypriot boy shows how 
the boys relate breadwinning to manhood: 
Cypriot Boy: I prefer my wife to stay at home ['staying home' means housewife in Turkish]. 
But if she insist on working, then she can work for herself. I don't expect her to contribute 
to household income in anyway. I should always be a main bread winner and her earnings 
shouldn't be more than mine. 
Turkish Boy [with a cynical laugh]: what about Sibel Can [a singer whose fame is well 
beyond that of her artist husband]? She is beautiful and buys expensive gifts to her 
husband. Don't you want yours to buy you a Porsche? 
Cypriot Boy: In the future, tell your wife to buy you one. It seems to suits you. I am thinking 
of buying two Porsche myself, one for me and one for her. 
However, the boys' self perception about work and manhood are not peculiar to them. In 
a study of young men's attitudes towards gendered work in Britain, Lloyd (1999) found 
that the majority of them had more traditional perceptions of being a man such as having 
a job, defending your family and being a good father. He concludes that: 
Work attitudes and also attitudes towards the domestic environment are changing for 
possibly substantial numbers of young men. However, attitudes towards masculinity and 
the male role, are lagging behind (Lloyd 1999: 30). 
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Table 2-12: Ideal Emnlovment Status of a Partnar hu Place of Orininc 10/1 
Kurdish Other Places in Cyprus Mixed Total 
Populated Turkey 
Areas 
Ideal Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Ferrer Male 
Employment (40) (52) (17) (17) (33) (17) (13) (17) (103) (103) 
Status of 
Future Partner 
Non- 23 12 6(1) 12(2) 18 18(3) 15(2) 18 11 
professional 
employee 
Professional 43 14 24 (4) 24 (4) 21 23 (3) 29 (5) 30 16 
employee 
Self- 20 29(5) 12 8(1) 18 
employed 
Don't 15 75 41(7) 65 (11) 49 82 (14) 54 (7) 71 (12) 35 74 
mind/Stay 
Home* 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*'Staying at home' is boys' choice and 'don't mind' is girls' choice. 
As a result, as far as the young people's perceptions are concerned, the future power 
relations in the Turkish-speaking households bring both change and continuity. It might 
change since the girls' perceptions of womanhood are considerably different from those 
of their mothers. They want more in relation to the outside world. However, the boys do 
not share this perception, they still think of women in terms of family criteria. This seems 
to create a conflict between women and men in the Turkish-speaking 'community'. 
On the other hand, this conflict might not be so severe because of resistant elements in 
the power relations in the future. This resistance comes from their ideals about their 
future partner's employment status. Also both the girls and the boys agree on what the 
division of labour in the households should be. They think that domestic tasks are mainly 
women's jobs, while the man is the main breadwinner. In this sense, the future Turkish- 
speaking women might be more disadvantaged than their mothers, if they also engage 
in paid employment. They will be responsible for the household's maintenance whilst in 
paid employment, while their earnings might not count as being as essential as that of 




In the sociological literature, Muslim family structure was associated with extended 
family size, a higher level of solidarity and patriarchalism. Accordingly, it was contended 
that these differences do not allow families to develop convergent patterns with Western 
families. Through reference to Muslim ethnic minority families in general and the 
Turkish-speaking migrant families in particular, it was claimed that, even though ethnic 
minority young people is affected by the western-style families of mainstream societies, 
such influences do not create any necessary implications for their future-life. 
More recent studies have indicated greater complexity and my study too has confirmed 
this. It is a fact that amongst Turkish-speaking young people, there was some adherence 
to traditional values. Most notably, attitudes towards pre-marital sexual relationships and 
inter-ethnic marriages were very conservative. Yet this is not the whole story. 
First of all, young people's attitudes diverge considerably from those expected in a 
traditional understanding of the family in many respects. The majority of young people 
do not want to have more than two children in their future families; they have a strong 
opposition to arranged marriages; they claim that they would marry someone even at the 
expense of their parents' disapproval if necessary; and they are also rather reluctant 
about living in extended families. It is also important to observe that girls, in particular, 
have positive attitudes towards employment in their future marriages. However and more 
importantly, it appears to be rather difficult to portray these sorts of attitudes simply as 
rhetorical repetition of the dominant society's family values before becoming 'full time 
Muslim'. Although such ambitions can be regarded as western values, young people's 
attitudes are not markedly different from their own parents. Given that most families are 
first-generation in the UK, such differences from conventional Muslim family images 
cannot be understood without referring to the changing family structure in Turkey within 
the wider process of economic and cultural transitions across the society. 
Moreover, even the continuity of the extended family (albeit at a very low level) serves 
the change in family structure. In Turkey, it functioned as a child caring mechanism for 
working parents in the cities (Kiray, 1982). Similarly, the extended family serves, in 
London, as a mechanism of change by supporting child bearing, not in nuclear family 
households but lone parent households (the rate of which is not fundamentally lower 
than the overall average of lone motherhood in the United Kingdom). In general, it can 
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be argued that despite young people's reservations concerning pre-marital sex and inter- 
ethnic marriages, they have a very considerably 'modern' understanding and this is not 
simply part of the 'unrealistic dreams of youth' created by the dominant society, but 
reflects otherwise continuing changes in the Turkish-speaking families both in the UK 
and in Turkey. 
119 
3. Problems With Existing Multi-cultural Education Policies: 
3.1 The Theoretical Framework of Multi"culturalist Education: 
In recent years, attempts to explain the under-achievement of ethnic minority students 
with reference to the effects of social and economic disadvantage have been largely 
replaced by debates centred on culture. Levels of achievement by these pupils are 
considered later. But, because there has been so much current emphasis on the 
importance of culture in explaining ethnic minority under-achievement, the chapter 
begins with a discussion of this. Conservative approaches began to emphasise the 
cultural backwardness of such groups in order to understand their educational problems. 
In reaction to these approaches, however, a growing number of multi-culturalist scholars 
tended to claim that the educational failure of ethnic-minority students is not because of 
cultural backwardness, but because of the lack of the recognition of their cultural assets. 
Accordingly, in order to improve the success of students, the multi-culturalist advocates 
formulated education policies such as promoting religious and ethnic identities and 
teaching ethnic minorities their own languages. 
The focus in the 1960s on under-achievement in the context of low IQ shifted in the 
1970s to the cultural area and assimilation policies (Mirza 1998: 122). Then, in the 
1980s, the well known Swann Report was published on the subject. Along with many 
others, the Report made some assumptions to explain the differences between Turkish 
and Greek Cypriot children's achievement (Swann Report 1985: 688-89). It observed 
that the Greek community was more self-confident, because they outnumbered the 
Turkish Cypriot community. Greek Cypriots supported their children's education more 
successfully, because of their greater financial security. Greek Cypriots were better 
educated and more urbanised and they had lighter skin compared to darker skinned 
Turkish Cypriots. In the schools where there were Turkish and Greek Cypriot children 
together, the former were deemed the representatives of 'barbarism', while the latter 
represented 'civilisation' by the majority community. According to the Report (Swann 
Report 1985: 689), these different stereotypes had a direct bearing on society's and 
teachers' expectations of, and empathy with, Turkish Cypriots. 
On the other side of Europe, in Germany, Muslim identity was also added to the list of 
factors behind the Turkish children's educational problems. In research on the 
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educational problems of foreign children in West Germany, Mahotra (1985), for instance, 
asked the teachers in several schools to complete forms for individual children to 
indicate educational problems. There were some questions such as 'social position in 
the class: hero or one of the leaders; average/inconspicuous; marginal/pariah' or 'social 
integration: liked by most classmates; average/indifferent; disliked by most classmates' 
(Mahotra 1985: 302-303) or those related to 'personality traits': 'Intelligence: above 
average; average; below average' and 'Looks like a foreigner: no; yes' (Mahotra 
1985: 304 and 308). 
At the end, the author concluded that Yugoslavian children mostly from Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina [although not mentioned, it is clear that the Muslim population was 
'cleansed' from this interpretation], who are the immediate cultural neighbours of 
Germany and German speaking areas, are most fully integrated into Germany, while 
because of the Muslim background, which is a totally different social and cultural 
heritage from that of Germans, Turks have difficulties in integrating into German classes 
and are often rejected by their classmates (Mahotra 1985: 296-7). 
In the 1990s, the multi-culturalist approach (later leading to the critical multi-culturalist 
approach) developed and argued that the cultural assets or deficits of the ethnic minority 
students are not the reason behind their under-achievement, on the contrary it holds that 
the lack of recognition of these assets in schools is the problem. As Verma and Mallick 
(1981: 52) argue: 
The realisation and recognition of the identity and culture of the ethnic minority children are 
not only important to the child's self-image, his intellectual functioning and social 
behaviour, but are also crucial for his occupational and social adjustment. 
This approach demands a curriculum covering the ethnic minority students' culture and 
languages. Nieto (1996: 293) commenting on this line argues that: 
Rather than attempting to erase culture and language, schools should do everything in 
their power to use, affirm, and maintain them as a foundation for students' academic 
success. 
In this line, Corson (1998: 111) investigates the problems of the urban poor in inner-city 
schools from a particular perspective which: 
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Recognises the pressing need for increased funding for inner-city schools, [but] also 
presents the urban poor as groups who have their own distinct values, norms, and cultural 
practices. 
Kincheloe and Steinberg (1997: 31) represent an understanding of critical multi- 
culturalism referring to the ability to examine the domains of race and white supremacy, 
gender and patriarchy, and socio-economic class and upper-middle and upper-class 
privilege in relation to and as functions of one another. Later, however, what they offer 
basically is a kind of abstract solidarity: 
With a spirit of solidarity among teachers, students and working people, such humane 
proposals draw upon the diverse experiences of white and non-white peoples, men and 
women, individuals from middle and upper-middle class backgrounds and those from lower 
socio-economic class settings (Kincheloe and Steinberg 1997: 43). 
According to its critics, the multi-cultural approach runs the risk of sharing a common 
approach with right-wing explanations of cultural relativism (Bauman 1997: 56). It also 
enhances the already existing polarisation of society: 
Under-achievement now wears the new clothes of anti-racist, post-modern difference. We 
are told schools have been colour-blind, differences and diversity must be addressed, 
racism is to ignore differences. It sounds right, it sounds good. But then, I worry, I think to 
myself, 'differences.... making distinctions between groups, was that not the cause of all of 
our problems in the first place? How can we progress out of this moral maze? ' (Mirza 
1998: 122) 
Wieviorka (1997: 148) also notices the possible racist implications of multi-cultural 
approaches: 
In an imaginary world in which all cultures are homogeneous and distinct from one 
another, relativism or even ethnocentrism in no way implies the suspicion of racism. But 
our societies are characterized by the co-presence of many different cultures, and by their 
fragmentation; cultural differences are produced and reproduced in this context, being 
subject here and there to ethnicisations and even racialisations which are not necessarily 
rejected by the members of these groups. 
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Moreover, Gokturk (1998) questions multi-culturalism not only in terms of its potential to 
create polarisation in society, but also its effect in inhibiting communications between 
groups in the context of Turkish- German relations: 
Well-meaning multi-culturalist projects often result in the construction of binary oppositions 
between 'Turkish culture' and 'German culture'. The focus on cultural difference which 
claims to be liberating, in practice, often covers up existing cross-cultural traffic and makes 
dialogue and interaction more difficult. 
In terms of educational policy implications, Carter (1987: 57) points out that: 
No one is a 'cultural police officer'. In order to reduce racial disadvantage and 
discrimination we need the sensitive provision of services in education to all as individuals 
and not as cultural, class, gender, or racial categories. 
Singh (1995: 12) favours promoting 'universal values' against 'particular ethnic values' in 
school curricula: 
In most democratic societies today some of the values we all share would include 
parliamentary democracy, the concept of freedom of speech and assembly, the 
independence of the judiciary, respect for persons, economic pluralism whereby individuals 
can advance themselves according to merit, the right to an occupation, the right to 
advance oneself according to merit and a commitment to learning and speaking the 
English language as a basic value for all British subjects. 
These studies have often overlooked how the existing policies might be perceived by the 
students and teachers in the schools. The following sections will study the implications 
of some of the existing multi-cultural policies from the actors' point of view. It will be 
discussed how multi-culturalism is perceived by young people as opposed to how it is 
served up for their best interests. However, it should be noted that the main aim of this 
thesis is not to discuss the whole range of multi culturalist initiatives, but rather to show 
how the Turkish-speaking young people might perceive the main multi-cultural policies 
which are already available to them. 
The first part will discuss the Turkish-speaking students' academic achievements. It will 
be argued that although multi-cultural initiatives might work in favour of academic 
success in one situation, it will not always bring the same amount of academic success 
in others. The second part will comment on the limitations of multi-cultural initiatives with 
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reference to the Turkish-speaking students' responses to the policies regarding religion. 
Then, in the third part, the critical multi-culturalist efforts will be discussed in order to 
overcome the limitations of existing multi-culturalism. The section will conclude that their 
efforts might not be effective, unless they produce some solutions to two important 
problems: the students' lack of English language skills and the inadequate number of 
ethnic minority teachers in mainstream classes together with existing ethnic minority 
teachers' undervalued status. Finally, the last part will address the need to go beyond 
cultural initiatives in order to overcome the feelings of exclusion of the Turkish-speaking 
students in British schools. 
3.2 The schools and academic performance of the Turkish-speaking 
students: 
The schools which Turkish-speaking students attend have highly concentrated numbers 
of ethnic minority pupils but, most importantly, the Turkish-speaking students are one of 
the majority groups in the schools. Over ten per cent of pupils in maintained primary and 
secondary schools in England are from ethnic minority backgrounds, and over seven per 
cent of pupils do not have English as their first language (DfEE and OFSTED 1997: 109). 
In Hackney, in 1989, Turkish was the second language for 16.19 per cent after Bengali 
(18.16 per cent) among the pupils whose home language was other than English 
(London Borough of Hackney 1996). In 1997, a total of over a hundred languages were 
spoken in Hackney (OFSTED 1997: 7) and 10 per cent and 3 per cent of all GCSE 
candidates were Turkish including Cypriots and Kurds respectively. In this Borough, only 
three out of ten GCSE candidates were English, Scottish or Welsh (Hackney Education 
Authority). 
In Haringey, 59 per cent of the 9673 secondary school students were from an ethnic 
minority. A total of 138 languages were spoken in the Borough. In 1981, Turkish was the 
third most common language being spoken by 4.5 per cent of the students. In 1994, 
Turkish became the second most common language with 8.2 per cent of pupils speaking 
it. In 1997,3.9 per cent of all GCSE candidates were Turkish Cypriot, 4.4 per cent spoke 
Kurdish and 5.2 per cent Turkish. The students who had English, Scottish and Welsh 
backgrounds made up of only 25.7 per cent of all GCSE candidates (Haringey Education 
Authority). 
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Moreover, the allocation of pupils from different ethnic backgrounds to the schools is not 
even. In Hackney, one of the schools included in my research had 61 per cent of its 
students from ethnic minorities and 35 per cent and nine per cent of all pupils had 
Bengali and Turkish origins respectively. In another school, 48 different languages were 
spoken and Turkish-speaking students represented the largest group with 28 per cent, 
while none of the pupils had UK origins. 
In Haringey, the situation is not so different. Although 13.5 per cent of all 1997 GCSE 
candidates in Haringey were Turkish-speaking and 25.7 per cent were of UK origin; their 
numbers are represented unevenly in the schools. In one school, 67 per cent of the 
pupils were of UK origin and only 3.8 per cent were from the Turkish-speaking 
'community'. In another one, these percentages were 24.1 per cent and point five per 
cent respectively. In another extreme, Turkish-speaking pupils formed 35 per cent of all 
pupils, whereas the percentage of pupils with UK ethnic origin was only 8.7 per cent. In 
the rest of the schools in the Borough, similar patterns existed. 
At the policy level, the multi-cultural composition of the students was recognised and 
appreciated in both boroughs and the particular schools in which fieldwork was 
conducted. Their policies encourage students from various backgrounds to reveal their 
'cultural values' and show them that the school valued these cultural assets. There are 
several initiatives serving this purpose. Some of the schools organised parents' nights 
specifically for Turkish-speaking pupils' parents. Others organised entertainment 
activities for all pupils to perform their cultural dances and music and share their cuisine. 
Besides, in the corridors or classrooms, there were posters to show the richness of other 
cultures and their achievements in history. The schools also invited their pupils to 
respect and be tolerant of each others' cultures in posters on which the two words 
'respect' and 'tolerance' were written in the languages of the children. Moreover, the 
schools put in efforts to recognise the needs of Muslim children and some of them 
allocate rooms to these children for praying, while others were considering such 
initiatives. The religious education covered all religions, including Islam. All of the 
schools had GCSE level Turkish language classes. 
Language support under Section 11 programmes was widely available, especially for 
refugee children. Section 11 programmes are designed to increase these children's 
language abilities in order to follow the curriculum and adapt in the schools. Section 11 
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(S11) of the 1966 Local Government Act empowers the Home Secretary to pay grants to 
Local Authorities and other institutions to support the costs of employing additional staff 
to help ethnic minority groups overcome linguistic and other barriers. Since September 
1993, with the introduction of the Local Government Act, the original insistence on New 
Commonwealth origin as a condition of grant aiding has been waived in favour of 
including all ethnic minority communities. Over the years the greater part of the funding 
has been allocated to education (DfEE and OFSTED 1997: 110). Projects concerned 
with teaching English as a second language (ESL) to bilingual pupils form the largest 
group of S11 education. 
In other words, none of the existing policies is what the multi-culturalist approach 
suggest are totally 'culturally blind' or 'assimilationist'. In fact, the contrary is true. In this 
respect, these two Boroughs might provide a test ground in order to analyse to what 
extent their existing policies are adequate to improve the Turkish-speaking students' 
achievements. Additionally, the ideas of the Turkish-speaking students and teachers 
might provide a good basis for assessing how these policies are received by the actors 
at whom they are aimed and to access their potential for the creation of more interaction 
between different groups. 
3.2.1 Turkish-speaking Pupils' Academic Achievement in two Boroughs: 
In the early years, there were no studies specifically focused on Turkish students in 
schools, let alone on Turkish, Kurdish and Turkish Cypriot students separately. In the 
early years, Turkish-speaking pupils were studied under the category of 'immigrant' or 
'Cypriot' children. In 1966 the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA) surveyed 
children's performances in verbal reasoning tests, and English and Mathematics in 52 
schools. They also took into account the heads' responses. They reached the 
conclusion that immigrant children, especially West Indian children, were below average 
compared with white pupils (Sonyel 1988: 24). Moreover, other research in that year in 
10 secondary modem schools in Haringey also concluded that Caribbean and Cypriot 
pupils had the worst achievement records in those schools (Sonyel 1988: 24). 
In 1975, there was additional research about the reading attainment of the total 
population of ten year olds in an inner London borough. Forty Turkish Cypriot children 
were included in the survey. It found that the comparable reading scores for West Indian, 
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Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot and non-immigrant children were 86,84,84 and 95 out of 
100 respectively (Sonyel 1988: 26). 
According to the report prepared by the Inner London Education Authority to show the 
1985 and 1986 0 levels and GCEs (this public examination was replaced by GCSE in 
1987) results for students from different ethnic backgrounds, Turkish children are the 
worst achievers along with Bangladeshis and Caribbean pupils (ILEA 1987: 14). The 
report evaluated a total of 17058 pupils of which 268 of them are Turkish aged 15 and 
16 years old. It states that 21.3 per cent of the Turkish children were not entered for any 
examination, compared to 19 per cent of all children (ILEA 1987: 4). Moreover, only 8.8 
per cent of Turkish pupils were awarded GCE grade 1, compared to the overall 9.8 per 
cent of pupils (ILEA 1987: 5). 47.6 per cent of Turkish children were awarded 0 level 
grades A, B or C, whilst this figure was 55.3 per cent for all children (ILEA 1987: 5). 
In 1986, the ILEA surveyed 15042 pupils and 285 of them were Turkish (ILEA 1987: 2). 
In this year, 25.3 per cent of Turkish children did not enter any exam compared with 20.1 
per cent of all children (ILEA 1987: 6). Only 6.8 per cent of Turkish children got Grade 1 
from their GCE entries, compared to 8.7 per cent of all children (ILEA 1987: 5). However, 
55.3 per cent of Turkish children got grade A, B or C from their 0 level exam which is 
slightly more than the general average of 54.8 per cent (ILEA 1987: 5). It is clear that 
although the number of Turkish students who manage to get grades A, B or C is lower 
than the average in 1985, it was point five per cent higher in 1986. 
In the 1990s, Dedezade (1994) studied the GCSE English and Mathematics results of 
Turkish and non-Turkish-speaking pupils from several North and East London schools. 
For the years 1990-93 inclusive, only 26.4 per cent of Turkish-speaking pupils got C 
grade and above from their GCSE English, compared with 38.4 per cent of non-Turkish 
speakers. In Mathematics, 25.4 per cent of Turkish-speaking and 28.7 per cent of non- 
Turkish-speaking pupils achieved grade C and above grades (Dedezade 1994: 24). The 
gap between the Turkish-speaking and other pupils is more obvious in the English 
GCSE examination (12 per cent), and it is less obvious in Mathematics where the gap is 
only 3.3 per cent. 
There are problems of access to the data on Turkish-speaking students' achievements. 
The schools' reports at borough level on their pupils' achievements do not show 
statistics for Turkish-speaking pupils separately. They are analysed either under the 
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category of 'others', 'European others' or in some cases under the category of 'Asian 
pupils'. Besides, there are no available data covering several years in a systematic way. 
And finally, the available data do not show gender differences. 
During the research, the most useful way of gaining data seemed to be to put young 
people's names on the questionnaire, and then request their exam results from the 
schools later, but then it became clear that revealing their names made some of the 
young people uncomfortable, so this idea was abandoned. Nevertheless, some data 
were obtained from one school, but were not adequate for a comprehensive analysis, 
since only 14 pupils in the sample came from that school. Besides, a quarter of the 
pupils were interviewed outside of their school premises and some of these students 
went to the schools which were either not contacted or refused to participate in this 
research project. In order to overcome these obstacles, two borough Education 
Authorities were contacted and the Kurdish, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot students' GCSE 
results for the years 1996,1997 and 1998 were requested. Only the 1997 GCSE results 
were provided in this way and the following analysis is based upon that data. 
As can be seen in Table 3.1, there are differences between the students in terms of the 
number of GCSE exams they sit. Among the Kurdish students, 12 per cent did not enter 
the exams at all, compared to six per cent for Turkish pupils and eight per cent for 
Cypriots. More than 80 per cent of all pupils enter five or more GCSE exams, while only 
47 per cent of Kurdish pupils and 66 per cent of Turkish ones did so. Yet, Cypriot 
students were able to enter more GCSE papers than the total group (88 per cent). 
Kurdish students perform relatively worse than the other groups in the Haringey schools. 
However, the gap between them and the others is narrow. Turkish and Cypriot students 
are doing even better than those from English, Welsh or Scottish (EWS) origins and all 
groups in Haringey Borough in 1997 GCSE exams. 
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Table 3-1: 1997 GCSE Results in Harinanv to/ .I 
Kurdish Turkish Turkish EWS All Groups 
(74) (88) Cypriot 66 (437) (1700) 
Achieving I or more 85 89 91 84 88 
Passes at A-G Grades 
Achieving 5 or More 78 82 89 78 79 
Passes at A-C Grades 
0 GCSE papers entered 12 6 8 10 9 
1-4 GCSE papers entered 41 28 5 7 10 
5 or more GCSE papers 47 66 88 82 81 
entered 
Source: Haringey Education Authority. 
Turkish-speaking pupils' achievement varies in terms of the borough to which their 
schools belong. Table 3.2 indicates that there are considerable differences between the 
Haringey and Hackney schools. In Hackney, only seven per cent of Kurdish pupils got 
five or more GCSE passes at A-C Grades. This is almost 74 per cent behind the Kurdish 
pupils' achievement level in Haringey. This is also the case for Turkish and Cypriot 
students. Nearly nine out of ten Cypriot students and eight out of ten Turkish students 
get five or more good passes in Haringey, while only 17 per cent manage to do so in 
Hackney. On the other hand, it seems that the schools in Hackney fail not only the 
Turkish-speaking students, but all children as well. Only three out of ten English, 
Scottish and Welsh origin students get five or more grade A-C passes from their GCSEs, 
compared to 78 per cent of those in Haringey. 
Gilborn and Drew (1992: 562) note that individual schools have the power to influence 
the educational experiences, achievements and future life-chances of their students. In 
other words, an important issue is to what extent ethnic minority pupils attend less 
effective schools (Drew and Gray 1991: 170). This confirms the findings of Smith and 
Tomlinson (1989: 305) in a study of 20 multi-racial comprehensive schools in different 
parts of England: 
what school a child goes to makes far more difference (in terms of exam results) than what 
ethnic group he or she belongs to. The relative performance of different ethnic groups 
varies somewhat between schools, but such variations are trivial compared with the very 
large school differences across all ethnic groups. In other words, some schools are much 
better than others, and the ones that are good for white people tend to be about equally 
good for black people. 
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In fact, Thomas et al. (1997: 465) find in their analysis of the effect that differing 
secondary schools make to the educational attainment of different ethnic groups based 
on the performance of different pupil groups over three years period in inner London 
schools that: 
it is the less effective schools ... with low GCSE attainment ... that are... widening the gap 
between ethnic minority and 'white' pupils. In contrast, more effective schools... with high 
GCSE attainment... are... narrowing the gap between ethnic minority and 'white' pupils. 
Table 3-2: 1997 GCSE Results in Hackneu (%1 
Kurdish Turkish and EWS (426) All Groups 
(43) Turkish Cypriot (142) (1420) 
Achieving 5 or More 7 17 30 30 
Passes at A-C Grades 
Source: Hackney Education Authority and DfEE (1997: 1). 
Broadly speaking, the evidence presented so far suggests that the Turkish-speaking 
students do not show a uniform pattern in terms of achievement in different boroughs, 
though these boroughs adopted a considerable level of multi-culturalist policies. 
Besides, the following part highlights the wide-spread scepticism amongst both students 
and teachers which makes such policies even more controversial. To examine the 
concerns of students and teachers, an attempt will be made to analyse the case of 
religious policies in schools. 
3.3 Some Problems with Multi-cultural Policies: 
In line with the attempts designed to underline the importance of the cultural assets of 
ethnic minorities, multi-culturalist scholars put a great deal of emphasis on introducing 
some religious incentives at schools. From this point of view, Jenkins (1991: 580), for 
example, comments that: 
There is a clear need to foster a multi-cultural perspective within discrete subject areas, 
particularly at secondary school level, and to boost the morale and identity of Muslim 
children. Muslim matters will not disappear from an administrator's frame of reference but 
will find expression in parent dissatisfaction and community advocacy. Far better to 
develop policy ahead of time which addresses areas of concern thus avoiding crisis- 
management techniques and providing enlightened school leadership. 
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Modood (1997b: 167) calls the current situation one of 'culture blind indirect 
discrimination': 
The English custom that requires staff to work on Fridays, the day of collective worship for 
Muslims, while recognising that it is unreasonable to demand work on Sundays, may have 
no justifiable grounds other than local custom. What is thought in schools, the character 
and delivery of medical and social services, the programme schedules of television and 
radio, the preference for certain forms of entertainment and culture, can all be sites of 
culture-blind indirect discrimination. 
However, policies to address these problems often do not take into account the fact that 
Muslim students cannot be put into a single category. Indeed, when the attitudes of the 
Turkish-speaking students towards religious education were examined, it became 
apparent that they were not too keen on it. A head teacher in one school planned to 
allocate a prayer room for the Turkish-speaking pupils. During the fieldwork, however, It 
became apparent that the majority of pupils in this school were Alevi, not Sunni, and 
Alevis do not have Sunni religious practices. In other words, the sectarian differences of 
young people (which is discussed in the first chapter) have effects on this issue. 
Moreover, this head teacher might not comprehend the relatively powerful secular focus 
of education in the majority of young people's minds which has its roots in the Turkish 
secular education system. As was discussed in the first chapter, secularism is a social 
project which has been on Turkey's political agenda since the 1920s and the reforms in 
the education system were at the centre of the secular project designed to break the 
new Republic's links with the Ottoman Empire. 
As can be seen in Table 3.3, only four out of ten Turkish-speaking pupils wanted a quiet 
place in the school for Muslims to go and nearly two out of ten had not made up their 
minds on this particular issue. The number of Kurdish students who actually wanted 
such a place was about three out of ten, while only about four out of ten Cypriot students 
answered this question positively. It seems that only Turkish students approve of such 
an initiative (over six out of ten Turkish students). Even in their case, 27 per cent still 
said 'no' to the allocation of a room for Muslims and the other 12 per cent were neutral 
about it. 
When the young people's religious identity was taken into account, it became evident 
that the Alevis are less keen to have a quiet place for prayers, in comparison to the 
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Muslims. As can be seen in Table 3.3, more than half of the Alevis do not approve of 
such a place and half of the Sunnis approve. Besides, it seems that the Cypriots and 
Kurdish Sunnis are less likely to approve of such a place, compared to the Turkish 
Sunnis. 
Table 3-3: A auiet place In school for Muslims to ao to I0/. 1 
Kurdish Other places in Cyprus Mixed Total 
Populated Areas Turkey 
AleA Siii Total Alevi &mi Total Sum Total Alevi Sly i Total Aleut Sm i Total 
(11) (1) 4 1 
Yes 33 36(4) 33 68 62 42 38 56 47 31 52 41 
(11) 
No 53 36 50 11 18, 27 36, 38 75 26 33 55, 29 41 
Don't 14 27(3) 17 14 12 22 24 25(1) 16(3) 20 14 19 18 
loiw 
Total 100 100 , 
100 100 , 100 100, 100 100 , 100 100 , 
100 100 100 100 
The number of the students who personally wanted to have such a place was even less 
than that of the students who approved of the idea. Table 3.4 shows that 43 per cent of 
the pupils do not mind whether such a place exists or not. It is especially striking that 
only two out of ten Kurdish pupils and about three out of ten Cypriot ones actually 
wanted a place in the school for Muslims to go and pray. A Kurdish girl comments on the 
issue: 
if they want to locate a separate place for Muslim children to pray, I don't mind, but 
personally I don't like it, because school and prayer are different things. We are here to be 
educated not to pray. 
Even the number of Turkish pupils who personally wish for such a place is only 44 per 
cent. Some of them, like the Kurdish girl quoted above, disapproved of the idea on the 
grounds that school and prayer could not be mixed. Others are against the idea for 
totally practical reasons such as appropriate personal cleaning before every prayer or 
difficulties of having a clean room. For instance, a Turkish boy said: 
Praying in a school might not be easy you know. You could use the lavatories in the toilet. 
But then, the toilets are not clean enough. And imagine you have to do that several times 
each day. Also they have to provide two rooms. One for us and other for girls. It is very 
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difficult. Maybe it is possible just for Fridays. I don't know, it may be better to leave praying 
at home. 
The Turkish students who personally do not prefer such an idea also mentioned that this 
policy may not help to deal with already existing prejudices and stereotypes. A Turkish 
boy explains that: 
Now, let's say they provide a room for praying. If you don't use the room, it makes you a 
bad Muslim. If you use the room, then it makes you Muslim and nothing else. 
The religious sectoral differences are again obvious between the young people in the 
context of their personal preferences for a prayer room. As Table 3.4 indicates, nearly 
half of the Alevis do not want such a place, while nearly four out of ten Sunnis do. 
Moreover, half of the Turkish Sunnis actually like the idea of having a prayer room, in 
comparison with 31 % of the Cypriot Sunnis. The number of Kurdish Sunnis who prefer a 
quiet room is more or less similar to that of Turkish Sunnis. 
Table 3-4: Personal preference for a quiet place in school for Muslims to ao to (%1 
Kurdish 
Populated Areas 
Other places in 
Turkey 









Total Alevi S1mi Total 
(14 
Yes 15 46 20 50 44 31 28 37(7) 23 14 39 26 
No 44 18 40 1 21 29 13 18 75(3) 16 27 49 17 31 
Don't 
nd 
40 36(4) 40 29 27 57 54 25(1) 47(5) 50 39 
, 
45 43 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100, 100 100 100 100 100 100 100, 100 
Some multi-culturalist policies turned out to be a mechanism for making outcasts of 
those students who do not conform to uniform typologies. Anthias and Yuval-Davis 
(1993: 193) pointed out in the context of the multi-culturalist norms that: 
their presumptions about being the keepers of the 'true' religious way of life, are 
unanswerable. External dissent is labelled as racist and internal dissent as deviance. In the 
politics of identity and representation they are perceived as the most authentic 'Others'. 
Indeed, although being Muslim, for the students, does not necessarily mean following 
every practice, unfortunately, the schools sometimes fail to recognise this fact. The 
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following statement of a Turkish girl was one of the most typical complaints in the case 
of 'authentic exclusions': 
When the subject is Islam, the teacher doesn't think what we say is true. He always needs 
other Muslim children's approval that what we say is 'true' or not. I mean, because a 
Somalian girl cover her head, it does not mean she knows more than me or she is a better 
Muslim than me. And sometimes, when we can't answer a question, he acts like I don't 
know, he didn't expect us to know anyway. 
3.4 The Critical Revision of multi-culturalism: Interaction and Language 
Problems: 
In recent years, in order to overcome the problems of multi-cultural policies, what is 
called a critical multi-culturalist approach has been promoted by some revivalists of 
multi-culturalism. In line with this, Short and Carrington (1996: 74) emphasise the danger 
of ignorance because of negative perceptions of difference as shown in exaggerations of 
their symbolic meaning: 
whilst we accept the importance of children learning about similarities, we are mindful that 
negative perceptions of difference do not evaporate as a result of teachers choosing either 
to ignore or underplay them. On the contrary, if unfamiliar rituals and beliefs are not 
discussed in a rational and informed way, there is a danger that children may exaggerate 
their symbolic significance. 
May (1999) indicates that the 'critical multi-culturalism' which refers to students' critical 
engagement with all ethnic and cultural backgrounds, including their own, might solve 
the problems of ethnic minority children along with poor performance. May (1999: 32) 
also adds that: 
It is one thing, after all, to recognize and describe cultural differences as they affect the 
educational performance of minority groups. It is quite another to unmask the reproductive 
processes which underlie these and which lead the school to prefer certain cultural values 
and practices (those of dominant group) over others. In this respect, the normalization and 
universalization of the cultural knowledge of the majority ethnic group, and its juxtaposition 
with other (usually non-western) knowledge and practices, should be critically interrogated. 
This approach basically proposes a multi-cultural education which helps the students to 
'distinguish unusual behaviour or cultural practices that are harmful to the interests of 
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the wider community from those are not', encourage them 'to debate the merits of any 
cultural practice and argue for the proscription of those they find morally and socially 
unacceptable' and finally identify and correct 'children's misconceptions of other 
cultures' (Short and Carrington 1999: 186). Burtonwood (1996: 234) suggests the same 
kind of multi-cultural education called 'critical rationalism' which encourages dialogue 
across differences. In the same tradition, Cummins (1996) offers a bilingual education 
for culturally diverse students in order to empower them and their communities through 
negotiating cultural identities with their educators. According to this argument, students 
should be encouraged to reflect critically on both their own cultural background and the 
mainstream society culture (Cummins 1996: 4). 
Indeed, the emphasis of critical multi-culturalists on the importance of interaction 
between different cultures becomes most crucial, as long as the children are able to find 
suitable conditions to interact with each other. In this respect, two important problems 
seem to be overlooked by this new revision of multi-culturalism. One is that the 
undervalued positions of the ethnic minority teachers in multi-ethnic schools prevent 
these teachers from participating in the process of preparing the children to interact with 
each other on wider grounds. Another problem is the language. These students are not 
competent enough in English to interact fully with others. 
3.4.1 The Problems of Ethnic Minority Teachers: 
As indicated earlier, the pupils in the schools were from various ethnic minorities and the 
Turkish-speaking pupils usually made up a majority of the students in the schools. With 
respect to this point, a Turkish teacher from one of the Haringey schools that had a 
majority of its pupils who were Turkish-speaking, noted that: 
They [teachers in the school] talked about multi-cultural education. What kind of multi- 
culturalism they talked about I am not sure. Take this school as an example, 99 per cent of 
the children are from an ethnic minority, most of them Turkish-speaking. The only British 
persons in this school are teachers, not students. These students spend all their time in 
their community. Believe me some of them even cannot write 'yes' correctly. But anyway in 
the name of multi-culturalism, we salute each other's cultures under the supervision of 
British teachers. 
In particular, the emphasis of this Turkish teacher on the 'supervision of British teachers' 
reflects the fact that most of the Turkish-speaking teachers were only either teaching 
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Turkish to Turkish-speaking pupils or helping them with their problems. In other words, 
although the students are from various ethnic backgrounds, the ethnic composition of 
the teachers, especially mainstream ones is predominantly white English middle class. 
Coultas (1989: 293) stressed that there is general discrimination against ethnic minority 
teachers in schools. Coultas (1989: 293) also added that the black teachers are allowed 
to work in the British education system only if they stick to the lower grades of teaching 
and supply work. 
Notably, in a study of classroom relationships between white teachers and Afro- 
Caribbean students, Wright (1987) observed antagonistic attitudes from teachers 
towards these students. Unfortunately, this issue is somehow absent in the critical 
approach of multi-cultural literature. When it comes to this issue, the advocates of multi- 
cultural education become ethnically blind about teachers' identities. They take for 
granted that teachers are white or English. Corson (1998: 137) for instance, talks about 
how teachers should have high expectations for their students, become familiar with the 
neighbourhood community and comfortable in it and speak openly about issues of race 
and discrimination. Corson (1998: 137) also suggests that teachers from students' own 
'racial' backgrounds should act as mentors, and role models and these teachers should 
be present in mainstream classrooms in order to use non-standard language forms in 
relaxed and non-mocking ways. 
Turkish-speaking teachers often complained that their presence was undervalued in the 
school. In one school, during the lunch break in the staff room, an experienced Turkish 
teacher talked about the mainly English teachers: 
Just look around you. They are cold like ice. I have been in this school for several years 
now. My only contact with them is restricted to 'good morning Mrs. A, bye Mrs. A'. That's it. 
Oh I forget of course, if there is no problem with some Turkish children. Only that man 
[referring to another ethnic minority Black teacher] sometimes comes and chats with me. I 
should be honest though, he is also the only person I approach sometimes for a little chat. 
In fact, after the break end, he was the only teacher who smiled and made a goodbye 
gesture to Mrs A and me from the far corner before leaving the room. Others somehow 
behaved as if we did not exist. 
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Some of the Turkish-speaking teachers do not believe that they were respected as a 
teacher by other staff. If one of them had a good relationship with Turkish-speaking 
pupils, it was automatically assumed it was because of his or her Turkish origin, not 
teaching capacity. This is exactly the point one teacher made: 
The other teachers make jokes about Turkish teachers like, 'Turkish children are very 
silent in your classes and listen to you. I think they are racist against other staff in the 
school. ' Most of the time, we replied by smiling. How can I say to them, 'Look, it is a basic 
pedagogy, if you put the child out of the classroom the first chance you have, then of 
course you are going to lose control'. I know a child who is not permitted in classes for four 
weeks now. At the moment I don't think even they remember why they suspended the child 
in the first place. In the Turkish classes, they learn and enjoy and when they learn, of 
course they respect you. 
Another problem these teachers faced, is their lack of participation in decision making 
processes. A teacher explained that: 
When you propose something new, they just say 'we are going to look at it'. Then naturally 
you will not hear anything from them. Couple of months later, if an English teacher goes to 
them with the same proposals, they just say, 'it is brilliant. This may improve our policies 
even further. Everybody automatically forgets whose suggestion this was in the first place. 
And, they give the responsibility of the task to this English person. 
The Turkish-speaking teachers also have problems with being used simply as a 
translator between the main-class teachers and the students. A Turkish teacher who 
taught mathematics in an English instruction secondary school in Turkey before coming 
to England with her husband, whose family live in London, was very critical of the 
situation: 
Every time something happen with the Turkish children, the staff come to me and ask for 
my help. Sometimes they even come in the middle of the lesson. Because you know I only 
teach Turkish there. How can my subject be as important as theirs? They just use me to 
make their points clear to the students or translate a letter to the parents. 
Given the nature of this existence of Turkish-speaking teachers in the schools, it could 
be argued that existing policies have a potential to alienate Turkish-speaking children in 
relation to mainstream British teachers. Curriculum adjustments, and training courses for 
white teachers might be just the tip of the iceberg. 
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It also requires more staff recruitment from ethnic minority communities, not only for the 
service of their own community pupils, but for mainstream subjects too. Otherwise, white 
teachers' efforts to show the degree of their appreciation of different cultures might be 
perceived by these children as 'artificial'. As Gilborn (1995) argues, teaching 
professionals, most of the time, act in accordance with their presumptions and labels 
about a particular community. Gilborn notes that there is a: 
need always to question taken-for-granted assumptions about ethnic minority students and 
their communities, especially essentialist and reductionist perspectives that gloss over 
important differences (Gilborn, 1995: 159). 
In this sense, young people question the credibility of multi-cultural policies. For 
instance, a Kurdish girl who attended a school where the majority of the pupils were 
Turkish-speaking and the mainstream teachers were English, explained why she did not 
like Music lessons in the school: 
The music teacher wanted us to translate Turkish pop music we choose into English. But 
how does she know I like Turkish pop music or pop music? It was so boring. What was the 
point? I really don't understand. Most of my classmates are Turkish anyway. They don't 
need translation. I don't think the rest of the class was too much bothered to listen to 
Turkish music. When it was translated, the words became stupid anyway. 
3.4.2 Language Difficulties- English Education: 
In particular, the lack of enough English skills makes a significant contribution to the 
academic difficulties of ethnic minority students. The main obstacle for many Turkish- 
speaking students, especially Kurdish ones, is language. As a Kurdish girl explained: 
Now you said you study in the university, but tell me if they put you in a class in which 
everybody, except you, spoke French. I bet you can't even study in a primary school. This 
is exactly what happens to me. I felt the time in school was a waste. 
A Kurdish boy who has been here for two years talked about the noise level in the 
classroom: 
My English is not good enough to understand everything anyway. When you add to this the 
teacher who start his lessons by shouting about lack of discipline from the beginning to the 
end, what basically you have at the end is a headache, nothing else. 
138 
This is a typical feeling among these students. They basically feel lost in the mainstream 
classes. During the fieldwork, it became apparent that some of the teachers and most of 
the students were dissatisfied with the current applications. A Section 11 teacher of 
Pakistani origin and a Turkish teacher complained about the allocation of the students in 
the mainstream classroom according to their age, not their level of English: 
Pakistani Teacher: 
When we came to this country, my brother and I could only speak a little English. We 
attended English language classes for one year, then we entered mainstream education. It 
seemed you were losing a year, but in time you had a chance to catch up more easily. It is 
better to lose one year than lose all possible education prospects. 
Turkish teacher: 
They just put these children in the main classes according to their ages from day one. After 
a couple of months, naturally the children lose their interest. 
Even the existing programme was under strict budgetary scrutiny. Most of the Section 11 
teachers complained about the lack of qualified staff and equipment. They stretch 
themselves from one classroom to another to help the students. For instance a Kurdish 
boy asks for books for each lesson: 
In Turkey, my mathematics was very good. In the primary school, I even managed to get 
an 'excellent' for mathematics. Here, as far as I can guess, it doesn't seem too difficult, if I 
manage to understand what exactly the problems are. Before I manage to understand 
something, the class passed to other things. It is difficult you know. Also in Turkey we have 
books to study, here there is not a specific book, only your notebook. I wish we have a 
proper book. Then at home, I can translate the exercises in Turkish by using a dictionary. 
3.5 Beyond Culture - Economic Exclusion: 
The Turkish-speaking students' problems are not limited to the cultural factors. As 
Fenton (1999) underlined, ethnicity issues cannot be reduced to economic/class 
discussions, but they cannot be isolated from them either. In this sense, these young 
people's exclusion could not be understood only in relation to culture without any 
reference to the socio-economic status of their families in general and the limited scope 
of education to provide future upward mobility for these young people in particular. 
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Rex (1982: 55) points out that the British educational system produces and centres 
around themes of class status and mobility to a degree which is probably unparalleled 
anywhere else in the world, so the problems faced by the immigrants' children in 
entering the British social system should be dealt with by referring to this issue. In this 
respect, Rex (1988) proposes an education system which provides two specific services. 
One is to provide equal opportunity to all children including minorities to have 'an equal 
chance of unequal rewards' (Rex 1988: 94), while ensuring that all children learn 
tolerance of cultural diversity (Rex 1988: 97). 
On the other hand, providing equal opportunity to ethnic minority children might help 
them to be more successful in the schools, yet whether educational success brings an 
upward mobility or not is a problem relating more or less to the available possibilities in 
the labour market. In this respect, Nichols (1981: 21) emphasises that: 
an increase in intergenerational mobility into higher positions cannot be automatically 
attributed to the results of more egalitarian policies (such as they are) having been pursued 
by politicians. Account has to be taken, too, of the expansion and contraction of different 
occupational categories over time. 
Even taking into account the existing structural economic barriers to the economic 
prospects of ethnic minority children, some critical multi-culturalists believe that multi- 
culturalism is the remedy for children's economic futures. Kalantzis and Cope (1999: 262) 
introduce a new understanding of cultural diversity to replace the 'traditional 
assimilationist curriculum' and 'existing multi-cultural applications of superficial 
pluralism'. Kalantzis and Cope (1999: 267) propose that this new understanding of 
cultural diversity portrays the children as "multi-skilled' all round workers who are flexible 
enough to be able to do complex and integral work' in the global economy. In this new 
work environment they argue: 
cross-cultural communication and the negotiated dialogue of different languages and 
discourses can be a basis for worker creativity, for the formation of locally sensitive and 
globally extensive networks which closely relate an organisation to its clients or suppliers, 
and creates structures of motivation in which people feel that their different backgrounds 
and experiences are genuinely valued (Kalantzis and Cope 1999: 268). 
However, my research failed to find evidence of opportunities for these young people 
becoming genuinely valued multi-skilled all round workers. Under the guise of respect for 
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their community values, the existing education policies provided these young people with 
limited experiences suitable only for jobs their parents may have had in their 
communities as will be discussed in the next chapter. Here however, it should be noted 
that educational policies in particular do not undermine, but underpin, this reality and 
might be best observed in the example of the Work Experience Scheme, which is a 
reflection of family exclusion on students' school lives through the case of work 
experience. 
3.5.1 The Role Of Schools In Terms Of Improving Employment 
Opportunities: 
It is important to show these young people that they can work outside of the community 
labour market, if they attain the necessary qualifications in schools. The Work 
Experience Scheme is an important tool to realise this aim in schools. Pupils in their last 
year of compulsory schooling are encouraged to undertake a period of work experience 
as part of their education. During a placement pupils carry out particular jobs in much the 
same way as regular employees. In 1992, over 90 per cent of pupils in their last year of 
compulsory schooling undertook placement (Foreign & Commonwealth Office 1995: 14). 
Pupils observe work processes and employees going about their normal work, and 
undertake projects on the employers' premises. 
Most Turkish-speaking young people are not given enough chance to learn about 
employment conditions in other sectors in the UK, either because they do not participate 
in the Work Experience Scheme (WES) or schemes in the community labour market 
which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
Although there are some suspicions about WES, some of the studies show that 
participation in WES increases young people's familiarity with working conditions and 
their confidence in schools (DfEE and OFSTED 1997: 52, Petherbridge 1997, Watts 
1983b). Watts (1983b: 96) has argued that the measurable outcomes of work experience 
are positive. 
The basic objectives of work experience are to increase pupils' knowledge and 
understanding of self and society and to help them to choose their future occupation by 
extending the range of occupations that the pupils are prepared to consider, and finally 
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to enable pupils to establish a relationship with a particular employer which may lead to 
the offer of a permanent job (Watts 1983a: 6-8). 
The Turkish-speaking young people are unlikely to enjoy these positive impacts of the 
scheme in terms of extending their opportunities and gaining confidence in a future 
career. Barton et al. (1988: 111) emphasise the importance of discouraging pupils from 
seeking placements with family and friends wherever possible so that new experiences 
can be gained. However, in the case of Turkish-speaking young people, quite the 
opposite is occurring. 
As shown in Table 3.5, more than half of the Turkish-speaking pupils who undertook 
placement, did their work experience course in a small shop which is typical of the 
employment done in the Turkish-speaking `community' (as will be shown in the next 
chapter). Only 15 per cent had a chance to work in a big store, whilst only three out of 
ten worked in an office environment. However, the differences between Kurdish, Turkish 
and Cypriot pupils in terms of work experience is striking. Just over eight out of ten and 
six out of ten Kurdish and Turkish students respectively worked in a small shop during 
their work experience course, compared to only three out of ten Cypriot students. 
Moreover, nearly six out of ten Cypriot students did their work experience work in an 
office, while only one in ten Kurdish students did so. 
Table 3-5: Where did you do your work experience? (%) 
Kurdish Populated 
Areas 18 








Small Shops 83(15) 63(5) 29(5) 36(4) 54 
Big Stores 6(1) 13(l) 12(2) 36 4 15 
Offices 11 21 25(2) 59(10) 1 27(3) 32 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
In the first instance, the Cypriot students might seem to have a better chance in terms of 
their placement, yet they are still far from the opportunities with which Work Experience 
might provide them. As Table 3.6 indicates, more than six out of ten students find their 
placement through their family connections. This figure is seven out of ten for Kurdish 
students. It seems that only Turkish pupils received the school's help on this matter, and 
the school managed to find work placements in an environment with which they were 
already very familiar. 
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In reality, if a student already has a part-time job, their employers signed the necessary 
replacement papers as a formality. This will be discussed in the next chapter. In other 
words, for a week the students' existing part-time job transforms into a work experience 
placement. As a Kurdish boy said about his own experience: 
I already worked in my uncle's barber shop. So he signed the work experience paper, then 
I brought them to the school and they approved it. That's it really. It was that easy. 
Tahla 'A. R! Who arranged the nlace for Work Experience? (%1 
Kurdish Populated 
Areas (18) 








I/Family arranged 72(13) 38(3) 59(10) 64(7) 61 
The school 
arranged 
28 (5) 63 (5) 41(7) 36 (4) 39 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
In other words, the schools do not give these pupils a chance to experience other 
employment opportunities, other than those already existing in the community labour 
market. It increases the children's isolation in terms of future economic prospects. This 
isolation is especially severe for Kurdish pupils, since they also need to overcome 
language barriers. 
The work experience scheme did not overcome the feeling of exclusion among the 
Turkish-speaking pupils. Ironically, they have intentions to continue their education, but 
still feel they might end up with their parents' jobs. It is evident that young people's 
perceptions of the conditions within their local labour market bore a close resemblance 
to the actual conditions (Biggart and Furlong 1996: 256). Within the depressed labour 
market conditions, they frequently remain sceptical about the value of the qualifications 
they are taking, but are scared of leaving the familiar environment of the school to enter 
an uncertain labour market (Biggart and Furlong 1996: 264). 
This is exactly what is happening to the Turkish-speaking young people. Table 3.7 
reveals that 85 per cent of the young people want to continue their education. The 
number of Cypriot young people who have intentions to continue their education is even 
higher than this total. In fact, none of the Cypriot young people want to enter working life 
after compulsory schooling. Their uncertainty and lack of confidence is evident from a 
discussion with Cypriot and Turkish boys: 
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Cypriot Boy: If let's say I have a doctor father, a teacher mother and a lawyer brother, can 
you imagine me in a Kebab business? No way. They will certainly find me a proper job in 
an office. Have you ever seen somebody with these background in a Kebab shop? I didn't. 
Turkish Boy: It is true you know. But there are other things outside of your control. 
PE: What do you mean with other things? 
Turkish Boy: I mean. If I become a doctor, I can only treat other Turkish people. If I have 
my own surgery, probably my patients will be Turkish people. I think the others do not trust 
somebody originally from this country. So at the end, after all your efforts, you can only 
earn a very limited amount of money. I know a doctor. Only Turkish people know him and 
go to him. And take the teacher, they can only teach Turkish children. Only we respect 
them as a teacher, not others in the school. 
Table 3-7: The vouna neoole's plans after comoulsorv education (%1 
Kurdish 













89 77 92 70 85 
Start Working 10 21 20 11 
No idea 1 3 8 10 4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
3.6 Conclusion: 
There has been a long-history of efforts within the academic community to explain the 
under achievement of ethnic minority students with reference to social and economic 
disadvantage. In time, however, conservative approaches have also begun to 
emphasise the cultural backwardness of such groups in order to understand their 
educational problems. In reaction to these approaches, a growing number of multi- 
culturalist scholars tend to claim that the educational failure of ethnic-minority students is 
not because of cultural backwardness, but because of the lack of recognition of their 
cultural assets. 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that Turkish-speaking young people do 
not show a uniform pattern in terms of academic achievement in Haringey and Hackney, 
albeit that both of these boroughs adopted a considerable set of multi-culturalist policies. 
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The students were fairly successful in the exams in Haringey, but not in Hackney. In 
addition, a wide-spread scepticism amongst students and teachers about multi- 
culturalist incentives makes such policies even more controversial. 
Most notably, when the existing multi-culturalist policies regarding religious incentives in 
schools were analysed, it was seen that a considerable proportion of the Turkish- 
speaking students were reluctant to have a place in the school specifically designed for 
prayer. In line with this, the students that do not fit the classical typologies of being 
Muslim, felt that they were not recognised as 'good Muslims'. 
It is a fact that the problems of multi-cultural policies have also been acknowledged by 
the new version of multi-culturalism which is known as 'critical multi-culturalism'. In 
particular, they place specific emphasis on the importance of cultural interaction 
between students from different ethnic backgrounds. In this respect, two important 
problems are, however, overlooked by this new revision of multi-culturalism. One is that 
the undervalued positions of the ethnic minority teachers in multi-ethnic schools prevent 
these teachers from participating in the process of preparing the students to interact with 
each other on equal grounds. Another problem is the language. These pupils are not 
competent enough in English to interact with others. Some students reported that the 
lack of text books for each lesson made the language problems of ethnic-minority 
students even more severe. This absence might be felt more strongly because they 
know there is a different way of teaching in Turkey. 
Nevertheless, the Turkish-speaking students' educational problems cannot be 
understood only in the context of cultural debates. One also needs to take into account 
the implications of their families' economic exclusion on the students' school-life in order 
to understand their problems. This became most evident in the case of the 'work 
experience scheme'. It was found that most of the young people were 'placed' in the 
small-shops of the Turkish-speaking 'community' in which they were already working on 
a part-time basis (The relation of students and their parents to the labour market will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter). Accordingly, the feeling that education 
would not bring exclusion to an end in their future-life, appears to be a fundamental 
factor influencing the students' educational ambitions. Broadly speaking, the empirical 
evidence suggests that a proper discussion of the educational problems of the Turkish- 
speaking students specifically requires the implications of wider economic exclusion. 
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4. The Disadvantaged Position of the Turkish-Speaking 
`Community' in Labour Market -A case of Exclusion: 
In general, the aim of this chapter is to analyse the Turkish-speaking young people's 
relationships to the labour market and their disadvantaged economic prospects with 
reference to exclusion. As Bastenier and Dassetto (1988) point out, when some basic 
elements of identity construction are considered, the potential formation of a sub- 
proletariat is a factor that should not be disregarded: 
those who, in principle, should have moved into the labour force are really faced with the 
very likely prospect of unemployment. A new kind of marginality is added to their political 
estrangement and the fragmentation of their cultural references. How is it possible to 
speak of social integration of these people when an essential element, their integration into 
the economy, is missing? (Bastenier and Dassetto 1988: 164). 
The developed capitalist economies have changed considerably in recent decades and 
as Wilpert (1988: 2) notes, young people in general and ethnic minority young people in 
particular, belong to segments of the population most affected by these changes. 
Sassen (1996a: 580) identifies three economic processes in highly developed countries. 
First was the expansion and consolidation of the producer services and corporate 
headquarters sector into the economic core of major cities like London. Second was the 
reshaping of manufacturing industry to compete with cheap imports and those of leading 
sectors such as telecommunications or finance. The third process was the 
informalisation of a growing array of economic activities. Informalisation represented a 
mode of reorganising the production and distribution of goods and services in order to 
compete with cheap imports and high-profit firms in the local markets and escape the 
regulatory apparatus of the formal economy. Sassen also adds that all of these 
processes have shaped the job supply: 
The expansion of the high-income work force, in conjunction with the emergence of new 
cultural forms in everyday living, has led to a process of high-income gentrification that 
rests, in the last analysis, on the availability of a vast supply of low-wage workers (Sassen 
1996a: 584). 
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According to Sassen (1996a: 584), there was a sharp polarisation in the labour market in 
terms of income. At one extreme, the high paid new jobs requiring a high skilled, college 
education were created and at the other extreme, there was a massive growth of low- 
wage service jobs requiring a low level of education. 
Sassen (1996a: 586-587) has emphasised two important features of segmentation in the 
organisation of labour markets. One is the decline in the proportion of unionised shops, 
the deterioration of wages, and the expansion of sweatshops and industrial home-work. 
Second is the shift in labour market functions such as recruitment, screening and 
training to the household or community. Migrant labour is engaged in particular kinds of 
jobs in relation to this transformation of the labour market. Sassen (1996a: 588) argues 
that: 
Immigrants, in so far as they tend to form communities, may be in a favourable position to 
seize the opportunities represented by informalisation. But the opportunities are not 
necessarily created by immigrants. They are a structured outcome of current trends in 
advanced economies. 
A good share of the informal sector is not the result of immigrant survival strategies, but 
rather an outcome of structural patterns or transformations in the larger economy. 
The labour market in these countries favours highly-skilled immigration but the pool of 
aspiring low-skilled immigrants is enormous and will expand exponentially in coming 
years (Castles & Miller 1993: 178). While illegal employment is growing, legal minorities 
become the victims of the job losses in the manufacturing sector and growing numbers 
of immigrants become self-employed and owners of small businesses such as 
restaurants (Castles and Miller 1993: 179). 
Moreover, the jobs which are available for the migrants are usually peripheral, and less 
secure and, in most circumstances, are those jobs that the domestic workers refuse to 
do. This is especially the case for first generation migrants, who have usually come to 
developed countries with fewer qualifications, are ready to do any job available in the 
labour market and are unlikely to criticise what they do and their working conditions. 
Whilst in the developed countries, they spend minimum amounts and save the maximum 
they can afford for a future in their country of origin. Economically they are at the bottom 
of the receiving countries' labour market, but are still better off when compared to the 
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conditions in their home country. The reason for their migration therefore, was largely 
the desire to make a better life for themselves. 
These first generation migrants come to developed countries with hopes for economic 
prosperity. For instance, in a study of Greek Cypriot migrants, Anthias (1983: 79) finds 
that their primary aim in emigration is to provide better economic opportunities for their 
families and that they are ready to work in any kind of job under any conditions. In the 
USA, Wilson (1997: 140-46) compared the attitudes of black Americans and newly 
arrived Mexican migrants towards dead-end jobs and low wages, and found that the 
Mexicans had considerably fewer reservations about these jobs. 
In relation to the second generation young people, it is important to study what might be 
their place in the labour market and how it might differ from that of their parents. Most of 
the studies which analyse young people in the labour market focus on the transition from 
school to work. Until the mid 1980s most theories had focused on the impact of social 
class background in order to analyse the young people's transition from school to work. 
For instance, Roberts (1975) introduced the concept of 'opportunity structures' in relation 
to occupational choice. He argued that: 
Careers can be regarded as developing into patterns dictated by the opportunity structures 
to which individuals are exposed, first in education and subsequently in employment, whilst 
individuals' ambitions, in turn, can be treated as reflecting the influence of the structures 
through which they pass (Roberts 1975: 142). 
The studies concentrated on the low aspirations of working class young people because 
of their limited economic opportunities. Reynolds (1976: 133) showed that the working 
class pupils' (the boys') expectations of their future were low. They expected to be 
apprentice carpenters, bricklayers, toolmakers, lorry drivers etc. Their aspirations were 
low - even when asked 'suppose you could do any job in the world and you had all the 
qualifications and experience required, what would you be? '. Most of the responses 
were the same as they still wanted to be bricklayers. Furthermore, also in relation to 
working class young people, Mungham (1976: 102) pointed out that: 
the worry about work, the nagging fear of being without it, linked them firmly with their 
parents' generation and was the basis of a deep-rooted conservatism. They had learned, 
from their parents, from older working class relatives and from their own experience of the 
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world not to expect very much. They saw the future not in terms of any possible prospects 
for advancement or change, but as a search for something secure. 
Willis (1978) argued that against the formal middle class value oriented school system, 
working class young people developed a counter culture driven from wider working class 
shop-floor culture. Willis (1978) recognised this counter culture as young men's self- 
preparation for working class jobs. 
Moreover, some theorists concentrated on the effects of the local environment on young 
people's experiences and expectations of their future possibilities. For instance, Timms 
(1978: 40) argued that the children's experiences in the boundaries of the local area 
determine what follows next in the future. In relation to the local boundaries, Johnston 
and Herbert (1978: 11) claimed that within the advanced industrial - urban societies, the 
most marked territorial separation almost invariably involves the members of ethnic 
minority groups. 
More recently, Lynch (1987: 202) found that ethnicity is significant for many aspects of 
labour market experience, stating that non-whites bear a disproportionate share of 
unemployment, all other things being equal (Lynch 1987: 209). 
Furlong (1992: 108) suggests that occupational aspirations of young people reflect the 
deeply-embedded impressions about the world which have developed as a result of 
experiences in the family and in school. On the other hand Furlong (1992: 121) also adds 
that although school-leavers have a reasonable idea about the sorts of opportunities 
available to them in the labour market, many young people hope to enter higher-level 
occupations and their experiences in the labour market are likely to lead eventually to a 
downward modification in their aspirations. Moreover, in an article on the same subject, 
Furlong and his colleagues (1996: 562) emphasise that: 
as a part of the process of socialisation, children come to share in the assumptive worlds 
of their parents, friends and neighbours and adopt similar outlooks on the world around 
them. Central to these normative orientations is a notion of future socio-economic status. 
On the other hand, Coles (1995) argues that during the transition from school to work, 
although the existing labour market constrains young people's future opportunities, they 
nevertheless might be able to choose from available career options. Coles (1995: 22) 
argues that: 
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Changes in education and training do not create extra or different jobs. But in responding 
to the opportunities that education, training and the labour market offer them, young people 
do choose between different career options. 
However, Bray et at. (1997: 32) maintain that boys in secondary schools want manual 
jobs without understanding the changing job market and the impact of the technological 
revolution. In other words, they don't seem too aware of the economic situation around 
them. 
These studies emphasised that working class children learn the values and conditions of 
the labour market around them mostly through their parents and that, as a result, they 
may choose (willingly or unwillingly) a career from a restricted range of opportunities. On 
the other hand, several studies of second generation migrant children show that the first 
generation's non-selective involvement in the labour market would not be the case for 
the second generation young people, and that their aspirations for the future might be 
higher than their parents. Waldinger and Perlmann (1998) discuss the differences in 
economic expectations of first and second generation migrants in the USA. They point 
out that: 
The immigrants arrive willing to do the jobs that natives will not hold: however low the jobs 
may fall in the US hierarchy, they still offer wages and compensation superior to the 
opportunities back home. Having been exposed to different wage and consumption 
standards from the start, the children want more (Waldinger and Perlmann 1998: 8). 
Furthermore, Hoffmann-Nowotny (1985: 127-29) observed high expectations among 
Italian young people in Switzerland. The author also shows that in Germany foreign 
children between 10 and 14 years of age have extremely high occupational aspirations. 
45 per cent of the Turkish children want to become a doctor, engineer, or teacher. The 
figure among the German children was only 12 per cent. On the other hand, only a small 
proportion of the foreign children in Germany believed in equality of opportunities for 
themselves and the belief decreased with increasing length of residence in Germany 
(Hoffmann-Nowotny 1985: 129). 
Dex (1983: 61,67) found from a study of 378 second generation West Indians and 463 
white female school leavers in Birmingham and London in 1971, that the young black 
women were very slightly more ambitious than the whites, and more clearly they desired 
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a different set of jobs than those held by their mothers and West Indian women in 
general. Penn and Scattergood (1992: 84) found similar results from a study of 376 Asian 
fifth formers in Sheffield in 1989. The majority of the respondents ideally preferred a 
professional job. Thornley and Siann (1991) observed that Asian girls' career aspirations 
were not so very different from those of their white peers. Waldinger and Perlmann 
(1998: 8) emphasise the same dichotomy for the second generation children in general: 
Historical considerations aside, the advent of the hourglass economy confronts the 
immigrant children with a cruel choice: either acquire the college, and other advanced 
degrees needed to move into the professional/managerial elite, or else accept the same 
menial jobs to which the first generation was consigned. Given the aspirational shift 
entailed in 'second generation revolt', the latter possibility is not on the cards. 
Nevertheless, generational upward mobility is not easy and it certainly does not depend 
upon merely the ability or aspirations of individuals. Piore (1979: 172) argues that: 
Any restriction that policy places on the first generation, in the attempt to control its access 
to jobs, is likely to affect the access of the second generation to channels of upward 
mobility. 
For some ethnic groups, this mobility takes not decades, but centuries. As Borjas 
(1994: 572) finds, by comparing skill differentials of the children and grand-children of 
migrants of 32 national origin groups in the USA: 
The skill differentials introduced by immigration became important determinants of the 
skills and labour market determinants of the children and grandchildren of the immigrants. 
In France, Lebon (1985: 145-46) pointed to a certain reproduction of the foreign labour 
force from one generation to the next, especially in the textile industry. Second 
generation migrants in France generally hold low-skilled jobs and encountered longer 
delays in obtaining either a first job or a new job. 
In other words, for ethnic minority children it seems difficult to fulfil their economic 
aspirations in the future. It is important to understand the mechanism which undermine 
these children's aspirations, since these might cause frustrations. In this sense, as 
Nichols (1976: 14) argues: 
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There can be many possible reasons why people 'accept' the situations in which they find 
themselves. To establish whether they 'accept', and in what way, requires specific 
investigation. 
Pertinently, the young people's relation to the labour market could not only be 
understood within the context of their future job prospects, but their current engagement 
in the labour market through part-time jobs or so called 'out of school work' is also 
important. Pettitt (1998: 1) emphasises that children's employment is affected by, and 
contributes to, the changing economic structure of the labour force. In fact, as Lavalette 
(1998: 38) notes, work and labour are central values of modern British society and 
labouring was always thought to develop good moral values in working class children. 
Moreover, Lavalette (1994: 226) argues that: 
Sociological research might usefully focus on the different social classes; the experiences 
of children employed by their parents, and differences in the labour participation of children 
from the minority ethnic communities. 
Lavalette (1994: 226) adds that such research on 'out of school work' benefits by 
adopting a perspective which fully locates child labour within the social structure of 
present class societies. However, there seems to be a disagreement within the existing 
literature on notions of what constitutes 'work' and direct comparisons between studies 
might often be difficult as different questions were asked. Sometimes respondents were 
asked if they were currently working, or have worked in the current school term, or have 
ever worked (Hobbs and McKechnie 1998: 10). Morrow (1992) emphasises the essential 
contribution of school children to the domestic tasks and even in some extreme cases in 
caring for the elderly or disabled family members. In my research, as the emphasis is on 
the children's conditions in relation to the labour market, part-time work outside the 
household will be taken into account. 
In this context, the chapter will analyse Turkish-speaking young people's relationships to 
the labour market and employment structure in terms of their future economic 
aspirations and their engagement in the labour market through their part-time jobs. Since 
knowing the conditions of the local labour market are important in order to analyse the 
young people's engagement in the employment relations, the first part of the chapter will 
concentrate on the labour market in general and the Turkish-speaking population's 
employment in particular. In the second part, the young people's aspirations in relation to 
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their parent's employment status will be analysed and finally the young people's part- 
time jobs will be studied. 
4.1 Labour Market Structure and Employment Condition in relation to the 
Turkish-speaking Population in Britain: 
The Turkish-speaking 'community' is concentrated in poor areas which offer limited 
employment opportunities. Consequently, these negative economic conditions have an 
effect upon the economic prospects of the community. As can be seen in Table 4.1, nine 
per cent of all the economically active population in the United Kingdom were 
unemployed in 1991, with 11 per cent of all active males and seven per cent of all active 
females being unemployed. In Haringey the unemployment rate of the economically 
active population was double this figure (18 per cent), whilst in Hackney the 
unemployment rate was 22 per cent. 
Moreover, the males are more likely to be unemployed than the females. In Haringey the 
unemployment rate of males was 18 per cent and that of women was ten per cent. In 
Hackney it was 22 per cent for males and 12 per cent for females. Besides, the rate of 
economically inactive women was 32 per cent in Haringey and 36 per cent in Hackney, 
while the national figure is higher (50 per cent). 
Apart from unemployment rates, employment figures for Hackney and Haringey are in 
tune with the national average. The percentage of male employees was 68 per cent in 
Hackney and 70 per cent in Haringey. The self-employed made up ten per cent of the 
active male population in Hackney and 12 per cent of that in Haringey. Eighty four per 
cent of active women in Hackney were employees, whilst this rate was 85 per cent in 
Haringey. Self employment among the women was not as popular as among the males 
(four per cent in Hackney and five per cent in Haringey). 
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Table 4-1: Economic Activity of the Turkish-speaking Population in Britain and in 
Hackneu and Harinaev (%1 
Grea t Britai n Turk s* C riots*` Hari ne Hac kne 
Active 
Total We Fen T M F T M F T M F T M F 
UnernpMW 9 11 7 40 40 41 13 15 10 18 18 10 22 22 12 
Employees 78 72 86, 44 41 49 59 52 70 71 70 85 69 68 84 




27 50 38 23 58 36 20 53 1 3-5-1 1-6 32 38 18 36 
*1991 Census did not indicate Turks and Kurdish Turks separately. 
**1991 Census did not indicate Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots separately. 
Sources: OPCS 1993a: 916-27,928-33,940-41, OPCS 1993b: 20, OPCS 1993c: 392, 
477. 
Furthermore, according to the Deprivation Index, which was prepared by the Department 
of the Environment in 1994 (DfEE 1994), Hackney and Haringey are two of the most 
deprived areas in terms of 13 indicators which are unemployment; crowded housing; 
lacking amenities; unsuitable accommodation; education participation; children in low 
earning households; number of cars; standardised mortality rates; long term 
unemployment; income support; derelict land; house insurance and educational 
attainment. Hackney was the third most deprived local authority out of 366, and 
Haringey was tenth. 
The deprivation is even more severe in some wards. According to Haringey Council 
Education Services and Statistics Department, no single ward in Haringey emerges as 
being amongst the 50 London Wards with the lowest levels of social deprivation. 
Eighteen of the 23 electoral Wards in Haringey have a higher level of deprivation than 
the median range for London. The level of deprivation in three wards is the same as the 
average deprivation level of all London wards and only two wards have a lower level of 
deprivation than the London average (Haringey Council Education Services and 
Statistics Department 1997). 
Owen and Green (1992: 27-8) point out that although ethnic minorities are improving 
their position in the labour market in the regions of economic expansion in Britain, their 
position is deteriorating in areas of economic contraction. A 'discouraged worker effect' 
amongst ethnic minorities is stronger in London than in some of the less favoured 
regions in which employment contraction results in high unemployment rates. 
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It is obvious that these unfavourable local conditions affect the members of the Turkish- 
speaking 'community'. However, all members are not affected by the disadvantages 
equally and there is a differentiation among them in terms of their places of origin. 
Although delineation of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Kurds from the 1991 Census data 
is not possible, the comparison between Turks and Cypriots in terms of employment 
conditions might provide some insights on the diversity between these groups. 
According to the 1991 Population Census, there are 14276 economically active Turkish 
people in Britain, 10154 of whom were men against 4122 women. The number of 
economically active Cypriots is 48021, consisting of 31116 men and 16905 women 
(OPCS 1993a: 916-27,928-33,940-41). Table 4.1 indicates that the unemployment 
rates among Turks and Cypriots are higher than the national average. However, it is 
more severe for Turks than it is for Cypriots: four out of ten economically active Turks 
are unemployed, compared to one out of ten economically active Cypriots. This figure 
shows a similar pattern for males and females as well. The Cypriot male unemployment 
is even slightly lower than the unemployment figure for Haringey and Hackney, while 
Turkish male unemployment is well over those figures. On the other hand, it should be 
noted that Turkish and Cypriot female participation in the labour market shows a similar 
trend. Both Turkish and Cypriot women are more likely to be economically inactive, 
compared with all British women, and women in Hackney and Haringey. 
The most striking characteristic of Turkish and Cypriot employment is the high number of 
self-employed, compared to the national figure. Only 11 per cent of the whole active 
labour force in Britain is self-employed, while 16 per cent of the Turkish active labour 
force and 28 per cent of the Cypriot active labour force are self-employed. Self- 
employment is especially popular for Turkish and Cypriot women. Although the Turkish 
and Cypriot women are less likely to be self-employed compared to their male 
counterparts, they are more likely to be self-employed compared to the general average 
in Britain (6 per cent of all active females). One out of ten Turkish women and two out of 
ten Cypriot women are self-employed. Yet, the difference between Turks and Cypriots 
still continue to exist. 
Free school meal entitlement is a good indicator to show the economic level of families 
and the diversity between Kurdish, Turkish and Cypriot families. Unfortunately these 
data are only available for the Haringey schools. Table 4.2 shows that in Haringey while 
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more than half of the pupils are not entitled to free school meals, only 11 per cent of the 
Kurdish, 17 per cent of the Turkish and 36 per cent of the Cypriot pupils do not require 
free meals. In other words, Cypriot students are three times less likely to require free 
school meals, compared to the Kurdish students in Haringey. In this respect, although 
the Turkish-speaking students are disadvantaged, compared to the total groups of the 
students, the Kurdish ones are the worst off among them. 
Table 4-2: Ethnic Groups by Free School Meal Entitlement among the 1997 GCSE 
Candidates in Harinaev (%) 
Ethnic Groups Yes No Total 
European-Kurdish (74) 89.2 10.8 100 
European-Turkish (88) 83 17 100 
Turkish Cypriot (66) 63.6 36.4 100 
All Groups (1700) 47.9 52.1 100 
Source: Haringey Education Authority. 
Haringey Education Authority also collected information about the families' social class 
backgrounds as defined in the 1991 national census. The data were used to measure 
the prosperity level of the wards in Haringey in which pupils live, rather than to measure 
the prosperity level of the parents in individual households. As can be seen in Table 4.3, 
the overall distribution of the pupils in the wards having various degrees of prosperity, is 
very even. On the other hand, Kurdish households in Haringey are less represented in 
the most prosperous wards, while more concentrated in the deprived ones. Only one per 
cent of the Kurdish households live in the wards with the highest percentage of heads of 
households in social class one or two. This ratio is seven per cent for Turkish families 
and three per cent for Cypriot ones whereas the general average for all groups is 12 per 
cent. 
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Table 4-3: Ethnic Groups by % of Heads of Households of the 1997 GCSE 
Candidates in wards grouped by % of Heads of Households in Social Class I or 2* 
in Harinaev (%1 
Distribution of Households in each wards 
Wards Grouped by % of Heads of Households 














Highest % of Heads of Households in 
Classes 1 or 2 
1.4 6.8 3 11.5 
Next Highest % in Classes 1 or 2 13.5 8 16.7 13.2 
Next to Lowest % in Classes 1 or 2 18.9 15.9 18.2 18.8 
Lowest % in Classes 1 or 2 40.5 36.4 24.2 29.5 
Unclassified 25.7 33 37.9 27.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
"Social Cass 1: Frolessional Occupations and Social Class 2: Managerial and Technical 
Occupations. 
Source: Haringey Education Authority. 
In general, the Turkish-speaking students come from disadvantaged families in terms of 
economic prosperity and from disadvantaged areas. In this respect, it seems that there 
is not a promising 'opportunity structure' for these young people. On the other hand, 
these restricted opportunities do not affect all the young people in the same way. The 
Kurdish young people have the worst conditions and the Cypriot ones have the best, 
while Turkish young people are somewhere in the middle. 
Apart from the deprived economic conditions which these young people confront, there 
is another challenge to their future employment prospect: the existence of ethnic 
economic enclaves as territorially concentrated clusters of businesses. The Turkish- 
speaking 'community' concentrates on the clothing industry and small shop employment. 
In order to analyse the intensity of this phenomenon, the following section focuses on 
the nature of employment relations and the Turkish-speaking families in the labour 
market in more detail with references to the parents' employment of the Turkish- 
speaking young people in the sample. 
4.1.1 Turkish-speaking Parents' Employment Conditions: 
The sample more or less confirms the general picture of the Turkish and Cypriot 
population according to the 1991 Census. Five visible characteristics are observed 
among the Turkish-speaking 'community' in terms of employment. First, is the high rate 
of unemployment. Second, is the high proportion of male self-employment. Third, is the 
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small number of professional employees. Fourth, is the small number of economically 
active women. Finally, there is a clear differentiation among the people from different 
places of origins in terms of employment. These observations are confirmed by one of 
the Turkish teachers. He said that: 
Most of the men do not work at all. But Cypriots are relatively better off. Of course not all of 
them. Because Cypriots came here earlier than the others. These new comers were the 
worst off. When they have a job, they usually work in the restaurants, markets or factories. 
Some of them are owners, and the rest work there. The majority of women are 
housewives. The women working in the factories are usually single or married without 
children. 
The Turkish-speaking 'community' members are mostly working in the clothing industry. 
The other important economic activity is small shop employment such as Kebab houses, 
small food shops and off licences. In these factories and shops, most of the time both 
employer and employees are from the Turkish-speaking 'community', even sometimes 
from the same region in Turkey or Cyprus. For instance, at the time of the research there 
were about 200 families in North London from the same village in Turkey. 
It should be noted that the adult employment figures used here were reported by their 
children, though it could be assumed that the figures might be more accurate if they 
were gathered directly from the parents. On the other hand because illegal employment 
was quite common among the Turkish community members, when attempts were made 
to put these sorts of questions to parents, there was some reservation about answering, 
whereas the young people were more willing to answer such questions. 
In this chapter, employees will be analysed in two different groups: non professional and 
professional. The category of non-professional employees mostly includes unskilled and 
semi-skilled manual employees such as finishers, ironers, machinists in clothing 
factories, waitresses in restaurants, shop assistants in food shops, car mechanics, 
nursery nurses, hairdressers, bus drivers and painters. A few non-manual employees 
(such as a receptionist and a priest in a Turkish mosque) were analysed in the category 
of non-professional employees. In addition, the mothers who work in the home for a 
textile factory or help in a family business are analysed under the category of non- 
professional employees. Professional employees are accountants, teachers, 
interpreters, doctors and engineers. 
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In the category of self-employed, there are clothing factory owners, owners of small 
shops such as kebab shops, food shops, hairdressers, dry cleaners etc. In the study, 
there are no self-employed fathers who hold a professional qualification, such as 
pharmacist. The main characteristics of the self-employed in the sample are the low 
formal qualification requirements, low barriers to entry and intense competition, which 
are quite common features of ethnic minority self-employment (Anthias 1983: 84, Rafiq 
1992: 53, Ram 1993: 573-75, Panayiotopoulos 1996: 440). 
Tahla 4-4- Fathers' Emnlovment Status by Fathers' Drinin 10M 
F athers' Places O ri in 
Fathers' Employment Status Kurdish 
Populated Areas 
(91) 






Unemployed 44 22 11 30 
Non-professional Employees 43 39 28 38 
Professional Employees 0 12 22 8 
Self-employed, owners of small 
businesses 
13 27 39 23 
Total 100 100 100 100 
No father: 28 
The unemployment rate among the fathers as reported by sons and daughters is high 
(Table 4.4). In general, three out of ten fathers are unemployed. Yet there are 
considerable differences between Kurdish, Turkish and Cypriot fathers. Table 4.4 
indicates that 44 per cent of the Kurdish fathers are unemployed, compared to 22 and 11 
per cent of Turkish and Cypriot fathers respectively. 
The differences between the fathers' employment status in terms of their places of origin 
follows a similar pattern in other categories as well. Although the number of fathers who 
have a professional job is very small (eight per cent), when compared with the number of 
non-professional fathers (38 per cent), it is nearly three times higher among the Cypriot 
fathers and none among the Kurdish fathers. The second largest group is self-employed 
fathers (23 per cent). Again, self-employment is very common for Turkish and Cypriot 
fathers, compared to Kurdish ones. 
It is also noted that the status of those unemployed, self-employed and unprofessional 
employees is not stable. The mobility between each of the employment types is very 
common. Somebody could be employed in a clothing factory as a machinist, then they 
could open a Kebab shop, then after two or three years they could be unemployed. An 
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example is the case of Murat, who is a married Kurd who came here seven years ago 
from a village in Kayseri and has five children, two boys and three girls. Murat and his 
wife started to work as finisher in a textile factory where one of their co-villagers was 
employed, and later they worked in several other factories. Murat became an ironer and 
Ayse (his wife) learned to use sewing machines. After two years, one of their daughters 
started to work in the factory with them. Four years ago they managed to get their oldest 
son, who lived with his grandparents in their home village, to England. The son started to 
work with his mother, sister and father and he learned to use the machines as well. By 
1997 they had saved some money and Murat left his job and opened a kebab shop in 
Haringey, while the rest of the family still worked in a factory. But he managed it for only 
one year, then he sold the shop and was unemployed for six months. Recently, he tried 
to open another kebab shop, but was unsuccessful. 
When we look at the mothers' employment status, 65 per cent of mothers are not in 
employment at all (Table 4.5). This figure is seven per cent higher than the 1991 Census 
figure for Turkish women and 12 per cent higher than that for Cypriot women. Yet, the 
number of economically inactive Turkish and Cypriot mothers is in tune with the 1991 
census. The mothers from outside of the Turkish-speaking 'community' and Kurdish 
mothers' low level of participation in the labour market causes an increase in the overall 
score, though the numbers of mothers from other groups are too small to be reliable. 
TahIP 4-5: Mothers' Emolovment by Mothers' Oriain (%1 
Mothers' Pla ces of Orig in 
Mothers' Employment Kurdish Other places in Cyprus Other Total 
Populated Areas Turkey (43) (58) countries (196) 
(90) (5) 
Housewives 73 62 53 83(4) 65 
Non-professional 27 33 31 17 (1) 29 
Employees 
Professional 2 9 3 
Employees 
Self-employed, owners of 2 7 3 
small businesses 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
No Mother: 10 
Only 27 per cent of the Kurdish mothers are active in the labour market. The low level of 
participation of some ethnic minority women, especially Bangladeshis and Pakistani 
women in the labour market in Britain is not a new phenomenon (Brah 1993, West and 
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Pilgrim 1995, Holdsworth and Dale 1997). According to the Fourth National Survey of 
Ethnic Minorities (Modood 1997c: 86), four out of five Bangladeshi women and seven out 
of ten Pakistani women are looking after the home or family. The difference in 
employment patterns among some ethnic minority women, as West and Pilgrim 
(1995: 361) suggest, can be explained by: 
variations in domestic responsibilities, but- and this is crucial- their significance is mediated 
by migration. Difference is also structured by economic opportunities, which are influenced 
by education and are heavily dependent on local labour market conditions. 
Among the Turkish-speaking women, economic opportunities in fact, play an important 
role in determining whether women are employed or not. First of all, most of them, 
especially those from Kurdish populated areas are uneducated and cannot communicate 
in English. Second, women are heavily dependent on jobs in the clothing industry, 
whereby intense competition necessitates low wages that are usually insufficient to pay 
for child care and other domestic responsibilities. Third, working at home for the 
factories is an option, if they have a sewing machine and a suitable place in the home in 
which to work and the necessary skills to use sewing machines. Most of the women, 
especially the recently arrived Kurds, do not have this skill and the only way to learn to 
use the sewing machines is in work training. 
In the beginning, women start to work as finishers, then usually a relative or a co villager 
teaches them to use the machines. But again, most of the machinists are paid on piece 
rates and they do not have the spare time to teach somebody, so when they do, it is 
really a favour. The case of Filiz is typical. She is a Kurdish refugee, who worked as a 
finisher in a Greek clothing factory and came to the UK four years ago following her 
husband who worked as a painter and repairman. She has no children and she works 
five days a week between eight thirty and five, earning £40 a week. Her aim is to 
become a machinist, but she cannot find anybody to teach her. 
don't like to work in this factory, but especially I don't like to work as a finisher. It is a very 
hard job. I am on my feet all day. At the end I only get £40. It is pocket money. The only 
reason I work here is because it is only five minutes away from my home. But one of my 
co-villagers promised to find me a job in the factory where she works and I hope she will 
teach me to use the sewing machine. Then I can earn some reasonable money. 
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Furthermore, like the fathers' employment, the differences in terms of origin are 
important regarding the mothers' employment as well. All Kurdish mothers are either not 
in employment or non-professional employees, while nine per cent of Cypriot mothers 
are professional employees. 
As was mentioned above, people from the Kurdish populated areas arrived only recently 
in the United Kingdom and most of them came from rural areas, with few qualifications. 
The majority of them are refugees in this country which creates extra uncertainty in their 
lives. Fekete (1997) argues that refugees were the worst hit in the new restructuring of 
economies, particularly in the manufacturing sector in contemporary Europe. Koser and 
Lutz (1998) have called the migration of refugees and illegal immigrants 'new migration' 
and, according to them, new migrants in Europe today are more vulnerable than ever 
before. 
Martin (1991: 85-88) claims that the refugee women are especially vulnerable in terms of 
employment opportunities in the receiving country. They find it difficult to obtain 
language skills or work training because of the cost, domestic burdens and cultural 
barriers. Additionally, Martin (1991: 87) argues that these particular problems often lead 
refugee women to become housebound and dependent on their husbands and children 
for social intercourse. Employment problems also affect refugee women's ability to 
adjust and integrate in their new country (Martin 1991: 87). 
Pertinently, there is another characteristic of the enclave economy to make the labour 
market conditions around the young people even more restrictive. The majority of the 
employment is provided by other members of the Turkish-speaking 'community'. This 
situation creates an employment opportunity structure dependent not only on available 
territorial jobs, but also on a restricted ethnic niche. Werbner (1999: 558) refers to this 
characteristic of ethnic economies as 'networked spaces embedded in particular 
industries which focus around the production and distribution of particular types of 
objects'. As can be seen in Table 4.6,78 per cent of non-professional employees work 
for a Turkish-speaking employer. Over eight out of ten Kurdish non-professional 
employees, who are the people working in the clothing factories and small shops, have a 
Turkish-speaking employer. Although the situation seems more relaxed in the context of 
professional employment, still 43 per cent of them have a Turkish-speaking employer. 
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Beside, three out of four Turkish professional fathers such as accountants and lawyers 
working for the factories and shops, are employed by a Turkish-speaking person. 
On initial examination, the Cypriot professional fathers might seem less dependent on 
this ethnic niche, since four out of five of them work for non-Turkish-speaking employers. 
Yet most of them are hired by their employers for jobs related to the Turkish-speaking 
'community' such as social services, education and translation. In the case of the ethnic 
enclave economy for Asian migrants in Manchester, Werbner (1999: 560) observes that: 
Once the clothing enclave was established, it created a need for a support network of new 
kinds of services: for accountants, solicitors and transporters; for travel agents, insurance 
brokers and taxi drivers; for plumbers, electricians and decorators; for fashion designers 
and clerical workers. 
It should be noted that the restricted labour market opportunities lead to vulnerability of 
the Turkish-speaking employees to the effects of Government policies. The best 
example is that of the 1999 Asylum and Immigration Act which could further restrict 
employment opportunities (Wolton 1999). The Act contains many aspects regarding 
asylum and immigration, but two of them are more likely to have considerable 
consequences for the communities: removal of cash benefits and accommodation 
allocation on a 'no choice' basis which came into effect on April, 2000. 
The Act removed cash benefits for all asylum-seekers and replaced them by vouchers 
provided directly from the Home Office and issued at the local post offices each week in 
five pounds, one pound and fifty pence denominations (Travis 2000). The vouchers are 
only able to be used at designated supermarkets in order to purchase essential living 
needs and the asylum seekers are not legally entitled to demand that they be given 
change. 
The first immediate effect of the voucher system might be on the small shop keepers 
and restaurant owners, especially Kurdish ones. The majority of their customers are 
Turkish-speaking like themselves. This can be seen from their shop windows, their price 
tags or menus which are all in Turkish. Most of them do not display any English labels at 
all. In other words, a non-Turkish-speaking person could not separate a sweet shop from 
a bakery or could not order anything in a restaurant. When the government stops 
providing cash for their customers, it is very likely that most of these shops will go 
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bankrupt. When this happens, they might no longer employ their fellow country men and 
women and the already high rate of unemployment might rise. As Travis (2000) 
suggests: 
adult asylum seekers who will have to live on vouchers worth £36.54 a week and are 
banned from working could face being further impoverished. 
The Act also gives no rights to the asylum seekers to choose where they would like to be 
accommodated. The Home Secretary may not consider any preferences for a specific 
locality. This means that the government could move the people away from their 
community, friends and family and the services of the majority of the professional 
employees involved in community related tasks might not be required any more and, 
therefore, they might lose their jobs. 
Table 4-6: Fathers' Emolovment by Emolovers' Oriain (%1 
Father's Place s of Origin 
Kurdish Populated 
Areas (33) 
Other places in 
Turkey (19) 
Cyprus (16) Total (68) 







Others Turkish Others Turkish Others 
Non- 
professional 
82(27) 18(6) 73(11) 27 (4) 73(8) 27(3) 78(46) 22(13) 
Professional 75 (3) 25 (1) 20 (1) 80 (4) 43 (4) 57 (5) 
The empirical evidence presented so far has endorsed the view that the Turkish- 
speaking 'community' shows various characteristics of an ethnic enclave labour market. 
On the other hand, the employment status of the members is not uniform and varies in 
terms of their places of origin. It seems that the Kurdish parents are the most 
disadvantaged group in terms of their employment status, followed by Turkish parents, 
whilst the Cypriots are doing well comparatively. The following section will analyse the 
effects of the enclave labour market conditions on the second generation Turkish- 
speaking young people. 
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4.2 Turkish-speaking Young people and Employment: 
As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the effects of the employment conditions 
on the second generation young people can be understood by situating the young 
people in the labour market in two ways: the young people's possible future employment 
prospects and their current engagement in the labour market. By analysing these two 
situations, it is possible to capture to what extent these young people are aware of the 
exclusion in relation to employment opportunities and labour market conditions around 
them. 
4.2.1 Turkish-speaking Young People's Future Expectations: 
Future expectations are assessed in two different ways. The first question is simply 
about what they want to be in the future. The second question, on the other hand, is 
about what they really think they will be in the future. The first question encapsulates the 
notion of their aspirations, whilst the second one is more related to their assumptions or 
predictions about the future. 
As can be observed in Table 4.7, the Turkish-speaking young people's aspirations are 
not low. More than half want to have a professional job in the future such as doctor, 
lawyer, architect or journalist. On the other hand, they do not believe they can achieve 
this ideal. In fact, 45 per cent of them think that they might have non professional jobs 
such as nursery nurse, air hostess, hairdresser, or police officer, instead of a 
professional position. One Kurdish girl said that: 
Sometimes I wonder if I can achieve my aim or not. It is difficult you know. But at the end I 
can't be nothing. I am certain about one thing- I can't get too much money. But at least I 
would like to earn more than my fathers' salary. It is about £60 a week. 
Moreover, a very small percentage of young people (two per cent) want self 
employment, but the number of young people who predict their future prospects as self- 
employment is three times higher than this figure (Table 4.7). Because of the uncertain 
nature of the economic conditions of self-employment, the young people show a clear 
dislike for small shop keeping or owning a clothing factory. As one Turkish girl states: 
You know, opening a shop is not a real job, there are a lot of them around now. They are 
here today and gone tomorrow. 
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During a discussion group with six Cypriot and Turkish boys, their opinions were asked 
about small shop and clothing factory ownership. Except one, whose father sold his dry 
cleaning shop and retired, the others' fathers were small shop keepers and clothing 
factory owners. All the boys showed clear dislike for these jobs, preferring to be a bank 
manager, pilot, architect, lawyer and politician. Then, when they were asked what they 
will really do in the future, the boys replied that: 
Turkish Boy: If I failed to study, I am going to have my own business like a Kebab shop, dry 
cleaner or clothes shop. 
Cypriot Boy: If I can't go to the University, I will manage my father's factory. 
There is no fundamental difference between the boys and the girls in terms of their 
aspirations, while slightly more girls than the boys predict their future as non- 
professional employee. Apart from this, the girls seem more certain about the future than 
the boys. Thirty six per cent of the boys have no idea about their future prospects, 
compared to 18 per cent of the girls. Besides, the girls accept that they are more likely to 
have a non-professional job, if they cannot realise their aspirations, than the boys do. 
Nearly six out of ten girls predict their future employment in the non-professional 
occupations, compared to three out of ten boys. 
However, there are differences in terms of the occupations the girls and the boys choose 
in each category. The girls more often mentioned being a teacher, than the boys, while 
none of the boys aspired to being or predicted that they would be an air steward or 
nursery nurse. Moreover, although their number is small, none of the girls who aspired to 
be self-employed or predicted that they would be, chose small shop or factory 
ownership. Instead they chose hairdressers, beauty salons or private nurseries, which 
were not chosen by the boys at all. 
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Table 4-7: Future Expectations (°h 
All Youn people 
As irations Predictions 













Non 34 37 35 33 56 45 
Professional employment 55 59 57 21 22 22 
Self-employment 4 1 2 10 4 7 
No idea 7 3 5 36 18 27 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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______Aspirations 
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Non 46 53 49 52 78 63 
Professional employment 44 45 45 14 13 13 
Self-employment 6 3 2 1 
No idea 4 3 3 33 10 23 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Nm professional ernpbynert 18(5) 30(3) 24 12(2) 53(9) 32 
Professional employment 71 10 59(12) , 65 18(3) 24(4) 21 
Self-employment 6(1) 6(1) 6 18 3 9 
No idea 6(1) 6(1) 61 59 3 24(4) 38 
Total 100 100 100 
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Non professional employTot 24(4) 27 26 24 4 36 32 
Professional employment 65(11) 73 70 35 (6) 39 38 
Self-employment 9 6 
No idea 12(2) 4 41 7 15 24 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Mixed 
As irations Predictions 













Non professional empigyrrot 24(4) 23 3 23 61 46(6) 23 
Professional employment 65(11) 69 9 67 35 6 8(1) 23 
Self-employment 35(6) 8(11 23 
No idea 12(2) 8(1) 10 24(4) 39'(9) 30 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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The differences between the Kurdish, Turkish and Cypriot families in terms of their 
positions in the labour market and their employment status are reflected in the 
differences between the young people's future employment expectations. Table 4.7 
indicates that seven out of ten Cypriot young people want to have a professional job in 
the future. This number is similar to the 67 per cent and 65 per cent of those of Turkish 
and mixed origins respectively. The real difference is with Kurdish young people. Only 
45 per cent of these young people want to be a professional employee in the future. 
Furthermore, Table 4.7 shows that the Kurdish young people are more likely than others 
to downgrade their future ambitions to non-professional employment. Sixty three per 
cent of them predict their future employment as non-professional employees, compared 
to 32 per cent of Turkish and Cypriot and 23 per cent of mixed young people. The 
difference between Kurdish boys and the others who predict their future as having non- 
professional employment, is even sharper. More than half of the Kurdish boys think that 
they will end up with this kind of employment, compared to less than one out of ten 
mixed origin, just over one out of ten Turkish and about three out of ten Cypriot boys. 
Like the boys, eight out of ten Kurdish girls predict that their future will be as non- 
professional employees, though they seem to be less differentiated from other girls, 
except Cypriot ones. Only 36 per cent of the Cypriot girls see their future in non- 
professional employment. 
The gap between the young people's aspirations and predictions shows the extent of the 
young people's awareness of the exclusion in the labour market and their disillusionment 
about their future employment prospects. It could be argued that if the future brings 
these young people what they predict, rather than what they aspire to, the most satisfied 
group of young people are those who predict their future as professional employee and 
the most disappointed ones will be those who predict their future as self-employed, while 
the young people who think they will end up with a non-professional job are in the 
middle. 
As can be seen in Table 4.8, since all of the young people who see their future in 
professional employment, aspire to these jobs rather than the others, they might be the 
most satisfied group if they can achieve this prospect. On the other hand, less than one 
out of ten young people who predict their future as self-employed, want to be self- 
employed, whilst half of them desire to be a professional. Nearly four out of ten of them 
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prefer to be non-professional employees instead of shop keepers. Given that the number 
of Cypriot and Turkish young people who predict their future as self-employed, is nine 
and six times higher than that of Kurdish young people respectively (Table 4.7), the 
Cypriot and Turkish young people are more likely to find themselves in undesirable 
conditions of self-employment. The following discussion between Turkish and Cypriot 
boys is a typical example showing the young people's negative perceptions of self- 
employment: 
Turkish Boy 1: Having a Kebab shop is the most awful thing which can happen to you. 
Cypriot Boy 1: My dad has a factory. It is a very hard job. Because nobody respect you for 
owning the factory. You are not higher than your employees. You can not say I am the 
boss, I sit and they work. You have to work as well. You have to lift the heavy stuffs. You 
have to work for long hours. I don't want to do this job in the future, but if there is no 
alternative left, then I have to work. 
Cypriot Boy 2: When you have a factory, sometimes there are jobs and sometimes there 
aren't. You can easily lose your business. 
Turkish Boy 2: When you have these sort of jobs, you can't move up. You might stay 
where you are for years, if you don't do worse. But for instance, (I don't know) if you are an 
architect in an office, then you can have a promotion in a couple of years. You can change 
the office if you don't like. 
Cypriot Boy 3: Also when you have your own business, you can have lots of problems with 
the customers. If they don't like the clothes, they ask their money back. They make lots of 
hassle. But if you work for somebody else, you start at 9 o'clock and finish at 6. It is over 
then. You can come your home and relax, leave the job at work. It is nothing to do with you 
anymore. This is the best advantage of having a good job and working in an office. 
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Self-em p. 6 2 3 10(l) 7(1) 3 2 
No idea 3 2 10(l) 7(1) 16 61 13 
Total 100 100 17100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Moreover, half of the pupils that believe they will have non-professional jobs in the 
future, actually want these sorts of jobs. Yet, a reasonable proportion of them (42 per 
cent) wanted to be a professional. Only two per cent of the young people who believe 
they will end up with a non-professional job have no idea about what they want to be in 
the future. In other words, these young people are much more clear about their future 
employment prospects. Given that the number of the Kurdish young people who think 
their employment prospects are in non-professional employment is double the number of 
those Cypriots and Turkish young people (Table 4.7), it can be said that Kurdish young 
people are less likely to be disappointed by their future employment, if they can achieve 
their aim. 
However, this does not mean that these young people might be ready to fill their parents' 
places in the future without any hesitation. While almost all of the non professional 
fathers are unskilled or semi skilled manual employees in the clothing factories or small 
shops, none of the young people, who aspire to be a non professional employee in the 
future want to work in manual occupations and in the clothing sector or small shops. One 
of the Kurdish girls says that: 
I want to have an office job in the tourism industry. But because my mother goes to a 
factory to work, when I finish school, probably I will go to a factory to work with my mum 
and dad. 
In this sense, the Kurdish young people's aspiration seem to confirm to a certain extent, 
the general assumption of the studies about the low working class aspirations mentioned 
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at the beginning of the chapter. On the other hand, there is a difference between the 
Kurdish young people and the working class young people that Kurdish young people 
dislike their parents' conditions and want more secure working class jobs. 
The analysis of the young people's perceptions of their future prospects in the context of 
their parent's excluded employment status again shows how influential the existing 
employment conditions are on their perceptions of their future. Table 4.9 indicates that 
the gap between aspirations and predictions is narrow for the young people who report 
that they have a professional father. In fact, most of them want to be a professional and 
believe they can achieve their aim. 
On the other hand, none of the pupils whose fathers are self-employed want a similar 
future, but nearly 12 per cent believe they will end up with self-employment. This is the 
highest percentage, when it is compared with that for other groups. Ercan is one of 
them. He was born here, his father who owns a Kebab shop outside London came from 
Turkey, and his housewife mother was English. Ercan works in the shop seven days a 
week during the holidays and weekends during term time from noon until three a. m. the 
next morning. He does all sorts of jobs like dealing with the customers, washing dishes 
etc. He says: 
I have no ambitions, whatever comes I will accept and work. You can never know what's 
going to happen to you. But in any case I can do my father's job. 
Tahip 4-9: Future Expectations by Fathers' Emalovment (%1 










Aspira. Predict Aspira Predict Aspira Predict Aspira Predict 
Non prof. em p. 44 57 40 49 13(2) 29 39 
Prof. em p. 52 20 52 16 93(14) 67(10) 61 20 
Self-employment 4 2 3 7 12 
No idea 20 6 28 7(1) 20(3) 10 29 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
The numbers are small but it would seem that the children of the unemployed and non- 
professional fathers are less likely to aspire to professional employment, compared to 
the others, especially those of professional fathers. Besides, the number of young 
people who want to be a non-professional employee is the highest in these two groups 
171 
and none of the young people who have a professional father prefer to have non- 
professional employment. 
It might be assumed that the girls' perception of future economic prospects are also 
influenced by their mothers' employment status as well as those of their fathers. Studies 
on other ethnic minorities find a positive relationship between the mothers' economic 
activity and the daughters' aspirations. As Bhachu (1991 b: 56) indicates: 
The fact that there is a high proportion of Sikh women in the labour market, that is, both 
mothers and daughters, have had considerable impact on their educational aspirations for 
their daughters. It is now necessary for girls to be educated to get reasonable jobs away 
from the unskilled factory work that most of the mothers and older less educated women 
are involved in. 
In the case of the Turkish-speaking girls, the mothers' employment status seems to have 
a reasonable influence on their aspirations, though none of the girls aspire to be a 
housewife or end up as one. Table 4.10 shows that only 28 per cent of the girls who 
have a working mother, aspire to have non-professional employment, compared to 41 
per cent of those who have economically inactive mothers. Moreover, only half of the 
housewives' daughters want to be a professional employee, while seven out of ten 
economically active mothers' daughters do so. It seems that not only their aspirations, 
but their predictions are also affected by their mother's employment status. Six out of ten 
housewives' daughters believe they will end up with a non-professional job, while only 
half of the economically active mothers' daughters believe so. Two out of ten girls, 
whose mothers are housewives, predict their future to be in professional employment, 
compared to three out of ten girls whose mothers are economically active. In addition, 
none of the girls whose mothers are employed wish to be self-employed, yet three per 
cent of them believe they will end up with this option. 
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Table 4-10: The Girls' Future Expectations by Mothers' Fmnlnvment 10J 
Mothers' E m lo ment 
Housewives 
(58) 
Economically Active Mothers 
40 
Aspiration Prediction Aspiration Prediction 
Non Prof. em p. 41 59 28 50 
Prof. em p. 55 17 68 30 
Self-employment 2 5 3 
No idea 2 19 5 18 
Total 100 100 100 100 
As has been discussed so far, the young people have considerable awareness of 
exclusion in relation to employment opportunities and the difficulties around them 
through their parents' experiences. When they think about their future prospects, their 
parents' status in the labour market has influenced their future expectations. In fact, 
these young people are not only aware of the nature of the employment opportunities 
around them, but also dislike what they might be offered. In fact, their parents' 
occupations do not only affect the young people's future aspirations, but also their 
current involvement in working life. 
4.2.2 Turkish-speaking Young People's Part-time Work: 
Although child labour is usually thought of as a Third World phenomenon, employment 
of school children is a widespread occurrence in contemporary Britain as well (Pettitt 
1998, Rikowski and Neary 1997, Lavalette 1998, Mizen et. at 1999). In this study, 32 per 
cent of the young people have a part time job and nearly 64 per cent of part time job 
holders work during the term time (Table 4.11). A teacher stated that: 
I think many families are sending their children to work during the weekend, and some of 
the children even don't come to the school, but work full time in the shops. When we have 
called the parents, they said they don't know their children were absent from school. But I 
think they do. 
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Table 4-11: Having a Part-time Job (%) 













Yes 42 22 32 67 57 64 
No 58 78 68 33 44 36 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Boys are more likely to work than girls. Forty two per cent of boys have a part time job, 
whereas only 22 per cent of the girls work part time. But when a girl has a part time job, 
she works as long hours as the boys do. For instance, a Cypriot girl working in a 
hairdressers talks about the difficulties she faces: 
I don't have a chance to sit for a minute. She (the employer) pays me very little. Of course, 
it is bit difficult to study when you work. 
In other words, when both the boys and the girls are in part-time employment, their 
conditions might not be different to each other. Yet, unlike the boys, the girls also have 
domestic responsibilities as well, regardless of having part-time jobs, though a working 
mother may put a bit more pressure on them to not have a part-time job. 
As can be seen in Table 4.12, the daughters of working mothers are less likely to 
engage in outside work. In the case of a working mother, the daughter is not only 
needed to help with domestic tasks, but she is also needed to take the mother's place in 
other ways. They have to prepare their brothers and sisters for school and take them 
home when they finish, give them dinner and cook for the rest of the family, clean the 
house, wash the dishes and do the laundry etc. Unlike the work outside, they don't even 
get pocket money for these tasks, since the domestic tasks are not defined as work to 
be paid, but as a responsibility to be fulfilled. In fact, the mothers, regardless of their 
economic status, think that it is necessary for a daughter to learn these tasks for their 
own sake in the future. As a Kurdish mother who works in a textile factory put it: 
I will not always be with her. When she marry, she needs to clean her own home and cook 
for her own children. So it is better for her to start doing these things at this age. Now she 
sometimes complains about things, but in the future, she will thank me for teaching her 
how to cook and how to manage a home. Anyway, if she refused to do, who does she think 
will do this? I can't, I am working at the factory. 
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Table 4-12: The Girls' Part time work by Mothers' Employment (%) 
Mothers' Employment Status Yes No Total 
Housewife (58) 24 76 100 
Economically Active (40) 18 83 100 
Total (98) 22 78 100 
Unlike the girls, the boys do not have domestic responsibilities. If they do not have a 
part-time job, their lives are much easier than those of girls in the same position. But the 
life of the working boys is far from comfortable. The most important determinant of 
whether a child has a part-time job or not is the father's employment status. The 
significant role of parents in their children's work is also mentioned in other contexts by 
the charity, Save the Children (1988: 72). The charity observe that many children worked 
for their parents, or for their parents' friends (Save the Children 1988: 72). 
The Turkish-speaking young people also work for their relatives or co-villagers and if 
they have a self-employed father, they work for him. If a child has a self-employed 
father, the contribution of the child's labour is quite essential to the father. Metcalf et al. 
(1997: 65-7) emphasise the importance of family labour for Asian self employed families. 
The same phenomenon is pointed out in the case of Chinese take-away businesses by 
Song (1997), who suggests that the children are given a substantial amount of duties in 
the shops. 
Table 4.13 reveals that more than half of the Turkish-speaking young people of the self- 
employed fathers work part time. These young people usually receive pocket money 
from their fathers in return for their work in the shop. Hakan, a Turkish boy who was born 
here, has a housewife mother and a coffee shop owner father. For as long as he can 
remember, his father has owned a coffee shop. He was the only son in the family with 
two sisters. Hakan worked in the coffee shop for pocket money after school and stayed 
there until eight o'clock in the evening and at the weekends, started in the morning with 
his father and left at two o'clock in the afternoon. Hakan wants to be an engineer, yet 
believes he cannot achieve his aim and will probably end up working in his dad's shop. 
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Table 4-13: Part time work by Fathers' Employment (%) 
Fathers' Employment Status Yes No Total 
Unemployed (54) 24 76 100 
Non-professional Employees (68) 25 75 100 
Professional Employees (15) 33(5) 67(10) 100 
Self-employers, owners of small 
businesses (41) 
54 46 100 
Total (178) 32 68 100 
The children of unemployed or non professional fathers do not have part-time jobs, 
unless some of their relatives or very close co-villagers owned a shop and they need 
extra help. This seems to be a common experience among the young people with 
unemployed parents. As Mizen et. al (1999: 430) argue: 
For children largely working in sectors of the economy notorious for informal recruitment 
procedures and a high turnover of labour, the absence of a parent or older sibling to 'ask 
around', 'put in a good word' or 'keep an eye out' for vacancy is likely to constitute a real 
barrier to work. This does appear to be the case for 16 to 18 year olds still in full-time 
education, where an unemployed parent corresponds with slightly lower rates of working. It 
may indeed be an invidious irony that those children most likely to derive the biggest 
material benefits from having a paid job are those most likely to be excluded. 
Indeed when they work, they earn pocket money and this contributes to the family's 
income and some of them even give their earnings to their mothers. Leonard (1998: 91) 
argues that the ability of children to provide for some of their own needs enables 
household resources to be directed to more immediate needs in low income families. 
This was the case for the Turkish-speaking young people having unemployed or non- 
professional fathers. A Kurdish boy, who works in one of his relative's barber shop after 
school and at weekends, said that: 
When we are in Turkey, my Dad worked in the bazaar in Bursa, he sold vegetables and my 
mum was knitting for other women in the neighbourhood in return of some cash. I was the 
eldest in the home and have one brother and one sister. In Turkey, I worked with my Dad. 
Here he couldn't work because of some health problems. In the barber shop, I clean the 
floor after the customers and bring them some tea or clean ashtrays. But also I am learning 
to cut the hair and other staff in time. He pays me pocket money. Sometimes I keep it, but 
usually I give it to my Mum. She uses it for extra expenses for my brother and sister. 
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The children of the professional employees have part-time jobs more often than the 
children of unemployed and non-professional employees. On the other hand, the nature 
of the jobs these children hold differ from one group to another. Middleton, Shropshire 
and Croden (1988: 57) found in their survey on children aged between 11 and 16 years 
that although poorer children are less likely than more affluent children to have paid part- 
time jobs, employed poorer children tend to have either more jobs and/or work for longer 
hours than others. 
Furthermore, the professional families and their children approach part-time jobs 
differently from other children. For instance, Lavalette (1994: 219) mentions that out of 
school work remained an activity performed by working class children at the start of the 
century but today it is, to some extent, a cross class activity, since this type of work is 
now believed by the families to be a beneficial learning experience in tune with many 
elements of bourgeois ideology concerning the morally invigorating experience of work. 
Similar comments are made by Hutson and Cheung (1992) in their study of Welsh sixth 
formers. Hutson and Cheung (1992: 52) observe that part-time earning became part of 
life for those in the sixth form colleges, regardless of their families' class background. 
The Saturday jobs are regarded by the children and their parents in positive terms such 
as independence, commitment, effort, achievement, learning about the 'real' world and 
about the management of money (Hutson and Cheung 1992: 59). These positive 
attributes of part-time work are also detectable among the Turkish-speaking part-time 
job holders from professional backgrounds: 
A Turkish Girl: I wanted to spend some time outside of the house and earn my own money. 
I didn't want to work in Turkish shops, so I went to all big shops at the shopping centre and 
asked the managers for a job. They asked me to fill application forms, then Etam offered 
me a job as a shop assistant during the weekends. I put the money in the bank and usually 
I spent it to buy some clothes or gifts to my friends. 
A Cypriot Boy: During the summer holidays, I occasionally go to my father's office. I help 
him there to arrange the files, post the letters, prepare some coffee or tea. It is fun. I 
enjoyed myself. Also if I worked hard, my father gave me some pocket money too. 
The part-time job is certainly far from being a fun experience for those working in their 
father's small shops: 
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A Turkish Boy: I can say that working in a Kebab shop is like going to a jail. The shop is 
like a prison. Because you are in the same place from 11 o'clock in the morning until two 
o'clock in the evening, without any break. At least I am luckier than my dad. I only have to 
work during the weekends. Even when you give yourself a day off occasionally, you can do 
nothing because you already felt so tired. That's why I code the Kebab business in my 
mind as a prison. I mean, I am working all right, but it is a misery. My dad always told me 
that 'the last job in this life is Kebab business. If you want to save your future from this, you 
have to read and become a man [which means 'go to school and get a good occupational 
career']. 
The introduction to working life happens to be very stressful for some of the Turkish- 
speaking young people, believing that their experiences are not encouraging and 
positive. They see the employment opportunities which the community offer them as 
highly restrictive for their future employment prospects, that is why none of the girls want 
to be a housewife like their mothers and none of the boys want to be a shop-keeper like 
their fathers. 
Not surprisingly, the actual physical excluded boundary around the young people shows 
a consistent pattern with the narrow economic and social one. As shown in Table 4.14, 
in order to explore the physical boundary around them, the young people were asked if 
they have ever been in other places apart from London and in central London. The 
number of young people who have been to other places in the UK is low. Sixty two per 
cent of the Kurdish, 59 per cent of the Turkish, 42 per cent of the Cypriot and 40 per cent 
of the mixed origin young people have not been to any other place in the UK apart from 
London 
The physical boundary around the community does not even stretch to Central London. 
Central London might be only half an hour distance by underground, but as indicated in 
Table 4.14,32 per cent of the young people have not been there even once in their life. 
Some of the young people think that central London is their local shopping centre or 
have been to Oxford Street only. Oxford Street is important to know because it is on the 
Piccadilly and Victoria underground lines and some of the families have their lawyers, 
who specialise in the Asylum cases or trade licences for their shops or restaurants, in 
that street. 
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Tahlp 4.14: Travel within the UK by nlar_p of r, rinin log 
Have you ever seen any 
other places in the UK? 
Kurdish Populated 
Areas (92) 








Yes 38 41 58 60 47 
No 62 59 42 40 53 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Have you ever been to 
central London? 
(92) (34) (50) (30) (206) 
Yes 67 62 66 80 68 
No 33 38 34 20 32 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
4.3 Conclusion: 
The current structural changes in the developed market economies bring about 
immigrant communities' exclusion in terms of employment opportunities in the labour 
market. Immigrants have been affected more than the non-immigrant population. Most of 
them are pushed to self-employment or other forms of informal community employment 
in the ethnic enclave labour markets. The future prospects of the second generations 
seem to be gloomier than what their parents' generation have at the moment. 
Young people's position in the labour market is usually analysed in the context of 
transition from school to work. Some studies emphasised the low aspiration of the 
working class young people because of their working class background. Others focused 
on the restricted opportunities of the local labour markets, while some claim the 
importance of the individual choices from the existing alternatives. On the other hand, 
my research revealed that these young people certainly do not have low aspirations and 
they have no desire to fill their parents' places in the labour market. Yet, the studies also 
showed that upward mobility is not an easy target for generations of migrants, especially 
if the current labour market transformations are taken into account. In this context, the 
chapter analysed the degree of awareness of the young people about the exclusion in 
the existing labour market in terms of employment opportunities. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the migrant children's employment prospects cannot be 
complete without studying their current engagement with the labour market through part- 
time so called `out of school' jobs, since their labour is essential for some of the migrant 
families, especially self-employed and unemployed fathers and working mothers. 
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In line with all these discussions, it became clear that the Turkish-speaking young 
people's perceptions about their economic prospects are clearly related to their parents' 
economic situations and the exclusion in the labour market. In fact, the parents' 
economic positions are not uniform and vary in terms of their place of origin, though they 
are located in the same deprived labour market and are dependent on the ethnic 
network to find employment. The Kurdish families are in the most disadvantaged 
circumstances, compared to the Turkish and Cypriot families. 
Unemployment and non-professional employment are more common among the Kurds 
and none of them have professional occupations. Turkish families might be better 
placed, compared to Kurds. The unemployment rate among the Turks is less than the 
Kurds and there are some Turkish professional fathers. Cypriot families appear to be the 
most advantaged group in the Turkish-speaking 'community' with the small number of 
unemployed and more in professional occupations. Yet even they are still pretty much 
dependent on the ethnic labour market in order to obtain employment. Self-employment 
is much more common among the Cypriot fathers, and shop or clothing factory 
ownership has its own risks and restrictions to be handled. 
The economic position of the fathers in the Turkish-speaking families has a visible effect 
on both the aspirations and expectations of Turkish-speaking young people. The Kurdish 
young people seem to have more moderate future expectations and appear to be clearer 
about what they might become. On the other hand, Cypriot and Turkish young people 
are more confused about the future, since none of them aspire to be self-employed and 
they believe their alternatives are quite restricted. Nevertheless, Turkish-speaking young 
people are able to evaluate the situation and they do not want to end up with similar jobs 
to their parents, while at the same time they do see their alternatives as considerably 
limited and they think that the situation might push them into undesirable occupations. 
However, despite all their disadvantages, their aspirations are clearly high, though they 
do not expect to reach their aims. The differences between their aspirations and 
predictions should not be interpreted to mean that they were unrealistic about their 
prospects. On the contrary, this difference showed that they had a great level of 
understanding about what was going on around them. In fact, none of the young people 
want to work in the clothing factories or small shops and none of the young people with 
self-employed fathers want to be self-employed. 
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Furthermore, a considerable number of pupils are already engaged in the labour process 
working under very hard conditions. This relatively early encounter with working life 
makes some of the young people even more alienated from their parents' excluded 
employment conditions. The working conditions are pretty hard for the young people, 
especially the boys who help their self-employed fathers after school hours. The 
conditions are even harder for the girls with a part-time job. The Turkish-speaking girls 
have to help their mothers with domestic tasks, regardless of the part-time job they might 
have. 
In the end, Turkish-speaking young people feel that exclusion in the current labour 
market is pushing them to make a choice: whether to accept the jobs which their parents 
already do or attempt to improve their future life-chances. In this context, the following 
chapter will analyse the latest theories of ethnicity which suggest that transnationalism 
would change these young people's lives for the better. 
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5. Transnationalism and Its Limits: 
5.1 Theory of Transnationalisation: 
Contemporary theorists, especially Americans, seem to have abandoned the term 
'migrants' in favour of 'transmigrants' and the term 'migrant communities' in favour of 
'transmigrant communities' (Cohen 1997; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999; Gubta and 
Ferguson 1992; Goldring 1998; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton 
1992; Schiller and Fouron 1999; Vertovec 1999). They indicate that the conditions of 
ethnic minority communities can no longer be analysed within the narrow boundaries of 
the dominant societies. Cohen (1997: 160) argues that: 
The massive amount and value of global transactions effected by the transnational 
corporations and their minions by no means accounts for the full volume of migration or 
capital movements. One has to move beneath these visible organisations to glean how a 
significant chunk of the "real" global market works. Traders place orders with cousins, 
siblings and kin 'back home'; nieces and nephews from "the old country" stay with their 
uncles and aunts while acquiring their education or vocational training; loans are advanced 
and credit is extended to trusted intimates; and jobs and economically advantageous 
marriages are found for family members. 
This theory advocates that the chances of ethnic minority communities for improving 
their conditions are increased once their dependency on the mainstream societies is 
reduced. Now, migrants are able to use their informal community links across national 
boundaries to engage in upward mobility. In this respect, this chapter will study the 
chances of Turkish-speaking young people to improve their conditions, since the 
Turkish-speaking 'community' might be the best candidate to be a transnational 
community. 
The theorists suggest that technological innovations such as air transport, long-distance 
telephone and satellite systems, prepare the necessary conditions for a grass-roots 
transnationalism. Vertovec (1999: 447) identifies transnationalism as: 
a condition in which, despite great distances and notwithstanding the presence of 
international borders (and all the laws, regulations and national narratives they represent), 
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certain kinds of relationships have been globally intensified and now take place 
paradoxically in a planet-spanning yet common - however virtual - arena of activity. 
Moreover, Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton (1992: 17) argue that: 
With the emergence of transnationalism the individual migrant is now embedded in a wider 
social field that spans two or more nations. 
Schiller and Fouron (1999: 356) introduce a concept of 'transnational social field', which 
means: 
an entry point that enabled us to trace the ways in which persons are linked together 
through social networks, but living within different political systems. The concept of social 
field has served as more than a metaphor of spatialization. It allowed us to observe a 
terrain of social relationships in which personal experiences and family strategies of 
surviving difficult economic circumstances and improving social position serve as the soil 
on which a broader language of national identity takes root and flourishes. 
The main emphasis of this perspective is that the conditions of migrant communities in 
the receiving countries are mainly determined by their engagement in transnational 
activities. Itzigsohn et at. (1999: 318) claim that there exists a 'transnational social field' 
constructed through the daily life and activity of immigrants, affecting all aspects of their 
life, from their economic opportunities, to their political behaviour, to their individual and 
group identities. 
There are two important assumptions of this approach. Firstly, the 'transnational social 
field' is said to break the easy alliance between place and identity and destroys the link 
between space (national boundary of receiving country) and community (migrant 
communities). In other words, places are no longer the clear supports of our identity 
(Morley and Robins 1993: 5). As Carter, Donald and Squires (1993: viii) point out: 
The forces of new technologies, globalization and 'time-space compression' have together 
created a sense of information flows, fragmentation and pace replacing what is now 
perceived to be a previous stability of homogeneity, community and place. 
Gubta and Ferguson (1992) argue that the communities are no longer related to certain 
spaces, but interconnected spaces. They say that: 
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Something like a transnational public sphere has certainly rendered any strictly bounded 
sense of community or locality obsolete. At the same time, it has enabled the creation of 
forms of solidarity and identity that do not rest on an appropriation of space where 
contiguity and face-to-face contact are paramount (Gubta and Ferguson 1992: 9). 
Similarly, Sorensen (1998: 242) argues that: 
In a world characterised by enhanced spatial mobility and formation of transnational flows 
of people and meaning, the correspondence between physical worlds and social realities 
among people differently situated is neither simple nor understandable with bounded 
concepts. 
This emphasis on the broken link between space and community implies that the 
migrant communities do not need to adapt to the dominant societies' national identities 
to identify themselves. In order to conceptualise the difference between space and 
community, Appadurai (1995) distinguishes the term 'neighbourhood' (national 
boundaries) as an independent social form from 'locality' (migrant communities). 
'Locality' is primarily relational and contextual rather than spatial, while 'neighbourhood' 
refers to actual existing social forms in which locality, as a dimension or value, is variably 
realised (Appadurai 1995: 204). When the local subjects (migrants) engage in the social 
activities of production, representation and reproduction, they contribute (generally 
unintentionally) to the creation of contexts which might exceed the existing material and 
conceptual boundaries of the neighbourhood (national boundaries) (Appadurai 
1995: 210). 
The second assumption of transnational theories is closely connected to the first one. 
Since the migrant communities no longer need to identify themselves within the 
boundaries of receiving nation states, they do not need the receiving nations in order to 
improve their social and economic conditions. Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999: 229) 
argue that: 
Whereas, previously, economic success and social status depended exclusively on rapid 
acculturation and entrance into mainstream circles of the host society, at present they 
depend (at least for some) on cultivating strong social networks across national borders. 
According to Basch, Schiller and Blanc (1994: 79), the new transnational way of life 
facilitates the survival of members of migrant communities: 
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Almost ubiquitously at the social center of this transnational field, the family facilitates the 
survival of its members, serving as a buffer against the intrusiveness of individual state 
policies; it fosters the social reproduction of its members, their class formation and mobility; 
and as the repository of cultural practices and ideology shaped in the home society, it 
mediates identity formation in the new setting as it socializes its members into a 
transnational way of life. 
Furthermore, the access of ethnic minority groups to their own media has particular 
importance. Ethnic minority language broadcasting can serve to keep their pride and 
integrity and ensure the continuation of their ancient idioms (Howell 1992: 240). 
With the introduction of satellite technologies, ethnic minority young people are not only 
affected by the media in the receiving countries but the media, especially television, 
coming from their places of origin. As Gillespie (1995: 360) outlines in her ethnographic 
study of a Hindu family in Southall, 
for the young people in this family, and in Southall more generally, there is no easy 
equation between geography, culture, and media. The new N delivery systems allow 
Hindus in London to keep in touch with Indian popular culture. TV plays a significant role in 
re-creating and re-presenting "tradition" among first and second generation Hindus in 
Southall. 
In this context, some of the theorists even promote transnationalism as a new way of not 
only surviving, but gaining economic and social status for the transmigrants. According 
to Portes (1999), transnationalism is a neutralised alternative to the restricted relation of 
immigrants with other groups in the mainstream society and their relatively 
disadvantaged position. Portes (1999: 470-72) discusses the possible effects of 
transnationalism on the second generation, in relation to their assimilation into the 
mainstream community. He argues that: 
For the second generation, in particular, it [transnationalism] offers a valuable 
counterweight to a relentless process of acculturation that leads children, even at an early 
age, to abandon their parental languages and embrace unquestioningly the norms and 
styles of the host culture. In America, this process of acculturation carries the price of 
learning and interjecting one's inferior place in the social hierarchy. That sense, which 
along with poverty, creates the conditions for downward assimilation, is neutralised by the 
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economic and symbolic alternatives that transnationalism makes possible (Portes 
1999: 472). 
Furthermore, Goldring (1998: 189) argues that transmigrants can also make claims of 
social status and social capital with specific reference to their places of origin in the 
context of the transnational social fields. They change their clothing styles, drive 
imported vehicles when they visit their home country, improve their housing and spend 
more money than somebody of similar status in their home country. Within the 
understanding of their community, therefore, they improve their social status. 
Similar points are made in the context of Turkish migrants in Germany. Caglar 
(1995: 311) points out that regardless of the economic and social achievements in 
Germany, Turkish people suffer a lack of recognition from German people. Most of the 
German Turks recognise Turkey as the most convenient place for matching their 
economic mobility with their social and economic capital (Caglar 1995: 312). Although the 
majority of them are workers in Germany, most of them earn more than even average 
middle class employees in Turkey, and their self-image, in the context of Turkish society, 
is not that of a worker. With these perceptions, not even Turkish migrants from rural 
parts of Turkey intend to return to their villages. If they ever return to Turkey, they prefer 
to settle in cities (Caglar 1995: 313). 
Basch, Schiller and Blanc (1994: 242) argue that transnationalism is a process, rather 
than a phenomenon. They emphasise that as long as the conditions in the receiving 
countries and home remain unchanged, the transnational activities continue as a trans- 
generational process. 
On the other hand, this perspective is not free from criticism. Some critics totally reject 
the existence of a transnational dimension to migrant communities in ways similar to a 
transnational character of advanced finance capitalism and the transnational character 
of the Americanisation of media messages. For instance, Kelly and Schauffler (1996: 34) 
claim that: 
Interpersonal networks are distinguished as much by their ability to generate a sense of 
cohesion as by the extent to which they can parlay group membership and mutual 
assistance into worthwhile jobs and knowledge. What distinguishes the impoverished from 
the wealthy is not their capacity to deploy social capital but their poorer access to 
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resources of high quality. Those resources often are embedded in physical locations not 
available to the impoverished. 
From the same perspective, Sassen (1996b: 23) comments that in today's large modern 
cities in Western Europe and the USA: 
We see a homogenizing in the urban forms of advanced economic sectors in cities with 
such disparate histories and cultures as New York, London and Tokyo. This pressure 
towards homogeneity overrides history and culture. But beyond the central urban core of 
high-rise luxury offices there are discontinuities within each of these cities: a hierarchy of 
urban forms, from the transnational urban space of finance to the old working-class 
districts and new immigrant communities (Sassen I996b: 23). 
In relation to media technologies, these critics emphasise the effect of Americanisation 
on the content of media messages. In contrast to transnational norms in the media, 
Burnett (1996: 4) reveals that some 55 per cent of all film screenings and 55 per cent of 
all home video rentals world-wide are not transnational, but uniform, American material. 
As Downing (1992: 272) observes in the case of Spanish-language media in New York: 
An initial impression of advertising on these channels, for example, indicates their similarity 
to Anglo advertising, with certain exceptions. Cosmetic advertisements are even more 
exaggerated. 
Morley and Robins (1995: 223) also underline the American effect on the media in 
general stating that: 
It is not simply that America exports a lot of television programmes - beyond that, America 
has written the 'grammar' of international television - the formats of television, developed in 
America, have literally 'set the frame' for the production of television in most other 
countries. 
Ang (1985: 3) argues that'American cultural imperialism' has successfully integrated into 
national 'cultural identity' itself. According to some critics, even transnational media, 
which supposedly serves the 'continuation of the ancient idioms' of transnational 
migrants, could not escape American Influences. As Karim (1998: 12) comments: 
Adoption of the market model of mainstream broadcasting appears to belie the cultural 
studies view of minority media resisting dominant structures and discourses. Ethnic DBS 
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(Digital Broadcasting Satellite Systems) networks carry out similar types of market 
research, programming schedules and advertising. Apart from certain differences in the 
modes of narrative, the only difference seems to be in the languages and cultures of the 
content. 
Other critics of transnational theories argue that even if migrants have transnational 
links, this does not give each member of this community equal access to the advantages 
of being transnational. For group members have access to this 'transnational field' in 
accordance with their social and economic status. As Guarnizo and Smith (1998: 12) 
point out: 
If we were to believe that transmigrants are socially, politically, and culturally unbound, the 
question then is how can we define who is and who is not a transmigrant? In other words, 
what are the boundaries of transnationality? 
Furthermore, in their study of Colombian migrants' transnational activities, Guarnizo and 
Diaz (1999: 417) found that Colombian transnational activities were not as boundless as 
the transnational theorists advocate: 
transnational processes are indeed a) socially bound (that is, they are embedded in social 
relations and expectations that bind across national boundaries); b) territorialized (that is, 
they occur in specific locations that provide certain opportunities and set limits to their 
reach); and c) they do not overcome class, racial and regional differences, categories 
which remain significant analytical tools for the analysis of transnational migration in 
general. 
Van Hear (1998: 253) has several reservations about the characterisation of 
transnational communities. One is related to these communities' cosmopolitan character. 
He argues that: 
by no means all, or even most, transnational populations are thrusting cosmopolitans. On 
the contrary, many are rather parochial transnationals - people with transnational networks 
and links, but with a parochial outlook or world-view (Van Hear 1998: 255). 
Another reservation is related to the nature of the solidarity among the members of 
transnational communities. He stresses that: 
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while transnational communities can be the source of useful sustaining networks and 
solidarity, there may also be profound divisions within them. Global village there may be, 
but villages are often rife with suspicion, bickering and backbiting. Such divisions in 
transnational communities may reproduce cleavages at home - and may indeed be one of 
the reasons for people to leave. (Van Hear 1998: 256). 
He also adds that: 
Divisions may also arise between the established populations of migrant origin and 
newcomers - including between different cohorts of the same ethnic or national group 
(Van Hear 1998: 256). 
In relation to the divisions among the members of transnational communities, 
Khandelwal (1996: 125) comments on the Indian community in New York that: 
While "Little India" can be located in the global diaspora of Indians, it is entirely possible 
that two Indian immigrant families living on the same block in New York City may not 
socialize because they come from two different regional cultures of India and speak 
different languages, particularly if they are not comfortable in the English language which is 
prevalent only among the middle and upper classes of urban educated Indians. 
Roberts, Frank and Lozano-Ascencio (1999) also emphasised the differences between 
rural origin migrants and urban origin migrants, and between poorer, less skilled 
migrants and highly skilled professionals. They argue that the Mexican transnational 
community is made up of Mexican migrants mainly from Mexican villages, while Mexico 
City migrants do not constitute a transnational migrant community, and this is especially 
the case of the highly-skilled professionals. Although unskilled city migrants are more 
likely to be members of that kind of community, these migrants use their kin contacts 
from their original villages, rather than friendships or neighbourhood contacts in Mexico 
City. 
In their study of Colombians in New York and Los Angeles, Guarnizo, Sanchez and 
Roach (1999) share similar views about transnationalism with Roberts, Frank and 
Lozano-Ascencio (1999)'s study of Mexican migrants. They point out that: 
the transnationalizing incentives, regardless of their empowering potential, have up to now 
found little echo among the vast majority of migrants. Migrants' relations with the country 
(Colombia) are still maintained as mostly private relations between kin and acquaintances. 
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Only a small elite and a few organisations have capitalised on these opportunities 
(Guamizo, Sanchez and Roach 1999: 390). 
Given this criticism of transnational theories, Mahler (1998: 82) argues that before 
reaching concrete conclusions, it is important to investigate what the transnational 
activities are; how representative they are in the entire transnational field; and how 
representative of the entire migrant population the participants in these activities are. He 
also suggests that the studies in this area should also investigate the role of gender, 
class, age and mobility in more detail (Mahler 1998: 82-86). 
Broadly speaking, then, in recent years, there has been increasing academic attention to 
what is called the transnationalisation of migrant communities in general and Turkish- 
speaking communities in particular. In this process, the advances in transportation 
systems, credit transactions amongst the ethnic minorities of different countries, and the 
'globalisation of ethnic-minority media' become amongst the most often referred to 
changes in regard to the transnationalisation of ethnic minority groups. In wider terms, it 
has been stressed that such developments substantially reduce distances between 
ethnic minority communities and their relatives at home and in other countries. It has 
also been indicated that transnationalisation alleviates dependency of ethnic minorities 
on the social and economic conditions in receiving countries, which were working as a 
mechanism for the reproduction of their disadvantaged status. In this sense, the 
transnationalisation process is claimed to be a challenge to the assimilation of especially 
younger generations, and an effective solution to their economic exclusion in receiving 
countries. 
In respect to such claims, the research for this thesis investigated the connection 
between young people's attitudes towards various issues and their access to 
Turkish/Kurdish newspapers and television. It was found that there are certain 
indications that there might be some affiliations between these two. However, the 
findings also suggest that this relationship is not straightforward in terms of assimilation 
and solutions to economic problems. 
In the first empirical part of the chapter, the transnational character of the Turkish- 
speaking 'community' will be studied to understand the degree of transnationalisation 
within the community. And in the second part, the attitudes of Turkish-speaking young 
people towards various issues will be analysed within the context of transnationalisation. 
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The proximity of Turkey to other European countries has made travel easy and cheap 
before techonological development paved way to cheap air travel, and so the travel 
dimension in the transnational migrants' lives is not so new for Turkish communities. 
That is why the media connection is (especially) analysed. 
5.2 Mapping Out the Transnationalisation Level in Turkish-speaking Young 
People's Daily Lives: 
This part will discuss the level of transnationalisation in the Turkish-speaking young 
people's daily lives. The Turkish-speaking 'community' in London is a prime example of 
a transnational community in the sense of the 'transnational' theoretical claims. When 
one enters a Turkish shop in Haringey, or when one learns about London's weather 
conditions from a Turkish television station, it is clear that the Turkish-speaking 
'community' in London is part of a 'transnational' network. Indeed, Robins (1 999b) claims 
a Turkish transnational community exists throughout Europe. The Turkish transnational 
community is differentiated from others in several respects. Unlike the Maghrebians in 
France or South Asians in Britain, they do not share a colonial past with any receiving 
countries, and they are the only group which has spread throughout the European 
community (Robins 1999b). 
Similarly, in a study of Kurdish asylum seekers in Finland and Britain, Wahlbeck (1998: 5) 
emphasised the aspects of deterritoralisation and transnationalism in the Kurdish 
communities in terms of the refugees' preferences for determining their identity in 
relation to their countries of origin, not their receiving countries. She also observed that 
most of the Kurdish refugees make trips all over Europe in order to keep in touch with 
friends and relatives (Wahlbeck 1998: 7). 
Moreover, Favell and Martiniello (1999: 16) emphasised that the exclusionary tendencies 
of formal political practice in Brussels encouraged the immigrants to depend on their 
own ethnic or religious alliances and, in the case of Turkish immigrants, these alliances 
are beyond Brussels or Belgium, and spread around Europe. 
If the community in London is a part of the Turkish transnational community, then the 
question is to what extent the Turkish-speaking young people participate in the 
transnational activities. The following section will discuss the intensity of transnational 
activities in Turkish-speaking 'community' life, particularly in relation to the young boys 
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and girls. According to the theorists discussed above, the transnational communities are 
different from others in two important respects: regular contact with their relatives 
beyond the boundaries of receiving nations, and receiving news from their home 
countries on a daily basis through new technologies such as satellite systems. These 
two phenomena are therefore chosen for analysis. 
5.2.1 Regular Contact with Relatives and Co-villagers both in London and 
in other countries: 
The relationship between relatives and co-villagers among the Turkish-speaking 
`community' is intense. When Kurdish and Cypriot families have relatives in England, 
they are mostly in the same area. Their relationships with family members and co- 
villagers is very important to them. Everyday they have face-to-face contact with their 
immediate relatives, and telephone contact with other relatives and they see co-villagers 
at wedding ceremonies. The relatives and co-villagers provide financial help as well as 
cultural and social support. When somebody needs money, they first ask for help from 
an immediate family member, before asking from anyone else. 
TnhlA 5-1: Relatives and Co-villaaers in Enaland by Place of Oriain (%1 
Relatives in England Kurdish Populated 
Areas (92) 








Yes 82 41 92 77 77 
No 19 59 8 23 23 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
The boundaries of the extended family network are not only within London, but within 
other countries as well, especially other European Union countries, though unlike the 
Kurdish and Cypriot families, the Turkish families do not have other family members in 
other countries. The Kurdish family network in Europe is especially close, exchanging 
information about the living conditions in different European states. A Kurdish father 
compared his circumstances with those of his brothers in Germany and France after 
attending a wedding ceremony in Germany: 
I told my brothers that everybody belongs to his own country. I am very happy with mine. 
The situation in France is worse. Germany is better. But I can never swap my condition 
with anybody else's. Here, the government helps you, and you can work in a decent job, 
my life could not be better. In Germany, they have only state income support, nothing else. 
They said that the streets in Germany are clear, but clean streets cannot feed you. In the 
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marriage ceremony, I gave the biggest gift. I understand their condition is terrible. I asked 
why they gave so little money. They said that they changed the tradition there, nobody 
gives so much money to the newly-weds anymore. But I know the real reason. They simply 
don't have any money. 
When one of the relatives has a financial problem, money is collected by other members 
of the family in different countries. Also, they send gifts to each other, and participate in 
special ceremonies. For example, during the field work, there was an old woman with 
three sons in London, a daughter and a son in Germany and another son in France, who 
had just arrived from Turkey and applied for asylum. When she had health problems for 
the first time, all her children sent money for her to go to a private doctor, because she 
has no social security in Turkey. A couple of months later, they decided to take her to 
doctors in Europe. Firstly, she went to Germany and spent three months there, then 
France and finally she came here. Actually, the doctors could not find out what was 
wrong with her, but she seemed happier because she was seeing all her children and 
grand children after a long absence. 
Tnhla 5-2ý Relatives in other countries by Place of Origin 101.1 
Relatives Kurdish Populated 
Areas (92) 








No 16 41 62 43 35 
Europe 84 56 16 43 57 
Other Countries 3 22 13 8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Extended family networks bring control and dependency as well as solidarity to the 
members. Gossip also spreads across the different countries in a very short period of 
time. A Kurdish girl: 
Sometimes my mum comes home and talks about a girl she saw in the park with a boy. 
Then she telephones the girl's mum. It makes me feel sick. How can I have a boyfriend? 
What might happen, when somebody sees me with that boy? My dad will kill me. 
This is not only true for young women, but for men as well. For instance, Staring (1998) 
documents strategies developed by the Turkish migrants in the Netherlands in response 
to the migrant relatives without documents, who are mostly male and so called 'tourists'. 
Migrants' relatives or friends usually look after their guests and help them financially or 
give assistance in finding a paid job, yet these relatives also circulate information about 
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their illegal status (Staring 1998). This reduces their chance of marrying a legal migrant 
woman from their own ethnic community in order to obtain legal status because of the 
distrust of the woman's family (Staring 1998: 234). 
In London too, although men are more free to commit adultery or go to pubs and night 
clubs, there are various rules which they should obey as well. For instance, they should 
never take the adulterous relationship seriously and should be ready to leave the 
relationship if the wife finds out; they can go to night clubs, but should not do it very 
often; and finally they should never gamble. If they exceed these social boundaries, they 
receive severe warnings to stop from their wives' family or their own family. By 
transgressing these boundaries, they also jeopardise the reputations of the other men in 
their family such as their brothers or their sons. For instance, a Kurdish woman had two 
sons, one of whom had a gambling problem, and for whom she could not find a girl to 
marry, having tried in Germany and Turkey. Then when the youngest son became 
eligible to marry, it was difficult to find him a girl too because of his brother's gambling 
problem. 
It seems that the transnational character of the social networks of the Turkish-speaking 
'community' is followed by its members' transnational physical mobility. As can be seen 
from Table 5.3,79 per cent of the Turkish young people have visited Turkey and 94 per 
cent of the Cypriot young people have been to Cyprus in the previous year of the 
fieldwork, and for the majority of the Turkish and Cypriot young people these visits are 
regular. On the other hand, some of the young people do not like to visit their parents' 
places of origin, when they are in Turkey or Cyprus, regarding these visits as boring and 
usually preferring to go to a holiday resort. One of the Turkish girls talked about her 
experiences: 
When my dad tells us we are going to Turkey, it means we are going to the village, where 
my mum and dad were bom. They like to go to there, but not us. There, we basically do 
nothing, no swimming, no shopping. We visit the relatives, even far relatives. Then after 
one month we come back here again, a waste of time. In school, the teacher said 'Oooh! 
you were in Turkey, you must have a marvellous time'. Yes of course, I watch the cows. 
Connection to places of origin is extremely rare amongst the Kurdish young people. 
Most of them are asylum seekers and could not go to Turkey, but they visit their relatives 
in Europe and other countries. Fifty three per cent of them have been to a European 
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country. Unlike the Turkish young people's experience in Turkey, most of the Kurdish 
young people like to visit their relatives in Europe. Turkish young people in London have 
also been to other European countries. Although Cypriot young people have their 
relatives in Europe, the majority of them are in Australia and Canada. Hence, their 
contact with these relatives is not as powerful as the Kurdish and Turkish young 
people's contacts with their relatives. 
Table 5-3: Physical Mobility in transnational context by place of oriain (°/ 
Have you ever been to 
Turkey for a holiday ? 
Kurdish Populated 
Areas (92) 








Yes 37 79 40 63 49 
No 63 21 60 37 52 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Have you ever been to 
. Cyprus for a holiday? 
(92) (34) (50) (30) (206) 
Yes 2 6 94 40 31 
No 98 94 6 60 69 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Have you ever been to 
any other countries 
apart from the UK? 
(92) (34) (50) (30) (206) 
In Europe 53 53 36 33 46 
In other countries 1 6 14 13 7 
No 46 42 50 53 47 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
As a result, it is evident that the Turkish-speaking young people have strong contacts 
with their relatives beyond London and in this sense, they are indeed transnational. But 
there is no doubt that the effect of these contacts is not as influential as that of Turkish 
television and newspapers, since their availability has become possible with new 
technologies and, in this sense, their existence creates a more logical ground for 
analysis from a transnational theoretical standpoint. 
5.2.2 Turkish Television and Newspaper Consumption: 
Although there are several local Turkish-speaking radio stations in London, Turkish 
television programmes and newspapers are also important parts of ordinary Turkish- 
speaking family life. Ninety nine per cent of the young people in the sample have a 
satellite dish in their home to access mainly Turkish channels. A few households, 
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especially Cypriot ones, watch the other international channels such as SKY TV or MTV. 
The television set is switched on first thing in the morning and switched off last thing in 
the evening. It is the background to women's daily tasks and family gatherings. 
Moreover, several Turkish newspapers, including local ones, are widely read within the 
community. 
Private television channels and international broadcasting are very recent phenomena in 
Turkey. Turkish state television broadcasting started in 1968 by a donated German 
transmitter in Ankara and, at the beginning of the 1980s, it covered over 80 per cent of 
the population. Colour broadcasting was introduced in 1984. The second channel was 
opened in 1986, a third one in 1989 and a fourth in 1990. Additionally, GAP TV (South- 
eastern Anatolian Project TV) begun broadcasting to the mainly Kurdish populated 
Southeast in 1989. Again, at the beginning of the 1990s, TRT International was 
introduced to broadcast to Central Asia and Europe. However, over the years the TRT 
broadcasting character has changed very little. It is highly centralised and susceptible to 
government policies. Moreover as Aksoy and Robins (1997: 83) argue: 
The 'real' Turkey, with all the complexities and diversity of its civil society and cultural 
identities has been denied, or, more correctly, disavowed, in the name of the 'official' 
cultural ideal. 
On the other hand, according to Aksoy and Robins (1997: 86), 'real' culture did not 
disappear from public life, but rather continued to survive in parallel to the TRT's 'official' 
culture through popular journalism, the film industry and Arabesk music. This 'real' 
culture manages to find a place in broadcasting with the introduction of private channels 
in the 1990s. Aksoy and Robins (1997: 88) argue that: 
What commercial television did was to draw the popular culture that had been leading a 
parallel life into the mainstream. And, thereby, they contributed significantly to cultural 
revitalization. This pluralization of the media scene was associated, too, with an opening 
up of political culture and debate. 
In contrast to Aksoy and Robins (1997), Kejanlioglu (1998: 42) argues that the state 
broadcasting in Turkey has never been a subject of long-term, or even short term 
planning in contrast to its counterparts in Europe. The infrastructures came from Britain 
and Germany, while most of the programmes were either imported, usually from 
America, or bad copies of foreign programmes. Moreover, although she acknowledges 
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the state channel's dour and faceless speakers, and uniform style imposed by the top 
state officials, Kejanlioglu (1998: 44) insists that this style is simply replaced by the 
commercial broadcasting mentality of friendly and humorous speakers, sensational 
reporters, and imitations of 'American Turkish' accents. Kejanlioglu (1998: 44) thus 
criticises what the private channels have really achieved since their first broadcasting: 
'Talk shows', erotic 'night gyms', the fights over broadcasting rights to football matches, 
media stars' transfers with astronomic fees, flamboyant competitions aimed solely at giving 
money away by asking questions like 'what are the colours of the Turkish flag? ' or 'what is 
the Turkish capital? ', 900 telephone lines for these competitions, bloody reconstructed 
'reality', the stars' private lives reported as news, Turkish films assumed to be watched 
even after they have been shown ten times, the neighbourhood soap operas which 
repeatedly cook up the same theme, 'where are the good-old days? '. 
This is exactly the picture of Turkish broadcasting which enters thousands of Turkish- 
speaking households in London and western Europe everyday. It has nothing to do with 
the complexity and diversity of the civil society advocated by Aksoy and Robins (1997). 
Even in the main news, there is in fact no news. The first news story is usually about the 
high ratings of the channel compared to its rivals, followed by the latest news from the 
set of popular soap operas shown on a particular channel, and finally the political news 
is restricted to the clothes or daily habits of political figures. Almost every news bulletin is 
interrupted by an advertisement break and finally, when this so called news finishes, 
there is another session of advertisements showing which company supplies the 
speakers' clothes, make up, shoes and studio furniture. 
Apart from commercialisation, there is almost no control over the content of the 
programmes. Although an independent commission (RTUK- Radio Television High 
Commission) supposedly works as a censorship board, it is mainly under state control 
and the members of the commission in some way manage to find 'dangerous' political 
messages against unity and the national security in the programmes and heavily censor 
them. In other words, nudity and violence are acceptable as long as they are not 
dangerous, and not against the 'country's interests'. As a Kurdish father complained 
about Turkish channels: 
When we first came to London, we didn't have a satellite, so for a couple of months we 
watched English channels, then we bought a satellite dish. But I am not happy with the 
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content of the programmes. There is no restrictions on anything you know. You can not 
watch them with your family without holding the remote control on your hand. In a normal 
film, suddenly that's a bed room scene. It is not suitable to watch with the children. We 
believe the English television is shameless, but I swear to God, ours is more shameless 
than theirs. 
There might be one exception to this picture: Kurdish Television (Med TV), broadcasting 
from London at the time this research was being conducted. It is not a commercial 
station, in fact, it is a politically oriented pro-PKK channel, mainly carrying news relating 
to the Kurdish problem from a PKK perspective, with political talk shows and 
occasionally Kurdish folk music. The news is usually about the conflict in South East 
Anatolia and shows speeches of the PKK Party officials. In that sense, it works like a 
counterpart to the Turkish National Television, TRT, again with faceless speakers and 
uniform style imposed from the PKK top officials. However, in March 1999 the 
Independent Television Commission ordered Med TV off the air due to its breach of 
impartiality and incitement rules (Black 1999). (it then became public that the chairman 
of the commission was also one of the directors of British Aerospace which begun 
licensed production in Turkey of assault rifles and grenade launches (Pallister 1999)). It 
should be noted that during the week following the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah 
Ocalan in Kenya in February 1999, Med TV managed to mobilise many Kurds to protest 
in many European cities. On the other hand, there is no doubt that these were very 
extraordinary times for the community and increased the audience for the channel. 
However, it is the highly commercialised and empty content of Turkish private television 
channels which appeals to the Turkish-speaking young people in London, not the 
politically oriented TRT or Med TV. As shown in Table 5.4,45 per cent of the Turkish- 
speaking young people watch Turkish television stations, while 19 per cent and 26 per 
cent of them watch English and Turkish mixed and solely English television respectively. 
A Turkish teacher claims that: 
These children watch Turkish television, read Turkish newspapers and the only occasion 
when they speak English is when their teacher asks them something. Even in the 
classroom, they continue to speak Turkish. 
As might be supposed from our earlier discussions, 66 per cent of the Kurdish young 
people watch Turkish television, while 58 per cent of the Cypriot ones prefer the English 
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channels. The distribution of the Turkish young people in each category is relatively 
even. 38 per cent of them prefer Turkish channels, compared to 20 per cent and 32 per 
cent of those watching English and both English and Turkish television respectively. It 
should be noted that TRT-INT is the least likely to be watched by young people, who 
overwhelmingly prefer to tune into one of the many private commercial channels. In 
other words, their main criteria is entertainment. In fact, most of the English channels 
they prefer are the music channel MTV or Sport channels. 
Table 5-4: The Youna neoole's Favourite Television Channels bvPlaceof Origin (%1 
Kurdish Other Places Cyprus Mixed Total 
Populated Areas In Turkey 
iv Fen We Td Fan M#; Tct Fen Mal; Td Fan Mab Td Fan We Td 
Channels (40) (17) (17) (34) (3ý (17) fA (13) (17) (103) (103) (äff 
Niftas 
Turkish 63 69 66 24 53 38 9 24 14 46 35 40 37 53 45 
(4) (9) (4) (6) (6) 
English* 10 6 8 24 18 21 61 53 58 46 29 37 33 19 26 
(4) (3) (9) (6) (5) 
Mixed 23 10 15 47 18 32 24 12 20 8(1) 24 17 25 14 19 
(b) (3) (2) (4) 
Kurdish 3 12 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 3 
(Med TV) 
Don1watdi 3 4 3 6(1) 120 9 6 120 8 0 120 7 4 8 6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 I00 T 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*these include some International channels, apart from Turkish ones, such as SKY TV or 
MN. 
Except for Turkish young people, there is no gender difference in terms of channel 
preferences. As indicated in Table 5.4, more than half of the Turkish boys prefer to 
watch Turkish channels, while nearly half of the Turkish girls watch both English and 
Turkish programmes. On the other hand, apart from the language differences, the 
content of the programmes they watched are very similar on both English and Turkish 
channels: they are usually soap operas or music programmes. As Geraghty (1997: 41) 
points out, 
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personal relationships are the backbone of soaps. They provide the dramatic moments - 
marriage, birth, divorce, death - and the more day - to - day exchanges of quarrels, 
alliances and dilemmas which make up the fabric of the narrative. 
In his sense, apart from language, there is very little difference between Neighbours on 
BBC and a Turkish soap opera. There are no obvious differences between the Kurdish 
girls and boys in terms of television channel preference. Table 5.4 reveals that both of 
them watch overwhelmingly Turkish channels. Moreover, only a small number of them 
prefer to watch Med-TV. The number of Kurdish girls who watch Med-TV is even fewer 
than that of the Kurdish boys. 
There might be several factors that encourage Kurdish young people to watch Med-TV 
less often compared to the other channels. Although some of the programmes are in 
Turkish, the dominant language of the broadcasting is Kurdish. The television channel 
also broadcasts in Kurdish dialects and Arabic. Most of the Kurdish young people have 
difficulties with the Kurdish language. Most of them can only barely understand and 
cannot speak it fluently. Moreover, like other Turkish-speaking young people in the 
sample they prefer entertainment programmes, rather than programmes that have 
political content. Mainly for this reason, they do not watch TRT-Int either. Both of the 
channels work like political broadcasting. Besides, even the entertainment programmes 
on both channels seem dull for the young generation compared to the flamboyant style 
of private channels. 
The difference between a grandmother and her granddaughters' attitude to Med-TV 
illustrates why entertainment programmes do not appeal to young people. The old lady 
liked to watch Kurdish folk music on Med-TV, because unlike others she can enjoy the 
words as well as music. However, when one of the girls is present, they change the 
channel. The girls complain that her taste is too old fashioned and they prefer to watch 
one of the popular soap operas or talk shows. 
Like Kurdish girls, the Kurdish boys like to watch Turkish television, but there are some 
differences between them in terms of programme preferences. The boys usually watch 
the sport programmes, while the girls prefer the soap operas and talk shows. However, it 
should be noted that during the prime times, all the family usually watch the TV together 
and for that reason, the prime time soap operas are often watched by girls and boys 
alike unless there is a second television in the household. 
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Apart from television, written media are also an important part of the young people's 
lives, though the Turkish-speaking young people watch television more than they read 
newspapers. Table 5.5 shows that 42 per cent of the young people read Turkish 
newspapers, compared to 20 per cent of those who read English ones. It should be 
noted that the most common English newspapers are so-called tabloid ones like the Sun 
and the Mirror, not broadsheet newspapers like the Times or the Guardian. 
In London, Turkish shops sell almost all the leading Turkish newspapers such as 
Hurriyet, Milliyet, Sabah. There are also several local Turkish newspapers produced by 
the Turkish Cypriot, Turkish and Kurdish communities. Some of the local newspapers 
have free distribution. In practice, though, the written media, like television, seems not to 
provide much of a voice to the community. The content of local newspapers is nothing 
more than advertisements for Turkish shops and society pages, whilst the Turkish 
national newspapers are very biased. 
In a study of five major Turkish newspapers, Inal (1995) observed a 'structural' bias in 
the press, arguing that powerful sources make the news. Ordinary people populate news 
only when they break the law. But even so, in crime stories, the journalist seems to rely 
on the police sources to define guilt and innocence (Inal 1995: 135). 
In fact, the most read sections in the Turkish newspaper are the magazines and the 
sports coverage, rather than the political news or the columns. There is not much 
difference in the young people's preferences in terms of their gender. On the other hand, 
the differences of places of origin make far more difference among the young people. 
More than half of the Kurdish young people and half of the Turkish young people read 
the Turkish newspapers, compared to 14 per cent of the Cypriots. More than half of the 
Cypriot young people read the English newspapers. In this sense, at least, Cypriot 
young people have a link to the society in which they live, while Turkish and Kurdish 
young people still have minimum contact outside of their communities. 
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Table 5-5: The Youna oeoole's Favourite Newsnaners and the Plan of Örinin (OM 
Kurdish Other Places Cyprus Mixed Total 
Populated in Turkey 
Areas 
Newspaper Fein Male Td Fen Male Tat Fern lv Tct Fen Mile Td Fen MJ9 Tä 
(40) R ( (17) (17) (34) (3) (17) (; (13) (17) ) (103) (103) B) 
Turkish/ 58 56 57 59 41 50 15 12 14 39 35 37 42 43 42 
Kurdish (10) (7) (2) (5) (6) 
English 8 8 8 18 6(1) 12 42 53 46 31 24 27 23 18 20 
(3) (9) (4) (4) 
Mixed 13 6 9 6(1) 29 18 18 12 15 18 17 14 11 12 
(5) (2) (3) 
Don't Read 23 31 27 18 24 21 24 35 28 15 24 20 21 29 25 
(3) (4) (6) (2) (4) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
On the face of it, there are many television channels and newspapers for the Turkish- 
speaking young people to choose from. They can read and hear television and 
newspapers from their country of origin at the same time as their counterparts in Turkey. 
However, their choices are not as wide as they appear to be. The content of the 
programmes which they prefer to watch is nothing more than entertainment with 
American style commercialisation. It is also a fact that the Cypriot young people receive 
this American style entertainment through other satellite channels which are mainly 
English. 
The evidence so far shows that the Turkish-speaking 'community' in London, indeed, 
has a transnational character. Yet, this, by no means, shows that being transnational 
has paramount effects on the Turkish-speaking young people's lives. 
5.3 Association between access to transnationational media and the young 
people's attitudes on various issues: 
As indicated before, the most challenging dimension of transnationalism on the 
immigrants' daily lives is easy access to their visual and written media, otherwise the 
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regular contact has always been a part of the immigrant communities. This is especially 
true for Turkish-speaking communities in European Union countries. These countries' 
proximity to Turkey and the fact that the most of the relatives live within the boundaries 
of the European Union, have always made travel easy. 
Besides, regular contact with relatives and co-villagers is more functional and essential 
in relation to the adult migrants, since according to the Transnationalists, their informal 
links provide them with economic as well as social solidarity. The economic dimension of 
this contact is not directly relevant to the Turkish-speaking young people's daily lives, 
since it is not them but their parents who participate in these activities directly. 
The influences of the media are especially well documented in relation to young people's 
lives in general. Kellner (1995: 162) suggests: 
Identity is mediated by mass-produced images in the contemporary media society, while 
image and cultural style is becoming ever more central to the construction of individual 
identities. Media culture provides a powerful source of new identities, replacing 
nationalism, religion, the family, and education as sources of identity. 
Moreover, in relation to the influence of popular music on young people, Ross (1994: 3) 
claims: 
The level of attention and meaning invested in music by youth is still unmatched by almost 
any other organized activity in society, including religion. As a daily companion, social 
bible, commercial guide and spiritual source, youth music is still the place of faith, hope 
and refuge. 
In a study of a London district, Southall, Baumann (1997: 210) observes that: 
The internal divisions by region could be multiplied, of course, by those of religion and 
intra-religious traditions, caste, migratory history, class, and numerous other factors. Yet 
the idea of Bhangra as an 'Asian music for Asians' consciously replaces these internal 
divisions by a shared external distinctiveness. 
The effect of media on young people is also observed for Turkish young people in 
Turkey. According to Sirman (1990: 35), in the village in Soke in the Aegean Region, the 
mass media, especially television, is affecting the eating and dressing habits of young 
girls who imitate the style of their favourite TV singers. 
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Given all these developments TV and Newspaper consumption has been chosen in 
order to discuss the relationship between transnational activities and Turkish-speaking 
young people's attitudes. As indicated in the first part of this chapter, it was the claim of 
transnationalisation students that the acceleration of interactions between migrants and 
home countries, especially since the mid 80s, has certain implications for identities, 
social lives and economic status in particular and thereby on the relations between 
migrants and the dominant society in general. 
In line with transnational claims, the relationship between the media and the young 
people's attitudes will be measured in nine categories: Britishness, inter-ethnic 
marriages, religious practices, having a room for praying in the schools, arranged 
marriages, extended families, family sizes, partner's job and, finally, economic exclusion. 
It will be argued that the implications of transnationalisation should not be exaggerated. 
As discussed in the first chapter, whether Turkish-speaking migrants regard themselves 
as Alevi, Sunni or Muslim is the product of long historical processes as expected of any 
ethnic or religious affiliations. Besides, as indicated in the second chapter, the structural 
transformation of family from traditional to modern forms also has a long historical 
background, and cannot simply be discussed within the limits of transnationalisation. In 
particular, parents being first generation migrants intrinsically includes the fact that their 
family structures have been well affected by development in Turkey, apart from the issue 
of transnationalisation. 
As can be seen in Table 5.6, there is indeed an association between access to Turkish/ 
Kurdish media and the young people's attitudes towards Britishness as an identity. 
Nearly half of the young people with no transnational media access chose Britishness as 
an identity, compared to about two out of ten of those with transnational media access. 
In relation to inter-ethnic marriages, although both categories of young people are less 
likely to prefer to marry somebody outside the Turkish-speaking 'community', the 
number is smaller for those who have no access to the Turkish/ Kurdish media. 
In this context, the transnationalism theorists might be right, when suggesting that 
transnationalism could influence the immigrants' lives. However, with respect to the 
practical implications of transnationalism, my research proves some limitations. In 
relation to the fasting practices of the young people for instance, there are no marked 
differences between those who have access to the Turkish media and those who do not. 
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Moreover, the pattern of indifference is repeated in the case of the young people's 
opinion on having a separate room for prayer in the schools. The young people's 
feelings about their families' intervention in their partner preferences also show 
similarities between those who have access to Turkish media and those who do not. 
Both categories of young people do not approve of the idea. Their negative attitudes on 
the issue of extended households also seems to have a limited connection with their 
access to transnational media technologies. And finally, the preference of Turkish- 
speaking young people for having fewer children in the future also has no relationship 
with access to the transnational media. 
However, the most important claim of the model might be the potential of the 
transnational social field to neutralise the negative effects of the dominant society and to 
protect the second generation young people from downward assimilation. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, Turkish-speaking young people did not predict their future job 
prospects as lying in professional employment, despite their high aspirations in this 
direction, instead believing that they might end up with similar employment to their 
parents in the future. Apart from those with professional fathers, the young people were 
pessimistic about their future opportunities. In this sense, it is reasonable to accept that 
if transnationalism is as advantageous as its advocates indicate, the young people who 
have regular access to Turkish home media, might be more confident about their job 
prospects, since they do not need to struggle any longer within the boundaries of the 
receiving country and might feel less exclusion due to existing disadvantaged economic 
conditions. 
Unfortunately, the opposite seems to be the case. As can be observed in Table 5.6, 
although both categories of young people, regardless of their access to transnational 
media, usually predict their future outside professional employment, the percentages 
with professional expectations among those with no transnational access is more than 
double those with transnational access. This pattern is also consistent in the case of 
visual media and written media access. Only one in six young people who watch Turkish 
or Kurdish TV predict professional occupations for their future employment prospects, 
compared to nearly one in four of those who do not watch Turkish or Kurdish TV. These 
proportions are much the same in the case of newspaper consumption. 
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In the light of these discussions, it becomes evident that having access to transnational 
media appears to have some association with less acceptance of British identity as one 
of indications of being adapted to the dominant society5. Even so, it seems that the 
relationship of transnational media with certain attitudes is much less close in other 
areas of the young people's lives. 
5 Of course there are difficulties in making these claims, because of possible differences within 
the Turkish-speaking 'community' which this thesis seeks to emphasise. Despite the very small 
numbers involved, an appendix has been added so that the reader may use data at the level of 
each sub-group. 
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No Access Access 
(112) 





Choosing Britishness as 
an identity 
14 42 18 35 18 49 
Choosin other identities 86 59 82 65 82 56 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Inter-ethnic Marriages 
Approved 28 40 21 45 25 45 
Not Approved 70 60 79 55 75 55 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Fasting 
Yes 45 51 53 45 52 43 
No 55 49 47 56 48 58 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Having a separate room for prayer in the school 
Approved 37 44 52 33 43 38 
Not Approved/Not Know 63 56 48 67 57 63 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Families' Intervention to the marriage 
Accepted 23 21 25 19 24 19 
Refused 77 79 75 81 76 81 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sharing the same household with their families after the marriage 
Accepted 13 10 12 12 12 11 
Refused 87 90 89 88 88 89 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Ideal Number of Children 
2 and less 59 61 58 62 58 64 
3 or more 41 39 43 39 42 36 




16 27 15 27 15 33 
non-professional Job 
Expectation 
84 73 85 73 85 66 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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5.4 Conclusion: 
In recent years, there has been increasing academic attention to what is called the 
transnationalisation of migrant communities in general and Turkish-speaking 
communities in particular. In this process, the advances in transportation systems, credit 
transactions amongst the ethnic minorities of different countries, and globalisation of 
ethnic-minority media have become the most often cited changes in regard to the 
transnationalisation of ethnic minority groups. In wider terms, it was stressed that such 
developments substantially reduce distances between ethnic minority communities and 
their relatives at home and in other countries. It is also indicated that transnationalisation 
alleviates the dependency of ethnic minorities on the social and economic conditions in 
receiving countries, which were working as a mechanism for the reproduction of their 
disadvantaged status. In this sense, the transnationalisation process is claimed to be a 
challenge to assimilation, especially the assimilation of younger generations, and an 
effective solution to their economic exclusion in receiving countries. 
In respect to such claims, this research investigated young people's attitudes on various 
issues in terms of their access to Turkish/Kurdish newspapers and television. It was 
found that there are certain indications that young people's attitudes are related with the 
transnationalisation of media. Most notably, the evidence might seem to suggest that 
watching Turkish/Kurdish television or reading Turkish/Kurdish newspapers is 
associated with young people's attitudes towards Britishness and inter-ethnic marriages. 
Those who have access to any of these or to both media facilities, had less tendency to 
describe themselves as British and to approve of inter-ethnic marriages. Accordingly, it 
is possible to say that these findings are consistent with assumptions regarding the 
implications of the transnationalisation process. Even so, however, my findings suggest 
that the implications of transnationalisation are not straightforward. 
First of all, despite more acceptability of Britishness amongst those who do not access 
transnational media, the identity issue cannot simply be discussed within the context of 
growing transnational activities in recent years as opposed to the assumption of 'a 
hitherto frozen country image in the past' (Robins 1999a: 4). As stipulated in the chapters 
on identity and education, young people's attitudes, especially in terms of religion, do not 
fit the stereotypical Muslim understandings: they were not strict followers of Islamic 
practices or strong proponents of religious incentives at schools. Such a divergence 
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cannot properly be understood without referring to the long-term historical background of 
religious and sectarian identity construction in Turkey. In this sense, young people's 
attitudes towards fasting or quiet places at schools do not vary according to their 
relationship with the globalisation of media. 
Nor can the specific attitudes to family structure be discussed within the short history of 
growing transnationalisation. As discussed in the family chapter, young people in 
general showed considerable opposition to arranged marriages, extended families and 
having more than two children. Given that their parents are mostly first generation 
migrants in the UK, their differences could not be reduced to the 'assimilationist effects' 
of the mainstream society, but can only be understood with a specific reference to the 
changing family structure in Turkey. Accordingly, the young people who access 
transnational media like those who do not, are considerably reluctant about arranged 
marriages, extended families and having more than two children. 
It is also worth mentioning that young people's predictions of their future economic 
prospects are not consonant with the rather optimistic expectations of scholars regarding 
the economic potential of transnationalisation. As discussed in the labour market 
chapter, most young people believe that they would not be able to acquire professional 
jobs in the future and that they will end up with disadvantaged jobs like their parents. 
Besides, as discussed in the education chapter, neither current education policies in 
general nor multi-culturalist incentives in particular, help to resolve young people's 
feelings that education would not help to achieve their occupational aspirations. 
Similarly, the analysis of students' responses does not suggest that those who have 
access to transnational media have more optimistic future-expectations. Ironically, it is 
those who are engaged only with the British media who appear to be more optimistic 
about their future careers. 
Broadly speaking, it is possible to argue that the lack of willingness amongst the young 
people who access transnational media to consider 'British' as their identity or to 
approve inter-ethic marriages, might suggest that transnationalisation affects young 
people. Even so, regarding attitudes towards religious issues and family structure, this 
study failed to find any difference between those who access transnational media and 
those who do not. While pinning their hopes on transnationalisation to save ethnic 
minorities from assimilation, transnationalisation models fail to capture the fact that, in 
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the case of Turkish-speaking communities, no proper analysis of the differences and 
similarities between home country and receiving country can be advanced without 
referring to widespread changes in Turkey. Likewise the hopes pinned on 
transnationalisation to bring the economic disadvantages of ethnic minorities to an end, 
are not confirmed by the less optimistic occupational predictions of young people who 
access transnational media when compared to those who do not. 
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Conclusion: 
In this part, I am not going to summarise the findings of my research in detail, as they 
can be found in the concluding parts to each chapter. Here I am drawing out several key 
issues and discussing some of their implications. A limited number of previous studies 
have either overly concentrated on Turkish Cypriot and Turkish young people, or 
overlooked the internal dynamics of the 'community'. The studies have identified a 
'Turkish' culture in contrast to a British one, defining the young people's situation as 
caught between two different cultures. By doing this, they have understood Turkish 
speaking young people's lives and aspirations within the contexts of the assimilation and 
integration debates. Furthermore, these studies usually analysed young people in an 
educational context and mentioned other issues such as family and employment only 
when relevant to the young people's school performance. Consequently, these studies 
revealed very little in terms of sectoral and religious differentiation and changes within 
the community arising from these internal dynamics. 
This thesis aimed to contribute to filling this gap. Yet as one of the first studies in the 
area, this one had its own weaknesses. Most notably, because of the lack of systematic 
information on Turkish-speaking communities, it was particularly concerned with 
providing basic information. Therefore, at times, the indicative features of the thesis have 
overweighed analytic discussions, although it has also attempted to link the empirical 
findings to theoretical debates on ethnicity. This study has not attempted to resolve the 
problems of young Turkish speaking people but to shed light on them. More than 
anything else, it has attempted to depict some of the key dimensions of the young 
people's lives, and what barriers they have had to overcome in order to survive, and how 
they have coped under the most difficult circumstances. In other words, this thesis has 
sought to identify how these young people live most of the time, and to set down what 
their aspirations, expectations and attitudes are towards certain issues, rather than show 
why they have these aspirations and attitudes. In this sense, this work might be 
considered a preliminary to later research. Another challenge for further research would 
be to extend the kind of analysis which has been presented here to include Turkish- 
speaking minorities in other countries, both in Europe, and in the classical immigration 
countries of the world such as Australia, America or New Zealand. 
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Apart from analysing these young people's lives and aspirations, my findings in this 
research have several implications in relation to the existing literature. First of all, the 
thesis has shown that it is difficult to identify a single Turkish and/or Muslim community. 
In this sense, it is possible to assume that diversity based on ethnic and religious 
differences exists within other ethnic minority communities, especially the so-called 
Muslim community in Britain. 
There are a number of differences based on ethnic and religious identity among Turkish 
speaking 'community' members. Until now, studies of ethnic and religious communities 
in general, and Muslim and Turkish communities in particular, have assumed a 
distinction between mainstream social values, held to be secular, western and/or 
Christian, and ethnic minority values, held to be religious, traditional and/or Muslim. They 
also argue that a Muslim family structure associated with extended family size, a higher 
level of solidarity and patriarchalism would not converge with the modern, nuclear and 
individualistic style of Western families. In relation to this understanding of ethnic 
minority communities, multi-culturalists have tended in recent years to claim that the 
educational failure of ethnic-minority students is because of the lack of recognition of 
their cultural assets in line with prevailing assimilation policies. This multi-culturalist 
understanding, like the theories on identity and family, has imposed its own ethnic and 
religious categories on some ethnic groups and then prescribed some cultural policies in 
line with these assumed cultural assets. 
No doubt, members of the Turkish-speaking 'community' are aware of their differences 
in comparison to members of the dominant society. Yet they are also more aware of the 
differences within the Turkish-speaking 'community'. The fragmented nature of the 
Turkish-speaking 'community' creates factions based on religious and ethnic identity. 
Consequently, the Turkish-speaking young people's ethnic and religious identities 
should not be analysed merely as a result of the conflict between the values of the 
mainstream society and the values of the Turkish-speaking 'community'. The sources of 
their ethnic and religious identity are the conflicts that have existed in the community for 
centuries. The Turkish-speaking young people in this study were Muslim Turks, Alevi 
Kurds or Cypriot Muslim Turks and had not begun to consider themselves members of a 
larger Muslim community or identify with other Muslim minorities living in Britain. In any 
situation, they retain their religious and ethnic identity as Muslim Turk, Alevi Kurd or 
Cypriot Muslim Turk. 
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In this sense, the relationship between religion and ethnicity is complex. They do not 
always go hand in hand. It is controversial to call all members of the Turkish-speaking 
'community' in London solely Muslim and Turkish. Making assumptions about religious 
identity is not a good starting point for analysis. When we assume a group's identity as 
Muslim, we can make three basic errors. Firstly, we can miss the differentiation at the 
level of self-identification of individuals. In other words, because somebody calls another 
a Muslim, it does not necessarily mean that they are a Muslim. Secondly, the practical 
implications of this identity can be missed. There are many differences in terms of 
religious practice. In other words, there are those who practice their religion and others 
who do not and this is an extra dimension of their identity. Finally, by assuming a group 
of people is Muslim, regardless of their differences, religious associations might be 
mistakenly taken to be the 'real' representatives of the community. 
A similar diversity has become evident in the analysis of ethnic minority families as well. 
Like the studies on ethnic and religious identities, research on ethnic minority families 
has also tended to emphasise the differences between secular western nuclear families 
and traditional ethnic minority families, while ignoring the existing diversity among the 
ethnic minority families. With reference to Muslim ethnic minority families in general, and 
the Turkish-speaking migrant families in particular, it is claimed by some writers that, 
even though ethnic minority young people are affected by the Western-style families of 
the dominant societies, such influences do not have any inevitable implications for their 
future life when they become 'full-time' Muslims. 
It is not only the identity and family studies, but the studies focused on the educational 
problems of ethnic minority children that also have a tendency to ignore the diversity 
within a particular group by imposing their own categories such as Muslim, or Turkish in 
the name of multi-culturalism. In the case of multi-culturalist education, in order to help 
explain the educational problems of ethnic minority children, a growing number of multi- 
culturalist scholars in recent years have claimed that the educational failure of ethnic- 
minority students is exacerbated by the lack of recognition of their cultural assets. 
However, when their suggestions regarding religious incentives in schools were 
analysed, it was seen that a significant proportion of the Turkish speaking children were 
reluctant to have a place in a school specifically designed for prayer. In line with this, 
those young people who did not fit classical typologies of being Muslim, felt they were 
not recognised as 'good Muslims'. 
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In relation to this current stereotypical understanding of Muslim identity and culture, this 
research has other implications relating to differences between the second generation 
and their parents. Among those who place a substantial emphasis on the distinctiveness 
of Muslim family structure, ethnic minority young people have usually been portrayed as 
being caught between their parents' traditional cultural values and modern values 
usually represented by the school system. This cultural clash supposedly creates a 
conflict between these young people and their parents. Consequently, there is real 
concern over the assimilationist effects of mainstream societies on young people. 
However, the present research showed that although differences between these young 
people and their parents existed, these differences could not only be encapsulated by 
the assimilation debate. There were a number of other factors such as the influence of 
changing family structures in Turkey and Cyprus, and the current labour market 
conditions in Britain creating these differences. Most importantly, these differences were 
negotiated by the young people and their parents. Despite the young people's ability to 
speak English (which gives them power over their non-English speaking parents, and 
creates the possibility of their becoming influenced by the family structure of the 
dominant society), there was a considerable attachment to traditional values. Most 
notably, attitudes towards pre-marital sexual relationships and inter-ethnic marriages 
were generally conservative. 
At the same time, however, young people had in many respects a markedly distinct 
attitude from traditional understanding. The majority of young people did not want to 
have more than two children in their future families. They were strongly opposed to 
arranged marriages and they even claimed they would marry someone if necessary at 
the expense of earning their parents' disapproval. They were also rather reluctant to live 
in extended families. It was also encouraging to observe that girls in particular had 
positive attitudes towards women remaining employed after they had married. More 
importantly, however, it appears to be rather difficult to portray these young people's 
attitudes as simply the rhetorical repetition of the mainstream society's family values 
before they 'become a full time Muslim'. Although such ambitions might be regarded as 
the implications of the dominant society's influences, young people's attitudes were not 
basically different from those of their own parents. Given that most families are first- 
generation in the UK, such differences from the conventional Muslim family image 
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cannot be understood simply as the assimilationist effects of the mainstream society. It 
is crucial to take into account the changing family structure in Turkey and Cyprus. 
The same fixed notion of traditional culture has also been evident in transnationalisation 
studies. While celebrating transnationalisation as a solution to the problems of 
assimilation, transnationalists ignore the fact that those exposed to transnational media 
do not simply see a home country which is 'frozen in the past' (Robins 1999a: 4), but a 
country which is, as discussed earlier, continuously changing in many aspects. In this 
sense, transnationalisation is not simply something which introduces fixed values but a 
transition process in Turkey. 
There was also another difference between young people and their parents in terms of 
the young people's economic aspirations and their parents' current economic situations. 
My research revealed that these young people certainly do not have low aspirations and 
have no intention of filling their parents' places in the labour market. Nevertheless, the 
thesis also shows that upward mobility is not an easy target for generations of migrants, 
especially if current labour market transformations are taken into account. It also 
became clear that the Turkish-speaking young people's perceptions of their economic 
prospects were clearly related to their parent's economic situation and their exclusion in 
the labour market. In fact, the parents' economic positions were not uniform and varied 
in terms of their places of origin, although they were located in the same deprived labour 
market and were dependent on the ethnic network to find employment. The Turkish- 
speaking young people were able to evaluate the situation and did not want to end up 
with similar jobs as their parents, although at the same time they thought their 
alternatives were considerably limited and that the situation might push them into 
undesired occupations. As a result, it was argued that existing differences between the 
young people and their parents could not simply be explained In the context of the 
assimilation debate, rather they should be considered in the light of the wider 
implications of the social changes in their places of origin and the current economic 
situation in Britain. 
Apart from emphasising the ethnic and religious diversity and the need for a more 
comprehensive understanding of generational differences, another implication of this 
study related to young people's gender identity and gender differences in their attitudes 
towards various issues. Throughout the research, every single subject was also 
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analysed in terms of gender differences. For instance, their involvement with religion 
was not simply a matter of where they were from or the sects to which they felt they 
belonged. It also depended on whether they were male or female and whether their 
mother and father practised religion or not. In addition, although the working conditions 
were somewhat hard for the young people, both boys and girls, and the boys who 
helped their self-employed fathers after school hours worked very long hours, the 
demands were very extensive for girls with part-time jobs, since they also had to help 
their mothers with domestic tasks, regardless of the part-time jobs they might have had. 
Furthermore, in the family chapter, it was argued that gender identity is not a simple 
result of conflict between two cultures: western and traditional. In fact, gender identities 
are negotiated between young men and women within the community. They not only had 
ideas about their roles and obligations in relation to their own gender, but they expected 
certain roles and obligations from the opposite gender as well. In other words, the girls 
not only defined what an ideal woman should be, but also defined how an ideal man 
should behave. This was the case for the boys as well. Moreover, these roles and 
expectations included both public and private spheres. In other words, the women's 
roles were not only defined in relation to the home, but outside it too. Likewise, the 
men's roles included both family and public obligations. 
Another important implication of this thesis might be the subject of hybrid identities and 
inter-ethnic relations. In relation to being British, Turkish speaking young people felt that 
even if somebody was born in this country, she or he could not become British in the 
cultural sense. On the other hand, when they visited their country of origin, they felt 
different to the rest of the population and this difference originated in the country of birth, 
namely Britain. In this sense, it is difficult to talk about the existence of hybrid identities 
such as British Turk or British Muslim in the case of Turkish speaking young people. 
They still felt themselves Muslim Turk, Alevi Turkish Kurd and Muslim Turkish Cypriot. 
In relation to cultural hybridity, their preferences for using a mixed form of Turkish and 
English languages as discussed in the family chapter, might be deemed to support the 
existence of cultural hybridity. However, apart from using the mixed language for the 
purpose of escaping from their parents' authority, this supposedly cultural hybridity factor 
was not detected in their friendship patterns or their attitudes towards inter-ethnic- 
marriages. Turkish speaking young people had reservations about some ethnic groups 
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in terms of friendship and inter-ethnic marriages and, in fact, the actual social 
boundaries around the Turkish speaking children might even not cross the inner 
boundaries of the sub-communities. Furthermore, young people's identities and their 
attitudes towards inter-ethnic and inner-ethnic relations had been influenced by historical 
and social developments in Turkey and Cyprus. For instance, unlike others, Cypriot 
young people were more aware of their differences from Greek Cypriots, while Turkish 
and Kurdish young people emphasised the importance of being Muslim or Alevi. 
A final implication of this thesis is that it is necessary to analyse the effects of the wider 
economic exclusion of ethnic minority communities for a comprehensive understanding 
of the young people's lives and aspirations. The existing approaches often pay little 
attention to this issue. For instance, the evidence presented in this study suggests that 
Turkish-speaking students' educational problems cannot be entirely encapsulated into 
cultural debates. One also needs to take into account the implications of the economic 
exclusion of families on students' school-life in order to understand their problems. This 
became most evident when the case of the work experience scheme was analysed. It 
was found that most of the students were ostensibly 'placed' in the small-shops of the 
Turkish-speaking 'community' for which they were already working on a part-time basis. 
Accordingly, they had the feeling that education would not bring exclusion to an end in 
their future-life. Schemes such as work experience which inadvertently reinforce 
students' cultural identification with their own community appear to exacerbate 
exclusion. 
Moreover, the analysis of the position of Turkish-speaking communities in the labour 
market showed that the current structural changes in developed market economies bring 
about severe disadvantages to immigrant communities in terms of employment 
opportunities. Most of them are pushed towards self-employment or other forms of 
informal community employment in the ethnic enclave labour markets. The 
unemployment and non-professional employment are more common among the Kurds 
and none of them have professional occupations. Turkish families might be situated in a 
better condition, compared to Kurds. The unemployment among the Turks is less than 
the Kurds and there are some Turkish professional fathers. Cypriot families might be the 
most advantaged group in the Turkish speaking community with the small number of 
unemployment and more professional occupations. Yet even they are still pretty much 
dependent on the ethnic labour market. It is also true for professional employees. 
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Beside, self-employment is much more common among the Cypriot fathers, and shop or 
clothing factory ownership has its own risk and restrictions to be handled. 
Despite all their disadvantages, the Turkish-speaking young people's aspirations are 
clearly high, though they do not expect to achieve their aims. The differences between 
their aspirations and predictions should not be interpreted to mean that they were 
unrealistic about their prospects. On the contrary, this difference showed that they had a 
great level of understanding of what was going on around them. In fact, none of the 
young people wanted to work in clothing factories or small shops and none of those with 
self-employed fathers wanted to be self-employed. In the end, Turkish speaking young 
people feel that the exclusion in the current employment market is pushing them to make 
a choice: Whether to accept the jobs which their parents already do or attempt to make 
their futures better. 
Broadly speaking, the young people's lives, identities and aspirations were structured by 
a multiplicity of ideological, cultural and structural factors, such as the impact of the 
global and the national economy on the local labour markets; social and cultural 
developments in Turkey and Cyprus; moral and cultural assumptions about women's 
and men's position in relation to the family, caring responsibilities and paid work; young 
people's own social and political perspectives on such issues, that is, how they might 
feel as well as think about them; and the role of education in the social construction of 
limited job expectations. In other words, economic, cultural, and social factors are all 
implicated. They are all integral to the framework of the analysis I have utilised 
throughout this thesis. And their combined effect, as I here tried to show, is that it is not 
sufficient to label them all 'Turks' as to assume that they share some larger and 






2-How old are you? 3-How many years have you been in England? 
4-Is your mother alive? Yes No 
5-Is your father alive? Yes No 
6-Could you tell me who in your family is living in your house? 
Mother Father Sisters- The number of Brothers-The number of and 
and ages: ages: 
Grandmother Grandfather Mother's Brother Father's Brother Mother's 
sister 
Father's sister Cousins- the number Uncle's wife Others (please, specify) 
of 
7-Do you have any other relatives in England? Yes No 
If you have, could you tell me who they are? 
Sisters- The number of and ages: Brothers-number. of and ages: 
Grandmother Grandfather Mother's Father's Brother Mother's sister 
Brother 
Father's sister Cousins- the number Uncle's wife Others (please, specify) 
of 
8- a) Where is your father from, please indicate the region? 
the name of the city and/or village 
b) Where is your mother from, please indicate the region? 
the name of the city and/or village 
9- Did you always live there, if no where did you live? 
a) the name of the city and/or village 
b) Who came to England, first? 
Father Mother Father&Mother 
Some brothers and/or sisters and the parents Whole Family 
Other (Specify) 
c) How long ago your parents had arrived to England before you came here? 
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10- Which educational level did you complete in Turkey or Cyprus? 
Primary Left Primary Secondary Left Secondary 
Higher Left Higher Other (Specify) 
11-Have you ever interrupted your education? Yes No 
12-If you had, why? 
I now want to ask a few questions about your parents' work: 
13-Does your father have a job in England? Yes No 
14-What is his job? (Please give as much detail as you can) 
a) where? (eg. factory, office, shop ......... ) 
b) What kind of work does he do there? (eg. ironer, owner, machinist, 
unemployed........ ) 
c)How many years does he do this job? 
d) How many days per a week does he work? 
e) How many hours per a day does he work? 
f) If your father works for an employer, where is his employer from? prompt. 
eg. Turkish, Turkish Cypriot ....................... 
g) What was your father previous job? please specify such as ironer, machinist, 
shop owner, unemployed etc. 
h) How many years did he do this job? 
i) How many days per a week did he work? 
n) How many hours per a day did he work? 
m) If your father worked for an employer, where was his employer from? 
prompt. eg. Turkish, Turkish Cypriot ....................... 
15-Does your mother have a paid job in England? Yes No 
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16-What is her job? (Please give as much detail as you can) 
a) where? (eg. factory, office, shop , home......... ) 
b) What kind of work does she do there? (ironer, owner, machinist,......... ) 
c)How many years does she do this job? 
d) How many days per a week does she work? 
e) How many hours per a day does she work? 
f) If your mother works for an employer, where is her employer from? prompt. 
eg. Turkish, Turkish Cypriot ....................... 
g) What was your mother previous job? please specify such as ironer, machinist, 
shop owner, housewife etc. 
h) How many years did she do this job? 
i) How many days per a week did she work? 
n) How many hours per a day did she work? 
m) If your mother worked for an employer, where was her employer from? 
prompt. eg. Turkish, Turkish Cypriot ....................... 
17-Many school students have paid jobs these days, do you work part-time? 
Yes No 
18- Do you do any work for money? 
Yes No 
a) When do you usually do this? 
Weekends Summer Holidays After School Fridays 
Other (specify) 
b) What are you doing? (working in a factory, a shop, a travel agency etc) 
c) How many hours in a day on average in term time? 
19- Is the person you work for a relative or a family friend?, if it is so, who is he or she? 
(uncle, aunt, father, mother etc) 
20-If you work, Can you keep your money yourself? Yes No 
If it is NO, do you give it to your father your mother 
a) Do you participate in any Work Experience Scheme (WES) in the school? 
Yes No 
b) If you did, where did you work? in the factory, in a barber shop, in an off licence etc. 
c) Who found this job for you? school, your family, yourself etc. 




e) If so, what sort of job would you like to do? factory work, off licence, shops etc. 
f) are there any other working people in your family, apart from you, your mother and 
father? such as brothers, sisters etc. If so, who they are, what are their jobs. 
SECTION 2: 
21- How many years after arriving in England, did you start at school? 
Less than one year 1-2 years 3-4 years more than five years 
22-Please could you compare your performance in school in England with Turkey? Are 
you: 
Much More Successful A Little Bit More Successful About the Same 
A Little bit less Successful A Great Deal Less Successful 
23-Which subject or subjects in the school do you like most? 
24-Why? Prompt: teachers/ easy/ content/ language 
25- Which subject or subjects don't you like at all? 
26- Why? 
27- In the school, do you prefer to have better contact with female teachers or male 
teachers? Women Men I don't mind 
28- Why? we are from the same sex, women or men can understand you better, they 
are both teacher etc. 
29-What kind of qualifications do you hope to get? 
a) how many GCSEs do you have or think to have? 
b) how many of them do you think would be grade C and above? 
c) are you retaking any GCSEs? Yes No 
30- Yr. 10/11 What will you do at the end of yr. 11? 
Yr. 12/13 What will you do at the end of this year? 
SECTION 3: 
31- What do you want to be in the future? 
32- What do you think you will really do? 
33-What is the possibility of having the job that you want? 
No possibility Very small possibility So so 
strong possibility Very strong possibility 
34- How likely is it for you to get a regular full time job? 
No possibility Very small possibility So so 
strong possibility Very strong possibility 
35-Do you hope to go to Turkey or Cyprus and work there? Yes No 
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36-In the future, the house you want to live: 
In which city In which area 
37- How much money do you want to earn PER Week or month in the future? 
38- If you have a lot of money, what would you like to do? 
39- When you earn your own money, do you want to : 
live with your family? or have your own house? 
40-Do you want to marry in the future? Yes No 
41- At what age would you like to marry? 
42- How many children would you like to have? 
43- What would your ideal partner's job be? 
44- Do you think that you will have a common budget with your partner in the future? 
Yes No 
45-If you have a daughter in the future, what sort of a job, do you want her to have? 
46-If you have a son in the future, what sort of a job do you like him to have? 
SECTION 4: 
47- Do you celebrate holy holidays (bayrams)? Yes No Sometimes 
48- Do you celebrate new year? Yes No Sometimes 
49- Does your father go to the mosque? Yes No 
50- If he does, does he go: 
Every day Fridays Holy days 
Ramadan Fridays and Holy days Fridays and 
Ramadan 
Holy days and Holy days, Fridays and 
Ramadan Ramadan 
51- Does your father fast? Yes No 
52- Does your mother pray? Yes No 
53- If she does, does she pray: 
Sometimes 
Every day Fridays Holy days 
Ramadan Fridays and Holy days Fridays and 
Ramadan 
Holy days and Holy days, Fridays and 
Ramadan Ramadan 
54- Does she fast? Yes No Sometimes 
55- Do you go to the mosque here? Yes No 
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56- If you do, do you go: 
Every day Fridays Holy days 
Ramadan Fridays and Holy days Fridays and 
Ramadan 
Holy days and Holy days, Fridays and 
Ramadan Ramadan 
57- Do you pray here? 
58- If you do, do you pray: 
Yes No 
Every day Fridays Holy days 
Ramadan Fridays and Holy days Fridays and 
Ramadan 
Holy days and Holy days, Fridays and 
Ramadan Ramadan 
59- Do you fast here? Yes No 
60- Should there be a quiet place in school for Muslims to go? 
61- Would you like that? 
Yes No Not know 
Yes No I don't mind 
62- Which language do you speak with your parents? 
63-Which language do you speak with your brothers and sisters, if you have any? 
64- Which place in Turkey or Cyprus does your best Turkish-speaking friend come from? 
Sivas, Lefkose etc. 
65- If you have ever had a foreign friend, where is s/he from? 
I haven't got any English Scottish 
Irish Welsh Indian 
Chinese, Vietnamese Caribbean African 
Greek Greek Cypriot Other (specify) 
Pakistani 
66- Could you look at the card again, are there any countries where you never want to 
have a friend at all? 
haven't got any English Scottish 
Irish Welsh Indian 
Chinese, Vietnamese Caribbean African 
Greek Greek Cypriot Other (specify) 
Pakistani 
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67- What group do you want your wife/husband to come from? 
I haven't of any English Scottish 
Irish Welsh Indian 
Chinese, Vietnamese Caribbean African 
Greek Greek Cypriot Other (specify) 
SECTION 5: 
Pakistani 
68- What are the names of your favourite television programmes? (Turkish and English 
please) 
69- Which newspapers if any do you read? 
70- Who is your favourite film star? 
71- Do you have a boyfriend or girlfriend? Yes No 
72- Where is she/he from? 
73- What is your favourite song? 
74- Who is your favourite singer? 
75- What is a 'good man' in terms of your criteria? 
76- What is a 'good woman' in terms of your criteria? 
77- Do you ever go to the First Zone (Central London)? Yes No 
78- How often? 
Every day At least once in a week At least once in a month 
every three months every six months every year 
79- Do you go to the holidays to Turkey or Cyprus? Yes No 
80- When did you go to there last time? 
81- Which parts of Turkey or Cyprus have you seen in these holidays? 
82-Have you ever been to any other country than England? Yes 
No 
a) If yes, which countries are they? 
b) For what reason have you been to these countries? seeing your relatives, family 
holiday, going with friends etc. 
c) Do you have any relatives living in other countries apart from England, Turkey and 
Cyprus such as Germany, France etc.? If you have please could you specify who lives 
where? 
83- Have you ever been anywhere in GB apart from London? Yes No 
84- Where? 
b) For what reason have you been there? family holidays, visiting relatives, going with 
friends etc. 
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85-Which category below do you feel best fits your identity? 
Turk Kurd Turkish Kurd British 
British Turk British Kurd Middle Eastern Other (sped 
Cypriot Turkish Cypriot Kurdish Cypriot 
86- Which category below do you feel best fits your identity? 
Muslim Christian Alevi 
Atheist Other 
(specify) 
87- Which category do you wish your husband/wife to belong to? 
Muslim Christian Alevi 
Atheist Other 
(specify) 
88- Which category fits your best friend? 
Muslim Christian Alevi 
Atheist Other (specify) 
89- Which category below do you feel best fits your identity? 
Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese Indian other group 
white black 
Caribbean 
black African black other 
90- Which category do you wish your husband/wife to belong to? 
Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese Indian other group 
white black 
Caribbean 
black African black other 
91- Which category fits your best friend? 
Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese Indian other group 
white black 
Caribbean 
black African black other 
92- Which category below do you feel is closest to your identity? 
Traditional or Modern or something else (specify) 
Why? your clothes, music, your family etc. 
93- Which category do you wish your husband/wife to belong to? 
Why? clothes, music, family etc. 
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94- Which category fits your best friend? 
Why? clothes, music, family etc. 
95- Do you smoke cigarettes? Yes No 
96- Can you smoke in front of your family? Yes No 
Only with my mother 
97-Do any of the people you know ( and I don't want to know who they are) use drugs? 
Yes No 
98- Where? School Your street 
Outside Other (specify) 
99- Do you think there should be more freedom for drug usage? Yes No 
100- Why do you think so? 
101- Do you give some parties in your home? Yes No 
102- How many times in a year do you go to societies (such as TYA- Turkish Youth 
Association)? 
Every day At least once in a week At least once in a month 
every three months every six months every year 
103- Which one do you go? 
104- Do you have a satellite dish in your home? Yes No 
SECTION 6: General Views 
105- If your family do not accept your marriage with somebody, what will you do? 
I do not marry I marry against my family wish Other (specify) 
106- If you marry in the future, do you want to live with your family or your partners' 
family in the same house? Yes No Not know 
107- Do you think it is a good idea for couples to live in the same house before 
marriage? Yes No Not know 
108- Do you think you can do that? Yes No Not know 
109- Can you accept it if your child does that? Yes No Not know 
110-Do you think it is OK for people to have children without marriage? 
Yes No Not know 
111-Can you do that? Yes No Not know 
112- If your child does that, how would you respond? 
a- I support him/her, I try to help him/her. 
b- I refuse to see him/her again. 
c-I force them to marry 
d-I beat them, then accept them 
e-other (specify) 
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113- If you have a son who is going to have a child without marriage, is it different for 
you to have a daughter in the same condition? Yes No 
Why? 
114-Would you like to vote in the future? Yes No 
115- Which party would you like to vote for? 
116- In the future, which language do you think you will speak with your children? 
Turkish Kurdish English Other (specify) 
117- In the future, do you think you will go to Turkey or Cyprus for holidays? Yes No 
118- Here are some descriptions of homeless people. Read them all. Which ones do you 
agree with? 
a- They are alcoholic and drug addicts. 
b- They have no place in the society and they are dangerous. 
c- They are parasites living with the tax payments' money. 
d- The have no families or relatives to protect them. 
e- They are forced by the society to live like this. 
f- The government does not help them, so they have to live under these 
conditions. 
- They are ready to change their conditions, if they have good opportunities. 
i- Other (specify) 
119- Here are some descriptions of unemployed people. Read them all. Which ones do 
you agree with? 
a- they don't have a good education. 
b- they choose the wrong occupation for themselves. 
c- they do not try hard enough to find a job. 
d- the do not have the powerful relatives or friends who can help them. 
e- compared to other people, they are less intelligent and have less ability. 
f- they are lazy. 
g- the Government does not provide enough opportunities for them. 
h- the employers do not treat all applicants equally, they make discriminations in 
terms of age, sex or race. 
i- Other (specify). 
120- What do you think three biggest problems will be in the world in the future? 
War Unemployment Unequal development 
between the nations 
Population increase 
Poverty Pollution Global warming Other (specify) 
Starvation Education Disease Health 
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121- Could you tell me whether you agree or disagree with the sentences below? 
a- There is no discipline over children in English families. Agree Disagree 
b- Children have more freedom in English families. Agree Disagree 
c- the respect between family members in English families is low. Agree Disagree 
d- the English families are more supportive of their children's education. 
Agree Disagree 
e- the English fathers are softer than the mothers. Agree Disagree 
f- in the English families, the men do some domestic jobs. Agree Disagree 
g- the harmony among the family members in English families is less. 
Agree Disagree 
122- Sometimes women deserve beating, Agree Disagree 
123- Why? 
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Choosing Britishness as 
an identity 
15 13 39 45 19 18 38 32 21 16 41 47 
Choosin other identities 85 87 61 55 81 82 62 68 79 84 59 53 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Inter-ethnic Marriages 
Approved 8 39 38 36 16 34 33 41 14 39 41 35 
Not Approved 92 61 63 64 84 66 67 59 86 61 59 65 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Fasting 
Yes 67 31 52 50 77 30 43 46 75 32 35 53 
No 33 69 48 50 23 71 57 54 25 68 65 47 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Having a separate room for prayer In the school 
Approved 26 25 31 21 30 25 28 22 30 25 28 21 
Not Approved/Not Know 74 75 69 79 70 75 72 78 70 75 72 79 
Total 100 100 100 100 100J 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Families' Intervention to the marriage 
Accepted 39 13 23 17 37 14 23 15 37 13 20 18 
Refused 62 87 77 83 63 86 77 85 63 87 80 82 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sharing the same household with their families after the marriage 
Accepted 5 18 6 17 9 14 3 20 7 16 4 21 
Refused 95 82 94 83 91 86 97 80 93 84 96 79 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Ideal Number of Children 
2 and less 67 54 59 64 65 50 60 64 65 52 59 71 
3 or more 33 46 41 36 35 50 40 36 35 48 41 29 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Employment Exclusion 
professiorýal Job Bpecbfion 18 15 25 31 19 11 25 29 18 13 28 38 
Job Expeclation 82 85 75 69 81 89 75 71 83 87 72 62 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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News a ers 
Transnational 
Turkish Media 




No Access Access No Access 
(8) 
Britishness 
Choosing Britishness as 
an identity 
12 20 (2) 10 20 12 29 (2) 
Choosing other identities 88 80(8) 90 80 89 71(6) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Inter-ethnic Marriages 
Approved 27 30(3) 23 30 26 29(2) 
Not Approved 74 70 (7) 77 70 74 71 6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Fasting 
Yes 37 40(4) 42 33 41 21(2) 
No 63 60(6) 58 68 59 79(6) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Having a separate room for prayer In the school 
Approved 21 2-0-(2) 15 25 18 29(2) 
Not Approved/Not Know 79 80(8) 85 75 82 71(6) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Families' Intervention to the marriage 
Accepted 22 30(3) 25 23 23 29(2) 
Refused 78 70-(7) 75 78 77 71(6) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sharing the same household with their families after the marriage 
Accepted 12 100) 12 8 10 7(1) 
Refused 88 90(9) 89 93 90 93(7) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Ideal Number of Children 
2 and less 57 60(6) 60 58 58 64 5 
3 or more 43 40 (4) 40 43 42 36(3) 




10 20 (2) 12 15 10 29 (2) 
_ non-professional Job 
Expectation 
90 80 (8) 89 85 90 71(6) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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News a ers 
Transnational 
Turkish Media 
Access No Access 
(10) 
Access No Access 
(11) 
Access No Access 
Britishness 
Choosing Britishness as 
an identity 
8 80 (8) 41 59 (6) 33 77 (5) 
Choosing other identities 92 20(2) 59 41(5) 67 23(2) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Inter-ethnic Marriages 
Approved 23 50 (5) 41 35 4 38 39(3) 
Not Approved 77 50(5) 59 65 7 62 62(4) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Fasting 
Yes 77 80(8) 77 77(8) 81 
__q"5) No 23 20(2) 24 24(3) 19 31 2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Having a separate room for prayer in the school 
Approved 46 40(4) 53 35(4) 52 31 2 
Not Approved/Not Know 54 60(6) 47 65(7) 48 69(5) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Families' Intervention to the marriage 
Accepted 23 20(2) 29 12(2) 24 15 1 
Refused 77 80(8) 71 88(9) 76 85(6) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sharing the same household with their families after the marriage 
Accepted 8 10(l) 6 12(2) 10 81 
Refused 92 90(9) 94 88(9) 91 92(6) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Ideal Number of Children 
2 and less 62 60(6) 59 65(7) 62 62(4) 
3 or more 39 40(4) 41 35(4) 38 39(3) 




15 20 (2) 12 29 (3) 10 39 (3) 
non-professional Job 
Expectation 
85 80 (8) 88 71 (8) 91 62 (4) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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No Access Access 
(13) 
No Access Access No Access 
Britishness 
Choosing Britishness as 
an identity 
29 (5) 33 14 (2) 35 25 34 
Choosing other identities 71(12) 67 86(11) 65 75 66 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Inter-ethnic Marriages 
Approved 43(7) 40 47 25 45 
Not Approved 57(10) 61 100(13) 54 75 55 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Fasting 
Yes 57(10) 40 57 7 40 58 37 
No 43(7) 61 43(6) 61 42 63 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Having a separate room for prayer In the school 
A roved 14(2) 30 43 (6) 26 25 29 
Not Approved/Not Know 86(15) 70 57(7) 74 75 71 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Families' Intervention to the marriage 
Accepted 29(5) 21 29(4) 21 33 18 
Refused 71(12) 79 71 9 79 67 82 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sharing the same household with their families after the marriage 
Accepted 14(2) 12 29(4) 9 17 11 
Refused 86(15) 88 71(9) 91 83 90 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Ideal Number of Children 
2 and less 57(10) 65 29(4) 70 50 68 
3 or more 43(7) 35 71(9) 0 -50 32 




71(12) 33 43 (6) 37 58 32 
non-professional Job 
Expectation 
29 (5) 67 57 (7) 63 42 68 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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APPENDIX TABLE 5: Access to Transnational Media and Mixed Origin Young 




















Choosing Britishness as 
an identity 
25 (4) 45 (6) 27 (4) 47 (6) 27 (5) 53 (7) 
Choosin other identities 75(13) 55(7) 73(12) 53(8) 73(13) 47(5) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Inter-ethnic Marriages 
Approved 25 (4) 33 (4) 27(4) 32(4) 27 5 33(4) 
Not Aroved 75 13 67 9 73 12 68 (10) 1 73 13 67(8) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Fasting 
Yes 45 8 61 8 64 (10) 1 53 8 60 (111 1 53 7 
No 55 (9) 39 (5) 36 6 47 (6) 40 7 47 (5) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Having a separate room for prayer in the school 
Approved 33 (6) 17 (2) 36 (6) 16 (2) 40(7) 70) 
Not Approved/Not Know 67(11) 83 11 64 10 84 12 60(11) 93(11) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Families' Intervention to the marriage 
Accepted 25 4 11 1 18 3 16(2) 20(4) 13(2) 
Refused 75 (13) 89 (12) 82 (13) 84 (12) 80(14) 87(10) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sharing the same household with their families after the marriage 
Accepted 25 (4) 17 (2) 9(1) 26(3) 20(4) 13(2) 
Refused 75 13 83 11 91 15 74 11 80(14) 87 10 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Ideal Number of Children 
2 and less 67 (11) 55 (7) 64 (10) -53(8) 60(11) 53(7) (7) 
more 336 456 366 476 407 475 




17 (3) 28 (4) 18 (3) 26 (3) 13 (2) 33 (4) 
_ non-professional Job 
Ex ectation 
83(14) 72(9) 82(13) 74(11) 87 (16) 67(8) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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